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I. INTRODUCTION
More than half a century has passed since the New Deal, the era known
for ushering in the modem administrative state, where broad-sweeping
regulatory powers were delegated to over a dozen new executive agencies
pursuant to a raft of social legislation. Until the later years of the New Deal,
courts were highly suspicious of socially progressive legislation, and, for that
matter, any legislation that upset common law systems supporting private
property rights and freedom of contract. Regulatory enactments were
especially vulnerable to invalidation for delegating policy-making authority to
an executive agency or other non-legislative entity. Such delegations were
considered a constitutional offense under the nondelegation principle of
separation of powers.
As the regulatory state grew, fueled by increasingly complex societal
needs and technological advances, standards of judicial review were
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developed to curtail abuses of agency discretion. Meanwhile, the
nondelegation doctrine receded into the dustbin of Lochner Era
jurisprudence.2 Since the New Deal, the nondelegation doctrine has been,
for all practical purposes, a dead letter. The delegation of regulatory details
to executive agencies, far from impairing the constitutional prerogatives of
Congress, is now generally recognized as promoting efficient and effective
government. So long as Congress provides policy objectives and some
standards to guide the agency, along with procedural safeguards to ensure
due process and unbiased decision-making, delegations have not triggered
constitutional concerns. Contemporary courts have rarely questioned even
the most extensive grants of power to federal executive agencies, viewing
nondelegation arguments as "barely worthy of a footnote." 3
Yet just last year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, a court
widely recognized as the veritable hub of administrative law jurisprudence,
opened a new chapter in the post-New Deal era by breathing life into the
nondelegation doctrine. In American Trucking Ass 'ns v. EPA,4 the court held
that the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") had overstepped its
constitutional boundaries and usurped legislative prerogatives in issuing
national ambient air quality standards ("NAAQS") for ground-level ozone
and particulate matter under the Clean Air Act.' According to the court, the
decision was unconstrained by any "intelligible principle," even though the
EPA had considered a full range of data regarding the air quality level
"requisite to protect public health" with an "adequate margin of safety," as
directed by this detailed and comprehensive statute.6
At the heart of the American Trucking decision lies the court's belief that,
absent clear congressional parameters, an executive agency like the EPA
would have unbridled power to send entire industries hurtling over the brink
of economic ruin. Although the court couched its decision in terms of a
search for intelligible principles, upon closer scrutiny, the opinion seems to
have little to do with a lack of legislative or administrative standards.
2. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1904); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS
HONORABLE COURT 78-81, 132 (1985). During the Lochner Era (circa 1905-1937), redistributive
laws, such as legislation regulating hours of employment and the use of child labor, were routinely
invalidated as interfering with the freedom to contract and substantive due process guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
3. Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 89 F.3d 1269, 1283 n.17 (6th Cir. 1996) (Boggs, J.,
dissenting) (citing United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817, 823 n.8 (8th Cir. 1977).
4. 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999), modified on petition for reh'g, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir.
1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000); 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000).
5. Id. at 1033-34.
6. Id. at 1034-35; see Clean Air Act § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1994).
32:941]
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Instead, the opinion implicitly rests on dual themes, both of which were
commonly found in pre- and early New Deal cases.
The first theme views regulatory legislation effectuated by agency
delegatees as too likely to upset settled expectations based on common law
property and contract doctrines, adversely and arbitrarily affecting state and
private interests and potentially tearing the fabric of the entire American
economy. Although this concern was prevalent during the Lochner years,
the D.C. Circuit failed to take note of the dramatic change in administrative
ground rules, and the advent of procedural safeguards against arbitrary
executive action, dictated by the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.'
Judicial review of executive decisions was not a particularly meaningful
alternative when the early nondelegation decisions were handed down. The
Administrative Procedure Act's safeguards promote agency accountability
and reasoned decision-making by providing a more regular and effective role
for both the public and the judiciary.
The second judicial motif is more subtle, though it too is reminiscent of
an earlier line of jurisprudence. The American Trucking court scrutinized
the Clean Air Act with what appears to be an especially acute sensitivity to
the broad and pervasive federal role fostered by laws enacted under the
auspices of the Commerce Clause. A restrictive view of Commerce Clause
power enjoyed its heyday in the federal courts throughout the Lochner Era.
But, like Lochner and the nondelegation doctrine, this approach had been
dormant, if not defunct, until the mid-1990s, when the Supreme Court lent
its imprimatur to a resurgence. In the past five years, several congressional
enactments have been struck down as beyond the scope of the Commerce
Clause powers,' and for a variety of related federalism concerns. 9
Both doctrinal threads woven through the American Trucking decision are
consistent with a developing pattern where the judiciary more frequently, and
in a wide range of contexts, reins in federal regulatory programs that affect
the economic and sovereign interests of the states and the bottom line of
business concerns. Whether the trend is characterized as the resurrection of
federalism or of nondelegation, "history seems to be recycling," to borrow a
7. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), amended by 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706
(1994).
8. E.g., United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1759 (2000) (invalidating the Violence
Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free
School Zones Act).
9. E.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 649-50 (2000) (concluding that
Congress could not abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit under Age
Discrimination in Employment Act); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905-22 (1997)
(invalidating a provision of the Brady Act on grounds that it imposed unconstitutional obligations on
state officers to execute federal laws).
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phrase from Justice Souter.' ° Seen in this light, American Trucking may be
but another example of a conservative backlash against redistributive
legislation, and more generally, big government. If so, perhaps the decision
can be limited in scope to regulatory statutes like the Clean Air Act, enacted
pursuant to the Commerce Clause, with pervasive effects on the entire
American economy. While this leaves numerous environmental and social
welfare statutes open to attack, it may effectively insulate other important
governmental programs from challenges of this sort.
This article has two objectives. First, it attempts to get to the bottom of
the concerns voiced in American Trucking and determine whether a strict
nondelegation principle, or some other principle of constitutional or
administrative law, best satisfies those concerns. This analysis examines the
parameters of a reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine in order to identify
those statutes most vulnerable to challenge and to assess whether those
statutes really do present a dilemma of constitutional dimension. The inquiry
focuses on legislative semantics (are there intelligible principles to confine
the agency's discretion?) as well as constitutional context (are certain kinds
of constitutional powers more likely to raise nondelegation concerns than
others?).
The second goal is to suggest a normative alternative for the review of
congressional delegations to executive branch entities. This proposal draws
upon well-known canons of administrative law, fashioning them into a two-
tiered analysis. Under the first prong, a court faced with an ambiguous
statutory provision should apply the presumption of implied delegation
handed down in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc," unless, given the overall context and subject matter of the statute at
issue, it is unlikely that Congress would have granted broad-sweeping
powers to the executive branch. If delegation can be implied, which it
should be in the majority of cases, the court must reject nondelegation
challenges, unless the delegation results in actual infringement of the core
prerogatives of another branch of government. Once this constitutional
threshold is met, the second prong of the proposal calls upon the court to
give heightened scrutiny to the agency's implementation of vague statutory
mandates to better ensure reasoned and unbiased decision-making and
accountability. In short, the proposed analytical framework attempts to
synthesize two fundamental principles of judicial review-Chevron deference
and Overton Park "hard look" review.'"
10. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1768.
11. 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
12 Id. at 842-43; Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
32:941]
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The article explores the historical and legal underpinnings of the
nondelegation doctrine before, during, and after the New Deal, along with
the rise of the administrative state and the role of executive agencies within
the constitutional framework, in Section II. Section III reviews the Supreme
Court's application of nondelegation, Commerce Clause, and federalism
jurisprudence over the years, and assesses the D.C. Circuit's opinion in
American Trucking against this backdrop. These first two sections
demonstrate that, although the nondelegation doctrine itself is an example of
anachronistic legal dogma, its objectives-safeguarding the separation of
powers and enhancing governmental accountability-are alive and well
today, and worthy of judicial attention, albeit through other legal
mechanisms.
The dangers of "strict" nondelegation review, based on a search for
intelligible principles as employed in the early New Deal cases and
resurrected in American Trucking, are highlighted in Section IV. Regulatory
statutes are loosely categorized and placed in a spectrum, ranging from least
to most discretionary, based on their legislative language. The spectrum
illustrates that, for the vast majority of regulatory provisions, whether the
standards expressed by Congress are intelligible is largely in the eyes of the
beholder. Section IV predicts that, if strict nondelegation review were to
become the law of the land, Congress may respond with a variety of tactics
to avoid the ambiguities and trade-offs that often result from the normal
legislative process. One such tactic may be to tack detailed legislative riders
onto appropriations bills, a practice which itself diminishes legislative
accountability and fosters a governmental imbalance of power. The potential
for such a response, along with the ad hoc nature of a nondelegation test
based on a "judicial fetish for legislative language,"" 3 set the stage for the
alternative proffered in the final two sections of the article.
Section V introduces the contextual Chevron-based alternative, and
examines it in light of two recent Supreme Court opinions, FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp.'4 and AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board."5
Both of these cases involved regulatory statutes that grant broad discretionary
powers to administrative agencies. Although the agency actions at issue
were invalidated, the Court's decisions rested on the bedrock tenets of
administrative law formulated in Chevron and Overton Park, indicating that
the Court has little interest in reviving the nondelegation doctrine as a ground
13. Warren v. Marion County, 353 P.2d 257, 261 (Or. 1960).
14. 120 S. Ct. 1291, 1297 (2000).
15. 119 S. Ct. 721, 738 (1999).
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for striking down congressional enactments.' 6  These opinions support the
article's central thrust: judicial review of an agency's statutory
interpretations and its ultimate decision can do more towards holding the
three branches of government to their constitutional duties and requiring
agencies to make fair, well-reasoned decisions based on intelligible
legislative objectives than does the nondelegation doctrine as resurrected by
the D.C. Circuit. 
17
The final section of the article tests the proposal by examining executive
implementation of statutes enacted through constitutional powers other than
the Commerce Clause. Specifically, Section VI applies the alternative
approach to President Clinton's exercise of Property Clause powers in
designating the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument and the Grand
Canyon-Parashant National Monument. Several lawsuits have been filed to
challenge the designations and, according to the state representatives, county
officials, and ranchers who are acting as plaintiffs, the President's decisions
are but an egregious display of executive discretion run rampant. 8 Their
overarching legal theory is that the executive branch, in issuing these
decisions under the Antiquities Act of 1906,1" has usurped legislative
prerogatives in violation of the nondelegation doctrine.
Section VI concludes that, even if the dubious trend toward strict
nondelegation review continues in the Commerce Clause context, it should
not become a significant restraint on the exercise of Property Clause powers.
16. In Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 120 S. Ct. at 1297, the Court found that Congress had
imposed unambiguous limitations on the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), such that no
deference need be given the agency's decision to regulate cigarettes under Chevron step one. See
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. In Iowa Utilities, 119 S. Ct. at 738, the Court held that the regulations
at issue were an unreasonable interpretation of statutory mandates governing local telephone
services, thereby failing Chevron step two. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. The step two
analysis in Iowa Utilities appeared to be a version of "hard look" review, although it was not
explicitly characterized as such by the Court.
17. A few days after the Court granted certiorari in American Trucking on the nondelegation
issue, it issued a second order granting certiorari on an issue raised by the industry-that the EPA
had incorrectly construed the Clean Air Act as prohibiting a consideration of costs in setting the
NAAQS. See Browner v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000) (mem.) (regarding the
nondelegation issue); Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Browner, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (mem.) (regarding
the cost issue). This second order gives the Court a vehicle to sidestep the constitutional issue
while still addressing concerns about the economic implications of regulatory statutes, using
administrative law principles and, more specifically, the interpretive standards of Chevron.
18. E.g., Compl. for Declaratory J. and Injunctive Relief and Deprivations of Federal
Constitutional Rights 112-29, Esplin v. Clinton (D. Ariz. filed Jan. 26, 2000) (No. CIV 00 0148
PCT PGR); Compl. for Injuctive and Declaratory Relief 88-94, Utah Ass'n of Counties v.
Clinton (D. Utah filed June 23, 1997) (No. 2:97CV-0479B); First Am. Compl. 38-44, Mountain
States Legal Fd. v. Clinton, (D. Utah filed Dec. 15, 1997) (No. 2:97CV-0863G).
19. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
32:941] 947
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Decisions issued under the Property Clause are less likely to have pervasive
economic effects than Commerce Clause programs such as the Clean Air
Act. Moreover, the Property Clause is broader in nature with respect to the
discrete category of activities it governs than is the Commerce Clause, in that
it provides dual proprietary and sovereign powers over federal public lands
and resources. At the same time, this broad-sweeping power is
counterbalanced and perhaps even canalized by trust-like duties to protect
public resources. Congress presumptively delegated extensive powers to the
executive branch to accomplish preservation-oriented objectives through the
Antiquities Act, satisfying the first step of the proposed Chevron-based
alternative.
However, while the Antiquities Act is an extremely important
preservation tool, national monument designations are distinct from other
public lands decisions in that no procedural safeguards are required prior to
designation. The Act gives the President unilateral power to designate
national monuments without public input or consideration of environmental
effects or alternatives. In addition, presidential decisions are insulated from
the Administrative Procedure Act's provisions for judicial review. As a
result, courts have no means of testing designations for arbitrariness.
Although the Clinton Administration has reached out to the affected public
prior to many of its designations, those efforts were voluntary and largely ad
hoc. Because neither the public nor the courts is allowed a meaningful and
regular role in the decision-making process, the second prong of the
proposed alternative cannot be satisfied. Without formalized procedural
safeguards to ensure against biased and arbitrary action, Antiquities Act
withdrawals, unlike most other public lands management decisions, may
raise concerns rooted in due process and fundamental fairness, but not
separation of powers.
II. THE EviLs OF DELEGATING THOSE DEVILISH DETAILS
Thanks to Schoolhouse Rock, an entire generation of Americans grew up
secure in the knowledge that the United States government is divided into
three branches, each of which plays a role in a democratic society. 20 Article
20. See Schoolhouse Rock: Three Ring Government (ABC television broadcast, 1979);
America Rock-Three Ring Government, Schoolhouse Rock, ABC Television,
http://www.genxtvland.simplenet.com/SchoolHouseRock/song.hts?lo+threering (visited Oct. 24,
1999). Schoolhouse Rock first aired in 1973, and lasted for thirteen years. Although the
Schoolhouse Rock phenomenon faded away in the mid-1980's, it has been revived recently, see
Sean Powell, Schoolhouse Rock Creators, at http://genxtvland.sinplenet.com/
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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I of the Constitution specifically provides that "[a]ll legislative powers ...
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States."21 In other words, elected
representatives in Congress have the power to make laws of general
applicability.' Meanwhile, executive power-the power to implement the
law-is held by the President,'3 and the power to review the activities of the
other branches, in the context of cases or controversies, is vested in the
judiciary.'
A primary reason for the constitutional separation of powers between the
legislative, executive and judicial branches is to provide checks and balances
against the capture of any one branch by another.' Separation of powers
deters government excesses through arbitrary or tyrannical rule and promotes
accountability. It also minimizes the potential for manipulation of
governmental processes by special interest groups and protects individual
citizens from the effects of factionalism.26
Although the doctrine forbids any branch from interfering with the central
constitutional "prerogatives of another" branch,' it does not require that
legislative, executive and judicial functions "be entirely separate and
distinct."' For a tripartite government to be workable, Congress cannot be
the only entity allowed to "make a rule of prospective force .... Congress
must be permitted to delegate to others at least some authority it could
SchoolHouseRock/creators.hts?lo (last modified Nov. 16, 1997), and has played a role in the early
education of several generations of Americans.
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
22. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 694 (1892).
23. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (directing the executive branch to
"take care that the Laws be faithfully executed ").
24. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2; Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 120 S. Ct. 693, 708 n.6
(2000) (finding that environmental plaintiffs had Article III standing to bring a citizens' suit to
redress Clean Water Act violations which had been ongoing at the time suit was filed).
25. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380-82 (1989) ("Mhe Framers 'built into the
tripartite Federal Government ... a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or
aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of another .... '" (discussing THE FEDERALIST 47
(Madison) and quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1975))). The Framers provided checks
and balances so that each branch remains free from the undue control or coercive influence of the
others. Id.; see also Sandra B. Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the Altar of
Appropriations Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457, 521-22 (1997).
26. CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 15-17 (1990) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN,
RIGHTS REVOLUTION].
27. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996).
28. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 380. In Mistretta, the Court lauded Madison's flexible approach
to the separation of powers: "the greatest security against tyranny-the accumulation of excessive
authority in a single Branch-lies not in a heretic division among the Branches, but in a carefully
crafted system of checked and balanced power within each Branch." Id. at 381 (citing THE
FEDERALIST 51 (Madison)).
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exercise itself. "29 In practice, Congress frequently legislates its policies and
objectives in broad-brush terms, leaving the details of execution to the
executive branch, with judicial review as a safeguard against abusive or
arbitrary action.
A. The Role of Administrative Agencies Within the Constitutional Framework
Administrative agencies are sometimes characterized, usually in
derogatory fashion, as constituting an unauthorized, unconstrained "fourth
branch of government."3" As the federal government is one of enumerated
powers, limited to those powers constitutionally granted to it along with
those "necessary and proper" to the execution of specified powers,3' a logical
starting point for this section is to shed light on the source of the authority to
create administrative agencies and delegate power to them.
The United States Constitution contains no explicit authority to create and
delegate powers to agencies.3 2 However, in the Necessary and Proper
Clause the Framers evidenced their clear intent that the federal government
possess the authority to exercise its enumerated powers effectively.33 The
29. Loving, 517 U.S. at 758 (citing Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43
(1825)).
30. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 33 (3d ed. 1999)
(citing Report of the Committee with Studies of Administrative Management in the Federal
Government 39-43 (1937)); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 160-61
(1962). The term was likely coined by Justice Jackson, in his dissenting opinion in FTC v.
Ruberoid Co.: "Administrative bodies ... have become a veritable fourth branch of the
Government, which has deranged our three-branch legal theories much as the concept of a fourth
dimension unsettles our three-dimensional thinking." Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent
and the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of Second Best, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 1 (1994) (citing Ruberoid, 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952)).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 18 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing [enumerated] Powers
.... "); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 324-25 (1819) (construing Necessary
and Proper clause to uphold constitutionality of national bank); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X
("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the People.").
32. See Harold H. Bruff, On the Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM.
U. L. REV. 491, 491 (1987) ("Ambiguity surrounds the constitutional relationships among the three
branches of government, and between the branches and the agencies."); Peter L. Strauss, The Place
of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
573, 596-605, 609-16 (1984) (noting that the Constitution says little about unelected officials who
"necessarily perform the bulk of the government's work," and describing provisions that do touch
upon the responsibilities of various government officials).
33. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see also Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial
Regulation but Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 29 n. 116, 51-55
[Ariz. St. L.J.950
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scope and breadth of the implied powers can be measured in terms of
necessity: if the power is "essential to prevent the defeat of the venture at
hand," it can be interpolated into the text of the constitution as necessary and
proper to effectuate the enumerated powers.' Agencies evolved out of
necessity-the constitutionally created branches needed agents to perform the
vast amount of detail work required to govern a modern society. Each
branch has created agencies to oversee federal programs, conduct
investigations, and fill in gaps left by broad-brush legislation with detailed
regulations and guidelines.35 The ability to delegate gap-filling power to
non-legislative branch entities allows Congress to concentrate on its primary
lawmaking duties and attend to the "venture at hand"-enacting laws "to...
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common
defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of
Liberty. "36 Thus, delegation of power to administrative agencies should be
viewed as a "necessary and proper" condition upon the successful operation
of a constitutional, tripartite government."
Because agencies are simply agents, their powers flow from, and are
subsidiary to, the branch that created them. Accordingly, agency action
must be consistent with the Constitution and the authorities granted by
n.207-29 (1999) (discussing early practices and judicial response as indicia of the Framers' intent
that Congress use all power conducive to constitutionally specified ends).
34. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 14 (4th prtg. 1962) (discussing judicial power to
review congressional decisions; see also Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 33, at 56 (discussing Chief
Justice Marshall's generous interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause in McCulloch, 17
U.S. at 406-15).
35. ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW,
AND SOCIETY 378 (2d ed. 1998).
36. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; see also Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996); J.W.
Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406-07 (1928); United States v. Romard, 89
F. 156, 156-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1898) (holding that Congress had lawfully exercised its power to
prohibit discharges of refuse into navigable waters unless a permit be obtained from the harbor
master, who could specify limits and placement of discharges; "such a power cannot be denied...
as it would defeat the only practicable and available means of protecting from nuisances the waters
under [Congress's] jurisdiction, unless maybe, by a sweeping enactment prohibiting all deposits in
the harbor").
37. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; Romard, 89 F. 156 at 158-59. Nonetheless, some
jurists and academics have argued that the modem administrative state, with its extensive reliance
on executive agencies, is unconstitutional, though they have not gone so far as to advocate
revolution or abolition of the current order. E.g., ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:
THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 158-69 (1990) (arguing that even though the modem
administrative state is unconstitutional, dismantling it would plunge our government into chaos);
Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1443-54
(1987) (arguing that New Deal legislation is unconstitutional, but accepting it as the result of
"political forces"); McCutchen, supra note 30, at 2 (advocating that, although "[t]here is no room
for a fourth branch within this tripartite scheme of governance," the Court should adopt a "second
best" approach, and tolerate unconstitutional practices that have become institutionalized).
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relevant statutes. The "organic act" that creates an executive agency and
delegates power to it, along with subsequent enactments providing more
detailed direction in specified contexts, set the parameters of the agency's
power by providing legislative goals, policies and standards.
A perusal of statutes related to environmental protection and natural
resource management will help illustrate this point. In the public lands
arena, the Department of Agriculture's Forest Service is instructed by its
organic acts to manage forest reserves using multiple-use-sustained-yield
principles.38 Within the Department of Interior, the National Park Service
Organic Act directs the Park Service to preserve and protect parks "and the
wildlife therein ... by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the
enjoyment of future generations. " " The Bureau of Land Management
operates under a variety of statutes,' but its general marching orders are
found in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act ("FLPMA"), which,
like the Forest Service organic acts, embraces multiple-use principles. 4
The EPA, generally charged with pollution control, has no true organic
act. Unlike agencies found in cabinet-level departments, the EPA was
created not by legislation but by executive order.4' It conducts its affairs
according to a variety of statutes scattered throughout the United States
Code, including the Clean Water Act,43 Clean Air Act," Toxic Substances
Control Act,45  and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA," or "Superfund"). 6
38. The Organic Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-482, 551 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998),
directed a sustained yield of timber and protection of water flow. It was amended by the Multiple
Use-Sustained Yield Act ("MUSYA") of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1994), which added a
multiple-use component to the Forest Service management mandate; and the National Forest
Management Act ("NFMA") of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1604 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), which
retained the multiple-use sustained-yield concept and added detailed requirements for forest
planning.
39. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1, la-I (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); see also National Park Service, The
National Park Service-Our Mission, at http://www.nps.gov/legacy/organic-act.htm (last modified
Oct. 26, 1999).
40. E.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 2, 6, 11-18 (1994).
41. Id. §§ 1701-1785 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Similarly, the Fish and Wildlife Service
derives its authorities from several different statutes, most importantly, the Endangered Species Act
of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), and the National Wildlife Refuge
System Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd--668ii (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
42. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. §§ 199-202 (1971), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(1994 & Supp. III 1997), cited in Lawrence E. Susskind & Joshua Secunda, The Risks and the
Advantages of Agency Discretion: Evidence from EPA's Project XL, 17 U.C.L.A. J. ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 67, 71 n.6 (1998-99).
43. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
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The EPA's programs and initiatives are sometimes criticized as piecemeal
and reactionary, with no unifying principle.' The lack of an organic act
likely contributes to a perception of arbitrariness, and perhaps even heightens
the suspicion with which courts review EPA activities. Intuitively, it seems
that a cabinet-level agency with a congressionally enacted "mission
statement" would be perceived as more credible and more accountable, and
would therefore be given more deference by courts. It follows, then, that
agencies like the National Park Service and the National Forest Service may
be less susceptible to nondelegation challenges than the EPA and other
agencies that operate under disjointed statutory directives. This article
concludes that the activities of federal land management agencies are less
likely to fall to nondelegation attack, not because of the cohesive nature of
their legislative mission statements but because of the source of their
power-the Property Clause.'
B. Separation of Powers, Laissez-faire Capitalism and Nondelegation
The primary criticism of congressional delegations of power to
administrative agencies is that such delegations erode the separation of
powers among the branches. Agency officials are not elected by the public
and are generally viewed as less accountable than the legislative branch, yet
they frequently wield policy-setting and rule-making authority.49 Prior to the
47. Susskind & Secunda, supra note 42, at 69-73 (describing EPA's history, and noting the
lack of a clear legislative mission or mechanism for setting long-term priorities).
48. See infra Section VI. Professor Cass Sunstein, having surveyed various agencies and
their organic acts, concluded that "there seems to be no link between clear statutory terms and
agency competence or agency contribution to social well-being." CASS R. SUNSTEIN, IS THE
CLEAN AIR ACT UNCONSTITUTIONAL?, 22-23 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Reg. Studies,
Working Paper 99-7, 1999) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, AIR I]; Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act
Unconstitutional?, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 303, 339 (1999) [hereinafter Sunstein, Air I1] (a revised
version of SUNSTEIN, AIR I). According to Sunstein, the perception of agencies operating under
open-ended mandates ranges from great respect for the Securities and Exchange Commission to
near-contempt for the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC"). Id. at 22-23; see also Encarta
Enclyclopedia, Interstate Commerce Commission, at http://encarta.msn.com/index/
conciseindex/00/00082000.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2000) (noting that the ICC was abolished in
1995, and its duties transferred to the Surface Transportation Board). Meanwhile, "[t]he
Department of Agriculture is one of the least well-regarded agencies, and the statutes it administers
are frequently all too clear." SUNSTEIN, AIR I, supra, at 22. The Department of Agriculture
houses a number of agencies serving myriad functions, from land management (the Forest Service),
to inspection and customs (the Animal and Plant Health and Inspection Service), to agricultural
services (the Natural Resources Conservation Service). It is not clear which agency among these is
the subject of Sunstein's assessment.
49. See William Funk, Rationality Review of State Administrative Rulemaking, 43 ADMIN. L.
REv. 147, 161-62 (1991) ("[Algencies are not created to be representative bodies, politically
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enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946,50 unelected agency
officials made important decisions largely free from public scrutiny and
judicial review, giving rise to separation of powers and due process
concerns.
5 1
It is therefore not surprising that the courts treated regulatory statutes as
something akin to noxious, "foreign substances" 52 when they first appeared
on the legislative scene around the turn of the century. In keeping with the
tremendous expansion of American industry and commerce, laissez-faire
principles, undergirding the common law's bias for private rights and private
markets, served as the "norm" or baseline for judicial review. 3 Viewed in
this light, regulations that protected workers and consumers were nothing
more than "unprincipled interest group transfers. "54 Because such transfers
were "in derogation of the common law," regulatory statutes were
interpreted very narrowly, often defeating the protections offered to the
statutory beneficiaries. 5 The judiciary's reaction was consistent with the
responsive to an electorate.... [Their] decisions are the product of institutional, rather than
personal, process.").
50. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
51. McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 180, 184 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 655 (1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Agency Inaction]; see also Sidney A.
Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and
the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 428 (noting that
heightened scrutiny of administrative action is "integrally related" to separation of powers concerns
implicated by the delegation of legislative and judicial power to agencies); Cass R. Sunstein,
Factions, Self Interest and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271, 287 (1986)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Four Lessons] (stating that judicial scrutiny under the Administrative
Procedure Act can "'flush out' impermissible motivations ... [and] guard against the dangers of
self-interested representation and of factional tyranny in the regulatory process").
52. SUNSTEIN, RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 26. at 5.
53. Laissez-faire economic theory is premised on the belief that government should not
interfere in the marketplace because individual freedom in bargaining will ultimately serve societal
needs by allocating resources in a way that promotes the greatest overall satisfaction. William H.
Page, Legal Realism and the Shaping of Modern Antitrust, 44 EMORY L.J. 1, 7-8 (1995) (citing
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 49
(Edward Canaan ed., 1976); and HERBERT SPENCER, THE GREAT POLITICAL SUPERSTITION, in
MAN VERSUS THE STATE 153-156 (1981)). Justice Holmes, in his famous dissent in Lochner v.
United States, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905), accused the majority of embracing this "economic theory
which a large part of the country does not entertain .... The 14th Amendment does not enact Mr.
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." For further discussion of the influences of laissez faire and
Social Darwinism on Lochner era courts, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of
Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L. REV. 379 (1988).
54. SUNSTEIN, RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 26, at 5.
55. Id. at 6 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co., 298 U.S. 492
(1936); FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619, 623-25 (1927); FTC v. American Tobacco
Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1924); FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920); and Johnson v.
Southern Pac. Co., 117 F. 462, 466 (8th Cir. 1902)); cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
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broader sentiments at work during the Lochner Era, when redistributive
legislation was routinely invalidated as interfering with the freedom to
contract and substantive due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 6
Despite judicial resistance, regulatory programs did not fade quietly into
the sunset. Quite to the contrary, governmental involvement in the daily
affairs of the citizenry became more prevalent in the Depression years of the
1930's, in light of increasing evidence that the marketplace had failed to
address important social needs. In the absence of regulation, unemployment
reigned; farmers had no markets for meager crops coaxed from parched and
eroded soils; factories exploited child labor and emitted pollution at will."'
The Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration set out to tip the scales in favor of
the public interest with a variety of New Deal programs. 8 Newly enacted
economic and social legislation gave regulatory agencies vast powers to
vindicate collective rights held by the citizenry at large.5 9
New entities were created to regulate and restore the securities markets,
to bolster agriculture, and to safeguard the workplace and the banking
system. New Deal agencies included key employment agencies, such as the
Works Progress Administration, along with a panoply of regulatory and
redistributive agencies, such as the Federal Communications Commission,
the Federal Power Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Social Security
U.S. 1, 58-60 (narrowly construing the Sherman Antitrust Act as prohibiting only unreasonable
restraints on trade, so as not to destroy the individual right to contract).
56. See Lochner v. United States, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (striking a New York law limiting
employment in bakeries to sixty hours a week and ten hours a day as an arbitrary interference with
the freedom to contract guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment). Lochner was followed by
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 268-77 (1918), invalidating a federal law designed to put an
end to child labor as beyond the Commerce Clause power; and Duplex Printing Press v. Deering,
254 U.S. 443, 464-78 (1921), holding that federal antitrust laws could be used to suppress labor
union activities. The Lochner Era lasted until the mid-1930's, spanning a period of about thirty
years; its demise went hand in hand with the eventual acceptance of New Deal programs. TRIBE,
supra note 2, at 66-68, 132.
57. See SUNSTEIN, RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 26, at 21-22.
58. For detailed analysis of New Deal programs and their economic and social origins and
social and legal ramifications, see generally 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN
RECESSION AND WAR (1995); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO
FDR (1955); PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL (1963); 1 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE
AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER (1957); 3 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.,
THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL (1960). For insights into New Deal
ideology during the waning years of the Roosevelt administration and World War II, see generally
DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, NO ORDINARY TIME (1994).
59. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 78-83.
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Administration.' Meanwhile, the power of existing agencies, such as the
Food and Drug Administration and Federal Trade Commission, was greatly
expanded.6'
In many instances, agencies were given broad policy-making authority,
which essentially combined all three governmental powers: legislative,
executive and adjudicative.62 Along with extensive power, early New Deal
legislation typically provided little direction to agencies, authorizing them to
prevent "unreasonable" behavior or to act "in the public interest."63 From
the executive and legislative perspectives, strict judicial vigilance over the
"system of checks and balances no longer appeared to be a necessary
safeguard of private property and liberty from factionalism, but instead-and
this was the crucial point-a faction-driven obstacle to social change in the
public interest."' Nonetheless, the judiciary, undaunted during the early
years of the New Deal, continued to voice concerns that open-ended
delegations and loosely phrased standards had a dangerous tendency to
promote self-interest and factionalism, some of the very problems supposedly
redressed by New Deal agencies.'6
Enter the nondelegation doctrine. Although its basis is Article I, there is
no explicit barrier to the delegation of legislative power in the constitutional
text."6 Its touchstone is John Locke's oft-repeated statement, that given the
principles of a limited federal government, "[t]he power of the legislative,
being derived from the people by a positive voluntary grant . . . , can be no
other than what the positive grant conveyed, which being only to make laws,
and not to make legislators." 67 The limitation on delegation of legislative
60. SUNSTEIN, RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 26, at 23-24.
61. Id. at 25, tbl.1.
62. Id. at 23.
63. See, e.g., NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 233 (1943) (upholding the Federal
Communication Commission's ("FCC's") regulation of chain broadcasting under the authority
granted by the Communication Act of 1934). This provision was examined most recently in AT&T
Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366, 378-79 (1999), but the nondelegation doctrine was not
raised in that case. See also infra notes 393-405, and accompanying text.
64. SUNSTEIN, RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 26, at 23. "The complicated character of
modern problems vastly increased the need for technical expertise and specialization in making
regulatory decisions." Id.
65. Id. at 29.
66. Likewise, there is no concrete evidence that the Framers intended a nondelegation
doctrine, and early practices demonstrated a willingness to delegate extensive discretionary powers
to the President in both military affairs and American Indian relations. Sunstein, Air 11, supra note
48, at 331-332.
67. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT §§ 141 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
1980) (1690) (emphasis omitted). Professor Theodore Lowi describes the congressional rendering
of legislative powers to the President and executive agencies as "legiscide." Theodore J. Lowi,
Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism and Administrative Power, 36 Am. U. L. REV.
956 [Ariz. St. L.J.
BEYOND THE NEW DEAL
power is meant to promote the balance of powers by ensuring that "important
choices of social policy are made by Congress, the branch of our
Government most responsive to the popular will."" In addition, the doctrine
is intended to protect against arbitrary action and abuses of governmental
power by enhancing political accountability and assuring substantive and
procedural safeguards to those who are affected by administrative action.69
III. WAXING AND WANING JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF PRE- AND POST-NEW
DEAL DELEGATIONS: FROM "LOOSE" TO "STRICT" REVIEW
Congressional delegations to executive agencies will be invalidated as
violating separation of powers if the statute improperly grants authority that
is purely legislative or judicial in nature.7 ° Chief Justice John Marshall
recognized early on that the line between the enactment of the laws, a
congressional power, and the execution of those laws, an executive power, is
a fine one: "The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those
important subjects which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself,
from those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and
power given to those who are to act under such general provisions to fill up
the details.""'
A nondelegation problem arises when Congress fails to give adequate
standards to guide the Executive's discretion in implementing a statute,
thereby allowing the agency itself to engage in legislative policy-making
functions. 72 Because the inquiry turns on whether Congress itself has made
the difficult policy choices, the statute has been the focal point. However,
the D.C. Circuit has recently taken the doctrine in a new direction, shifting
the focus from Congress's statutory directive to the agency's construction of
it, holding that an agency's interpretation may be so broad as to offend
295, 299 (1987). "Because the people cede inherent legislative power to their representatives
through a democratic process of elections, it is not appropriate for the legislators to cede that power
to nonelected officials who will not necessarily reflect the popular will." Robert W. Adler,
American Trucking and the Revival (?) of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,233,
10,235-36 (2000).
68. Indus. Union Dep't. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
69. See Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 758-59 (D.D.C. 1971)), modified on
petition for reh'g, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000) (mer.); 120
S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (mer.).
70. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-88 (1952) (holding
that a seizure order issued by the President violated separation of powers).
71. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825).
72. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
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separation of powers by presuming the power to act beyond its authorized
executive role."
The Supreme Court's judicial litmus test for reviewing legislative
delegations to executive agencies has long been whether the statutory
language provides an "intelligible principle" to guide agency action.74 This
test, which turns on legislative semantics, has changed very little over time,
but the stringency of its application has waxed and waned significantly,
depending on the political and social forces at work. It also appears that
heightened scrutiny has been applied to executive action authorized by a
certain type of enactment. Statutes issued pursuant to Commerce Clause
authority, having a tendency to affect the entire economy, appear to be more
closely scrutinized than those that have other constitutional powers as their
source.
75
A. Nondelegation Review Through the New Deal Years
Nondelegation was considered a "principle universally recognized" by the
late 1800's, 6 even though at that time the Supreme Court had never actually
struck down a statute on nondelegation grounds. When the nondelegation
doctrine was first announced, the Court was quite tolerant of congressional
grants of authority to executive bodies, upholding legislation so long as there
were some standards to define the scope of the agency's power to regulate.'
73. See Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034-40 (Williams, J.); discussion infra Part III.B.3.
This approach was foreshadowed in an early D.C. Circuit opinion, International Union, UAW v.
OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1991), also issued by Judge Stephen Williams and a few
lower court decisions, see Sunstein, Air I, supra note 48, at 310 n.22 (citing cases).
74. See J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409 (upholding delegation based on "intelligible"
statutory principle). Prior to J.W. Hampton, the Court considered whether the legislature had
provided an adequate standard for the delegatee to fill in the gaps left by general statutory
provisions. See Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43.
75. See PIERCE, supra note 30, at 50-51; see also David Schoenbrod, The Delegation
Doctrine: Could the Court Give it Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1224-25 (1985). For a
discussion of challenges outside of the Commerce Clause context, see infra Part V.
76. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
77. For the earliest cases to address the nondelegation concept, see Cargo of Brig Aurora v.
United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 387-388 (1813) (recognizing a nondelegation issue, but
upholding the enactment in question), and Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43 (sustaining a
legislative grant of power to federal courts to adopt their own rules of process). In Field, the Court
upheld a provision of the Tariff Act of 1890 which directed the President to suspend an exemption
of import duties "whenever, and so often" as he should be satisfied that the duties imposed on U.S.
products by any country producing and exporting certain enumerated commodities were
"reciprocally unequal and unreasonable." 143 U.S. at 680. The Court found that the President's
power was simply:
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For example, in United States v. Grimaud,11 the Court rejected a challenge to
the Organic Act of 1897, which directed the Department of Agriculture to
protect timber and watersheds within national forest reserves from
destruction by regulating "their occupancy and use." 79  The Organic Act,
according to the Court, set forth the legislative purposes along with sufficient
guidance on how to effectuate those purposes. As such, the Act, in spite of
its rather obscure directive, simply provided the agency with the power not
to legislate but "to fill up the details."'
By the early New Deal years of the 1930's, the political and judicial
atmosphere had changed dramatically, and the search for intelligible
principles became far more intensive. By then, the judiciary could be
counted on as the bastion of the most powerful and resourceful
industrialists-those very same entities who had benefited greatly from
laissez-faire government and the common law's protections for contract and
property rights."' The nondelegation doctrine, along with substantive due
process and Commerce Clause constraints, emerged as the vehicles of choice
for striking down progressive New Deal legislation.'
In 1935, for the first time, the Supreme Court struck down two statutory
provisions for unlawfully delegating legislative powers. In A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 3 the provision in question, the Live Poultry
Code, a section of the National Industrial Recovery Act ("NIRA"), allowed
firms to agree to codes of fair competition and authorized the President to
enforce the codes if, inter alia, they did not promote monopolies.8 The
Court found that the provision provided no standards, other than "the general
mhe enforcement of the policy established by Congress. As the suspension
was absolutely required when the President ascertained the existence of a
particular fact, it cannot be said that in ascertaining that fact, and in issuing his
proclamation, in obedience to the legislative will, he exercised the function of
making laws.
Id. at 693. Other early cases upholding broad delegations include Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S.
470, 497-98 (1904) (sustaining delegation of authority to "establish uniform standards" for
importing tea), and J. W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 403-04 (upholding delegation of power to President
to adjust tariffs when rates failed to "equalize ... differences in costs of production").
78. 220 U.S. 506 (1911)
79. Id. at 509 (citing provisions now codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 475, 478, 551 (1994 & Supp.
IV 1998).
80. id. at 517 (quoting Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43). For further discussion of the
nature of the Property Clause as a source for statutes such as the Organic Act, see discussion infra
Part VI.A.
81. Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 33, at 78 nn.353-55.
82. See SUNSTEIN, RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 26, at 19-20; see also supra notes 52-
56 and accompanying text.
83. 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935).
84. See id at 521-23.
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aims of rehabilitation, correction and expansion. " 85 As a result, it allowed
the President vast and unfettered authority to determine what to do "for the
betterment of business," constrained only by the extent of the federal
commerce power. 86 In turn, the provisions at issue were also found to be
beyond the Commerce Clause authority, as the sale of chickens wholly
within one state did not directly affect interstate commerce.'
That same year, in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,"8 the Court struck
another provision of NIRA that allowed the President to prohibit the
transportation of petroleum in interstate commerce in excess of amounts
allowed by state law. 9 The petroleum provision was faulted for giving the
President "unlimited authority to determine the policy and to lay down the
prohibition . . . as he may see fit."' One year later, in Carter v. Carter
Coal Co. ,91 the Coal Conservation Act, which established local boards to set
coal prices and authorized collective bargaining over wages and hours, was
invalidated on due process grounds as an improper grant of legislative power
to private parties.' In addition, the Court concluded that coal production did
not directly affect interstate commerce, but instead merely preceded
commerce, and was therefore local in nature.93
In response, FDR proposed a bill that would, in effect, allow him to pack
the Court by expanding the bench from nine to fifteen members, presumably
so that he could appoint justices more favorable to his policies. 94 Roosevelt
dropped his "Court-packing" plan, however, when one Justice "switched"
and cast his vote in favor of Washington State's minimum wage law in West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish" in 1937. Supreme Court review of a key New
85. Id. at 541. Congress's stated policies included removing obstructions to the flow of
commerce, encouraging the organization of industry and cooperative action among trade groups,
advancing united action of labor and management, eradicating unfair competitive practices, and
conserving natural resources. See id. at 521-36 (citing National Industrial Recovery Act § 3, 48
Stat. 196 (1933)).
86. Id. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 524-550.
88. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
89. Id. at 411, 417-21.
90. Id. at 415.
91. 298 U.S. 238 (1936)
92. Id. at 311; see also United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64-68 (1935) (striking the
Agricultural Adjustment Act as an invalid exercise of the general welfare clause).
93. Carter, 298 U.S. at 301-03; Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 33, at 70-71 (discussing
Carter). For a discussion on the history and trends in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, see id. at
56-93; infra Part III.B.2.
94. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 66-68.
95. 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937). Justice Owen Roberts, a Hoover appointee, has been dubbed
"the switch in time that saved the nine." TRIBE, supra note 2, at 66 (quoting future Justice Abe
Fortas); see also WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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Deal program followed closely on the heels of Parish, and in NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp. ," the National Labor Relations Act was found a
valid exercise of Commerce Clause authority.' By the early 1940's,
legislation providing for unemployment compensation and agricultural
support programs, along with the second Coal Conservation Act, had been
upheld with minimal judicial resistance.9"
Professor Bruce Ackerman explains the events of 1935-37, including the
Supreme Court's decisions and the re-election of Roosevelt in 1936, as
nothing short of a pivotal "constitutional moment" in American legal
history." It is by no means universally accepted, however, that Roosevelt's
Court-packing plan had the direct effect of eviscerating judicial resistance to
New Deal programs, thereby paving the way for a progressive new
governmental approach to societal problems."°° Some commentators believe
that individual pieces of early New Deal legislation would have survived had
they been as ably drafted and defended as later "Second New Deal"
enactments, like the National Labor Relations Act provisions at issue in
Jones & Laughlin Steel.'' Although the exact reason may be unclear,
without question, 1937 "marked a sharp change in the Supreme Court's habit
of striking down New Deal legislation as exceeding the federal commerce
power, or violating the due process or equal protection clauses. ""0
In the ensuing years, broad delegations were routinely and universally
upheld. Delegations that provided only vague standards have passed muster
so long as the scope or degree of the agency's power could be construed as
relatively narrow, or adequate procedural protections were given to the
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 160-62 (1995) (asserting that the
Court-packing plan directly affected the Court's response to New Deal legislation).
96. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
97. Id. at 43.
98. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942); Superior Bath House Co. v.
McCarroll, 312 U.S. 176, 179 (1941); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 31 F. Supp. 125,
128 (E.D. Ark. 1940).
99. Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013,
1053-55 (1984) (explaining that the citizenry, responding to the signals sent by the Supreme Court's
decisions, indicated its acceptance of significant new directions in legislative activity, not by
attempting a formal constitutional amendment, but by way of the 1936 election); see also Daniel J.
Hulsebosch, The New Deal Court: Emergence of a New Reason, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 1979
n.31 (1990).
100. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND
CENTURY 236-37 (1990); G. Edward White, Cabining the Constitutional History of the New Deal
in Time, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1392, 1407-09 (1996).
101. E.g., Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201, 249-55
(1994).
102. Daniel A. Crane, Faith, Reason, and Bare Animosity, 21 CAMPBELL L. REV. 125, 136
n.56 (1999).
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persons subject to regulatory power. 0 3 Courts have found that even the most
ambiguous provisions may gain "meaningful content" from the statute's
overall purpose and general philosophy, as well as its legislative history,
factual background or historical or social context. " For example, statutes
authorizing the Federal Communications Commission to regulate broadcast
licensing "as the public interest, convenience, or necessity" requires, °5 the
Price Administrator to fix "fair and equitable" commodities prices,"° and the
War Department to recover "excessive profits" earned from military
contracts, 7 have all withstood delegation challenges.
By the 1970's, the nondelegation doctrine was, for all intents and
purposes, defunct. In Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally,'°  a
remarkably broad provision of the Economic Stabilization Act was upheld,
giving the President authority "to issue such orders and regulations [as
deemed] appropriate to stabilize prices, rents, wages and salaries" at 1970
levels, with adjustments as "necessary to prevent gross inequities.", °9
According to the court, it was enough that the Act provided some limiting
language, along with adequate procedural protections, including judicial
review. "'
The notion that procedural safeguards might allow a statute with few
explicit guiding principles to dodge the nondelegation bullet finds support in
the earlier Supreme Court cases, including Schechter Poultry.' There, the
Court drew a distinction between the offending provision of NIRA and other
103. See PIERCE, supra note 30, at 53-55.
104. E.g., Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Am. Power
& Light Co. v. SEC. 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946)), modifying on petition for reh'g, 175 F.3d 1027
(D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000) (mem.); 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (mem.);
see also Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947) (considering banking industry's "well-
defined practices" to uphold delegation to Federal Home Loan Bank Board to issue regulations for
appointing conservators for savings and loan associations).
105. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 214-16 (1943) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 303).
106. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 , 422-26 (1944).
107. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 747, 788-89 (1948).
108. 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.C.C. 1971) (Leventhal, J., for three-judge panel).
109. Id. at 745, 764 (quoting Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, § 202, 84 Stat. 799
(amended 1971) (expired 1974)).
110. Id. at 746-47.
111. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530 (1935); see also
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 583-85 (1963) (upholding delegation to Secretary of Interior
where Secretary's power to apportion Colorado River water could be reined in by congressional
oversight or judicial review); NBC, 319 U.S. at 214, 216 (rejecting a nondelegation challenge to the
National Communications Act, which allowed regulation of radio broadcasting as the "public
convenience, interest, or necessity requires," because Congress had provided adequate guidance, in
light of the Act's stated goals and procedures, when reviewed with the overall context of radio
broadcasting in mind).
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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federal enactments like the Federal Trade Commission Act which, despite its
seemingly unconstrained grant of discretion, required the agency-delegatee to
utilize special procedures before making a determination of "unfair methods
of competition."" 2 In American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, the Court
specifically noted that statutory rulemaking procedures and opportunities for
judicial review provided an adequate check against unconstrained delegation
of power to executive agencies." 4  Notably, that same year, the
Administrative Procedure Act was enacted, requiring federal agencies to
engage in specified rulemaking processes with increased opportunities for
public involvement." 5 The Act also opened the door for judicial review of
agency action, which in many cases had been barred by sovereign
immunity.1
6
Thus, in the post-New Deal, post-Administrative Procedure Act era,
courts have been far more interested in ensuring that procedural safeguards
cabin the exercise of delegated power so that those affected by agency action
are protected from arbitrary and abusive decisions. As the Oregon Supreme
Court so adroitly observed:
[Tlhe requirement of expressed standards has, in most instances,
been little more than a judicial fetish for legislative language, the
recitation of which provides no additional safeguards to persons
affected by the exercise of the delegated authority .... [lit is of
little or no significance ... that the statute ... stated the
112. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 532-34. The opinion also distinguished the Interstate
Commerce Act and the Federal Radio Act, both of which delegated power to executive agencies
who were required to make findings, based upon evidence, before applying the relevant statutory
standards. Id. at 539-41.
113. 329 U.S. 90 (1946).
114. Id. at 105-09; see also Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 170 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
115. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). For a discussion of the
Administrative Procedure Act's background and legislative history, see McNollgast, supra note 51,
at 180-84.
116. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994 & Supp IV 1998). "It long has been established, of course,
that the United States, as sovereign, 'is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued . . .'"
United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586
(1941)); see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.)
("The universally received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against the
United States"). However, the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 indicated that judicial review
of administrative action should be available. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Claims Court at the
Crossroads, 40 Cath. U. L. Rev. 517, 522 (1991) (citing ch. 324, Pub.L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237
(1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 5 of the U.S. Code). To clarify the point,
the 1976 amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act explicitly waived the federal
government's sovereign immunity from injunctive relief. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 94 -574, 90 Stat.
2721 (1976) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-703)); see also United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206,
227 n. 32 (1983).
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permissible limits ... in terms of such abstractions as "public
convenience, interest or necessity" or ... "for the public health,
safety, and morals" and similar phrases accepted as satisfying the
standards requirement." 7
Giving heightened attention to procedural safeguards over linguistics
makes sense when viewed in light of the primary functions of the
nondelegation doctrine. The noted administrative law scholar Kenneth Culp
Davis proposed that the nondelegation doctrine be reformulated to better
protect against arbitrary agency action: courts should "look to the totality of
legislative and administrative standards and procedural safeguards to
determine whether administrative discretion has been confined to the greatest
degree practicable. " " 8 So long as Congress has established the substantive
policy choice, procedural requirements enhance judicial review by
facilitating a complete administrative record, thereby providing a basis for
more thorough inquiry into the agency's conclusions; as a result, regulatory
decisions are less likely to be biased or arbitrary. Moreover, if the
congressional objective is provided and some guidance is available, either
explicitly or otherwise, so that agencies are not making law out of whole
cloth and courts are afforded a meaningful oversight role, separation of
powers is less likely to be impaired.
B. Judicial Review in Recent Years: Another Swing of the Pendulum
1. Supreme Court Review of Nondelegation Challenges
Although no post-New Deal Supreme Court opinion has invalidated a
statute on nondelegation grounds, since 1980 there have been a few signals
that the pendulum may be swinging back, under the weight of the most
117. Warren v. Marion County, 353 P.2d 257, 260-01 (Or. 1960) (en banc) (citing 1 DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, §§ 2.03-.05; and FORKOSH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, §§ 83-
84). Oregon is one of a handful of states that seem to rely solely on procedural safeguards in
rejecting nondelegation claims. See Gary J. Greco, Standards or Safeguards: A Survey of the
Delegation Doctrine in the States, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 567, 598-99 (1994). Many states have
upheld delegations to administrative agencies if the legislature has provided some form of "loose"
standards, particularly if the legislation includes procedural safeguards. Id. at 574, 588-97.
118. 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 3.3, .15 (2d ed. 1978);
see also Kenneth C. Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713 (1969).
Davis's proposal gained support in state courts, see Developments in the Low-The Interpretation of
State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1477 (1982), and likely influenced the three-
judge panel in Amalgamated Meat Cutters, see supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text. See also
SUNSTEIN, RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 26, at 24-25.
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conservative justices, toward the "strict" nondelegation review seen in the
early New Deal cases. That year, in Industrial Union Department v.
American Petroleum Institute,"9 the Court remanded an Occupational Safety
and Health Administration ("OSHA") standard limiting workplace exposure
to benzene.' The Occupational Safety and Health Act required OSHA to
set exposure limits for toxic materials that would "most adequately assure, to
the extent feasible ... that no employee will suffer material impairment" of
health.' According to the plurality opinion, had "feasibility" been the only
limitation on agency discretion, OSHA could impose substantial costs on
industry without any risk-based justification.'2 Citing Schechter Poultry, the
Court surmised that such a "sweeping delegation of legislative power" might
violate the nondelegation doctrine. " The Court, however, avoided the
constitutional issue by finding that OSHA's discretion was adequately curbed
by the Act's definition of safety standards as those standards "necessary or
appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment.""2 This provision was
construed as requiring OSHA to make a threshold determination that a
"significant risk of material health impairment" existed at the level of
exposure prohibited by its regulation."Z
Justice Rehnquist, concurring, believed that the statutory provision did in
fact violate the nondelegation doctrine because it gave "absolutely no
indication where on the continuum of relative safety [the Secretary of Labor]
should draw his line. " 'z  Rehnquist added that, "in the light of the
importance of the interests at stake, I have no doubt that the provision at
issue, standing alone, would violate the doctrine against uncanalized
delegations of legislative power. "127 Justice Scalia, a law professor at the
tine, praised the possible revival of the nondelegation doctrine: "[E]ven
with all its Frankenstein-like warts, knobs, and (concededly) dangers, the
unconstitutional delegation doctrine is worth hewing from the ice. The
119. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
120. ld. at 662.
121. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1994).
122. Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 640.
123. Id. at 646 (quoting A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 539
(1935)).
124. Id. at 639 (quoting Occupational Safety and Health Act, § 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 652(8)
(1994)).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 675 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist opined that "the language 'to
the extent feasible' . . . renderis] what had been a clear, if somewhat unrealistic, standard largely,
if not entirely, precatory." Id. at 681-82.
127. Id. at 675.
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alternative appears to be a continuation of the widely felt trend toward
government by bureaucracy or (what is no better) government by courts. "
One year later, in American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v.
Donovan,129 the Court, reviewing the Occupational Safety and Health Act yet
again, held that a cost-benefit analysis was not required to support "feasible"
exposure standards. 30  It found that the legislative history, though not
"crystal clear," provided sufficient evidence that feasible meant "capable of
economic and technological accomplishment."1 3' In dissent, Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, stated that Congress itself was
required to make the hard policy decision regarding the role of costs in
workplace safety; by evading the issue, it had unlawfully delegated its duties
to an executive agency. 32
A delegation issue was raised again in Mistretta v. United States, 33 but
was flatly rejected by the Court, which held that Congress had provided
sufficient guidance for the Sentencing Commission to develop federal
sentencing guidelines.'" Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, noted
that, although Congress had granted the Commission substantial discretion in
formulating guidelines, the congressional directives at issue went beyond
mere "intelligible principles." 3 5  It was sufficient that Congress had
legislated "a full hierarchy of punishment-from near maximum
imprisonment, to substantial imprisonment, to some imprisonment, to
alternatives-and stipulated the most important offense and offender
characteristics to place defendants within these categories." 36  Indeed,
according to the Court, the development of sentencing guidelines "for
hundreds of different crimes by a virtually limitless array of offenders is
precisely the sort of intricate, labor-intensive task for which delegation to an
128. Antonin Scalia, A Note on the Benzene Case, REG. Jul-Aug 1980, at 25, 28; see also
Andres Snaider, Note, The Politics and Tension in Deligating [sic] Plenary Power: The Need to
Revive Nondelegation Principles in the Field of Immigration, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 107, 111-112
(1992).
129. 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
130. Id. at 508-09, 530-36 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5)).
131. Id. at 514.
132. Id. at 547-48 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The two dissenters stressed the importance of
leaving questions of fundamental policy in the hands of "the elected representatives of the people,"
but conceded that if the delegation had involved a complex technical issue incapable of legislative
resolution due to a lack of congressional expertise, rather than a matter of public policy avoided
because of a lack of political will, it may have been permissible. Id.
133. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
134. Id. at 371-80.
135. Id. at 379.
136. ld. at 377.
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expert body is especially appropriate."137 The Court made a point of
explaining that, in a complex modem society, "Congress simply cannot do
its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives,"138
and that Congress, in enacting regulatory statutes, need not select the method
of policy implementation that would result in the most minimal delegation of
discretion to administrative officers possible."'
After Mistreta, all had been relatively quiet on the nondelegation front in
Supreme Court jurisprudence until the Court accepted the petitions for
certiorari in American Trucking."o However, during the intervening years,
the Court had reined in congressional and executive powers under a variety
of other theories, indicating that there may also be renewed interest in
nondelegation as a limitation on federal power. In particular, federalism
concerns have experienced a resurrection, with a majority of the Court
imposing limitations based on states' rights and a restrictive view of the
Commerce Clause powers.
2. Supreme Court Review of Commerce Clause and Federalism
Challenges
Throughout the post-New Deal era, the scope of the Commerce Clause
was viewed as so exceedingly broad that it appeared to be almost limitless.
In fact, between 1937 and 1995, the Supreme Court upheld every federal
137. Id. at 379.
138. Id. at 372; see also Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996) ("To burden
Congress with all federal rulemaking would divert that branch from more pressing issues, and
defeat the Framers' design of a workable National Government.").
139. Id. at 379 (citing Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425-26 (1994)).
140. Browner v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000) (mem.); Am. Trucking Ass'ns
v. Browner, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (mem.). There were only a few cases in the late 1980's and
early 1990's that dealt with nondelegation arguments head on. In 1991, the Supreme Court upheld
a statute allowing the Attorney General to schedule controlled substances on a temporary basis if
they posed an "imminent hazard to the public safety." Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 166-
67 (1991) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(1)) (noting that the statute imposed additional restrictions on
the discretion to list substances: such substances must have a "high potential for abuse," with "no
currently accepted medical use treatment" and "a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug ...
under medical supervision"). The Court also upheld provisions of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice allowing the President to define aggravating factors for imposition of the death penalty in
military capital cases, Loving, 517 U.S. at 771-774, and to exercise the taxing power, Skinner v.
Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 220-21 (1989). Most recently, in reviewing a broad-
sweeping grant of authority to the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") to regulate drugs and
drug devices, the Court did not even hint at nondelegation, instead applying routine standards of
judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291, 1297-1315 (2000); discussion infra Part V.B.
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statute challenged on Commerce Clause grounds. 14' But Commerce Clause
jurisprudence experienced a sea-change in 1995, and the Court has since
struck down two high profile federal regulatory programs as beyond
interstate commerce, raising themes not seen since the Lochner years. In
1995, the Court issued United States v. Lopez," invalidating the Gun-Free
School Zones Act,' 43 which made knowing possession of a firearm in school
zones a federal offense.44 The Lopez decision held that the Act "by its terms
ha[d] nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise";
thus, possession of a gun in a school zone could not be considered an
economic activity that "substantially affect[ed]" interstate commerce.'"
Subsequently, in United States v. Morrison,'" the Court struck down the
civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act, 47 finding that
gender-motivated crimes of violence did not constitute economic activity
within the reach of the federal Commerce Clause power.'" Most recently,
several environmental statutes have come under fire, and the Court has
accepted certiorari in a Clean Water Act case challenging the regulation of
wetlands as beyond the purview of the Commerce Clause. 49
141. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 33, at 1, 4, 13-107 (providing an in-depth assessment
of the historic underpinnings of the Commerce Clause and the evolution of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence).
142. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
143. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
144. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62 (1995). Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
stressed that federal legislative authority under the Commerce Clause "is subject to outer limits."
Id. at 557. He remarked that the scope of the interstate commerce power:
[Miust be considered in the light of our dual system of government and may
not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect
and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would
effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local
and create a completely centralized government.
Id. (quoting dicta in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
145. Id. at 562. The Court noted that:
Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as to the substantial
burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce .... But to the extent that
congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that
the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though
no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here.
Id. at 562-63 (citations omitted).
146. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 13,981 (1994).
148. Id. at 1749-52.
149. See Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 191 F.3d 845 (7th Cir.
1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000). Commerce Clause challenges to another far-reaching
environmental statute, the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1994), have also
been raised in the circuit courts, so far unsuccessfully. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 492-94
(4th Cir. 2000) (holding that the Endangered Species Act's prohibition on activities on private
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The remarkable nature of the Lopez and Morrison decisions can best be
illustrated with a brief historical overview. During the Lochner Era, a
restrictive view of Commerce Clause powers prevailed when, for example,
federal laws designed to put an end to child labor were struck down as
unconstitutional in Hammer v. Dagenhart."0  Under Hammer, Congress
could regulate only those activities with direct effects on interstate
commerce.' Two of the cases that brought that era to a close were United
States v. Darby,' which overruled Hammer, and Jones & Laughlin Steel,
which held that activities that individually are intrastate in nature may be
regulated if together they have a "substantial relation to interstate
commerce."' Subsequently, the Court upheld one of the most sweeping
assertions of power over commerce ever to come before it in Wickard v.
Filburn,'5' finding that Congress had a rational basis for believing that the
aggregate effects of domestic, noncommercial wheat farming, used largely
for home consumption, substantially affected commerce and therefore
justified federal regulation.' There, the Court noted that a more expansive
view of Commerce Clause powers was consistent with the earliest Supreme
Court precedent: "At the beginning Chief Justice Marshall described the
Federal commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded."'56
After Wickard, a relaxed view of the Commerce Clause powers prevailed
until the 1995 Lopez case. The "substantial relation" test is still the present
day formulation of federal Commerce Clause powers,' 57 but in application
property that would "take" a red wolf and reintroduce it into its historic range as an experimental
population of endangered species, was valid under the Commerce Clause); Nat'l Ass'n of Home
Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1041-57 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding the Endangered Species
Act's "take" provision, as applied to endangered species of fly found only in California, was a
constitutional exercise of the Commerce Clause power), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998). In
Gibbs, the court expressly distinguished Morrison and Lopez, and found that the provision at issue
involved economic and commercial activities (tourism, scientific research and commercial trade in
animals and pelts), and that takings of red wolves in the aggregate would have a substantial impact
on interstate commerce. 214 F.3d at 490-510.
150. 247 U.S. 251, 273-77 (1918).
151. Id.
152. 312 U.S. 100, 115-25 (1941). Darby also limited Carter Coal and, by implication,
Lochner. For a discussion of the erosion of judicial intolerance for New Deal programs, see supra
notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
153. 301 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1937).
154. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
155. Id. at 120, 128 ("It can hardly he denied that a factor of such volume and variability as
home-consumed wheat would have a substantial influence on price and market conditions.").
156. Id. at 120 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-195 (1824)).
157. The "substantial relation" test is one of three categories within the regulatory scope of the
Commerce Clause. Congress may also control "the channels of interstate commerce" to keep them
"'free from immoral and injurious uses,'" such as racial discrimination, and "the instrumentalities
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the test is becoming far more restrictive, as seen in both Lopez and
Morrison. In Morrison, Justice Souter, in dissent, lamented:
Since adherence to these formalistically contrived confines of
commerce power in large measure provoked the judicial crisis of
1937, one might reasonably have doubted that Members of this
Court would ever again toy with a return to the days before NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. ... , which brought the earlier
and nearly disastrous experiment to an end. And yet today's
decision can only be seen as a step toward recapturing the prior
mistakes."' 8
The Court's efforts to distinguish post-1937 Commerce Clause cases like
Wickard from Lochner Era cases like Hammer were not the result of a
principled application of constitutional theory or precedent, explained Justice
Souter, but "laissez-faire economics, the point of which was to keep
government interference to a minimum. "- 59
Even beyond the Commerce Clause context, the Court has expressed
renewed interest in federalism and states' rights."6  Up until the early
1990's, federalism challenges to congressional enactments had almost as
dismal a track record as did Commerce Clause arguments, with the Court
rejecting all but one.' 6' Then, in 1992, the Court struck a provision of the
of interstate commerce," such as navigational channels and railroads, including vehicles traveling
wholly within a state. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (citations omitted).
158. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1767 (2000). A precursor to this remark
can be found in the concurring and dissenting opinions in Lopez. There, Souter, in dissent, queried
whether the Court's decision "does anything but portend a return to the untenable jurisprudence
from which the Court extricated itself almost 60 years ago." 514 U.S. at 608. He replied to his
own rhetorical question: "[t]he answer is not reassuring." Id. Justice Kennedy, concurring, stated
that "[tlhis case requires us to consider our place in the design of the Government and to appreciate
the significance of federalism in the whole structure of the Constitution." Id. at 575.
159. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1768 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 605-06).
160. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, The Three Faces of Federalism: An Empirical
Assessment of Supreme Court Federalism Jurisprudence, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 741, 741 (2000)
(noting that "[t]he most recent Supreme Court term devoted considerable attention to federalism,
especially under the Eleventh Amendment, and was perceived to have aggressively advanced the
interests of states' rights vis-A- vis federal legislation.").
161. Until 1992, only one federal statute was declared unconstitutional on federalism grounds.
That case, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), was subsequently
overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 530-31 (1985).
See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 502 (1995); Laurence
H. Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to
Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1067 (1977). Professor Chemerinsky's
article provides an illuminating exposition of Supreme Court federalism jurisprudence and its
relationship to the underlying values of federalism, defined, for the purposes of the article, as the
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Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act which required states to accept
ownership of waste or regulate it according to congressional instructions,
reasoning that such requirements lie outside Congress's enumerated powers
and were inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment.' A few years later, in
Printz v. United States, 3 the Court found that a provision of the Brady
Act' requiring states to conduct background checks on prospective handgun
purchasers, imposed an unconstitutional obligation on state officers to
execute federal laws. 65  The Court's opinion emphasized the vitality of the
system of "dual sovereignty" established by the Framers, as well as the
express limitation on national power found in the Tenth Amendment's
reservation of state power."
State sovereign immunity has likewise been invoked more frequently in
recent years to restrict the scope of a variety of federal regulatory statutes,
including the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 7 the Fair Labor
Standards Act,'" and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.'69 Even the recent
Morrison decision, striking the Violence Against Women Act, can be
characterized as a blow for federalism. Although the holding is based on
Commerce Clause analysis, according to dissenting Justice Souter, it was a
extent to which state governmental autonomy limits the exercise of federal power. See generally
Chemerinsky, supra.
162. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174-88 (1992). Similarly, in Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992), the Court held that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act generally did not preempt actions for damages under state law tort theories. Justice
Blackmun attributed the Court's reluctance to find preemption to "the principles of federalism and
respect for state sovereignty." Id. at 533 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).
163. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
164. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1994 & Supp. 111996).
165. Printz, 521 U.S. at 933-35.
166. 521 U.S. at 918-22; see also U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.").
167. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 640-50 (2000) (concluding that
Congress had gone beyond its authority by attempting to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity from suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
168. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that Congress could not subject
state to Fair Labor Standards Act suit in state court without its consent).
169. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) (finding that Congress lacked
authority, in the face of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, to subject states to Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act claims in federal court). Another recent Supreme Court case that could be
placed in the shadow cast by federalism is City ofBoerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997),
striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, in part because it undermined the
federal-state balance. Id. at 2172-74.
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product of the majority's interest in the states' long tradition of exercising
police powers over violent crimes.°
Both the increasing use of states' rights and the judicial curtailment of
Commerce Clause powers have closely tracked the renewal of the
nondelegation doctrine, with each theory once again becoming viable means
of limiting federal regulatory powers in the twenty-first century
administrative state. Most susceptible to limitation are those statutes and
regulations that have the potential for pervasive economic effects.
3. The D.C. Circuit's Decision in American Trucking
Echoing the Commerce Clause and federalism themes of Printz, Morrison
and Lopez, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit invalidated the
EPA's interpretation of the Clean Air Act in American Trucking.'7' The
court held that the EPA's regulation of ground-level ozone ("03") and
particulate matter resulted in an "unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power,"" reviving a doctrine "dormant since the mushrooming of the
regulatory state under the New Deal."'" Instead of finding the statute
unconstitutional and vacating the national ambient air quality standards
("NAAQS") in their entirety, however, the court remanded the regulations to
the EPA for an articulation of intelligible principles to constrain the agency's
discretion. '74 The EPA's petition for rehearing en banc on the nondelegation
170. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1768 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting).
However, the Court rejected both Commerce Clause and federalism challenges in one notable case,
Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666, 672 (2000), where it held that Congress could restrict the sale or
release of a driver's personal information in the Driver's Privacy Protection Act pursuant to its
authority to regulate interstate commerce. Distinguishing Lopez, the Court noted that this
information was widely "used by insurers, manufacturers, and direct marketers," and that the sale
and release of such information as an interstate article of commerce was "sufficient to support
congressional regulation." Id. at 671. Distinguishing Printz and New York, the Court held that the
Driver's Privacy Protection Act did not offend the Tenth Amendment, as it did "not require the
states in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens," but rather "regulate[d] the states
as the owners of databases." Id. at 672.
171. 175 F.3d 1027, 1033-40 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000)
(mem.); 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (mem.).
172. Id. at 1034, 1057 (remanding the ozone final rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,863 (1997), and the
final particulate matter rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 65,637 (1996)).
173. George F. Will, See You in Congress ... , WASH. POST, May 20, 1999, at A29; see
also Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1057 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
174. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1057 (reserving the question of whether the fine particulate
NAAQS should be vacated), modified on petition for reh'g, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000) (mem.); 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (mem.).
972 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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issue was narrowly denied,"' but the Supreme Court has granted its petition
for certiorari.'76
Pursuant to the Clean Air Act, the EPA must set primary air pollution
standards, or NAAQS, for certain criteria pollutants as "requisite to protect
the public health" with an "adequate margin of safety."'7 It must review the
NAAQS at least every five years and revise them when "appropriate," using
the same criteria and processes as it used to set them in the first place. 78
Further, the Act generally requires standards to "accurately reflect the latest
scientific knowledge useful in indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable
effects on public health or welfare which may be expected from the presence
of such pollutant in the ambient air, in varying quantities.""9 A key goal of
the Act is "to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so
as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its
population. " " Largely as a result of the NAAQS, the Act can be credited
with tremendous improvements in air quality for all of the criteria pollutants,
and is considered a great success story among regulatory programs.'
The court engaged in a detailed consideration of the agency's revised
ozone and particulate matter NAAQS. In revising its ozone NAAQS, the
court noted, the EPA had performed an extensive review of studies on the
risks of lung diseases associated with automobile and industrial emissions of
ozone precursors and had considered findings by the Clean Air Scientific
Advisory Committee ("CASAC"), a scientific body established pursuant to
the Act."s The EPA focused on the nature and severity of adverse health
175. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct.
2003 (2000) (mem.); 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (mem.). Only four judges voted to deny the petition,
while five would have granted a rehearing en banc. Because Judges Wald and Henderson did not
participate, the EPA failed to get the vote of a majority of the judges in regular active service. See
195 F.3d at 13.
176. Am. Trucking, 120 S. Ct. at 2003 (mem.). A few days later, the Court also granted the
industry's petition for certiorari to review the EPA's interpretation of the statute as prohibiting a
consideration of costs in setting the NAAQS. Am. Trucking, 120 S. Ct. at 2193 (mem.).
177. Clean Air Act § 109(b)(1), (d), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b), (d) (1994). The Act also requires
secondary NAAQS to protect the "public welfare," id. § 7409 (b)(2) (1994), which generally
includes effects on the environment as well as "economic values," 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h) (1994).
Criteria pollutants are those air pollutants caused by "numerous or diverse" sources that have an
adverse effect on public health or welfare, as listed by the EPA pursuant to section 108, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7408(a) (1994).
178. Clean Air Act § 109(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(1) (1994).
179. Clean Air Act §§ 108, 109, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408(a)(2), 7409(b)(1) (1994).
180. Clean Air Act § 101(b)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1994).
181. Sunstein, Air 11, supra note 48, at 323 n.84, tbl. 1.
182. See Clean Air Act § 109(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2) (1994). CASAC also peer-
reviewed the EPA's staff reports regarding the health effects of ozone and particulate matter. See
Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1999), modified on petition for
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effects, the size of the at-risk population, and the degree of scientific
uncertainty at various levels of exposure.'13 However, the agency could not
pinpoint with precision an ambient concentration level for either ozone or
particulate matter "requisite to protect the public health" with an "adequate
margin of safety.""
Focusing on ozone as representative of the rulemaking at issue, the EPA
faced a difficult task because ozone is regarded as a non-threshold pollutant-
one which likely causes adverse health affects at any exposure level above
zero." EPA Administrator Carol Browner explained that the agency's risk
assessment of exposures at levels above zero "indicated differences in risk to
the public among various levels ... but they did not by themselves provide a
clear break point for a decision."'" In the face of scientific uncertainties, the
EPA decided to replace the existing 0.12 parts per million ("ppm") standard,
based on one-hour average concentration levels, with a new 0.08 ppm eight-
hour standard, a level that had been recommended by CASAC.'8 It
determined that more people are exposed to more serious and long-term
effects at levels above 0.08 ppm. '" In rejecting a more stringent standard,
the EPA explained that 0.07 ppm was closer to peak background levels from
non-anthropogenic sources of ozone, 89 and that "[t]he most certain 03-
reh'g, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000) (mem.); 120 S. Ct.
2193 (2000) (mem.). Oxides of nitrogen and other pollutants react with sunlight to form ozone, or
smog; thus, the effects of these precursors were considered in the rulemaking. Id.
183. See Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1035 (citing National Ambient Air Quality Standard for
Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,868, 38,883 (Jul. 18, 1997)).
184. Alec C. Zacaroli, Court Rulings Imperil EPA's Efforts to Clamp Down on Ozone
Pollution, 30 ENV'T REP. 325, 326 (1999).
185. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone: Proposed Decision, 61 Fed. Reg.
65,716, 65,727 (1996) (noting that "it is not possible to select a level below which absolutely no
effects are likely to occur"). "03 may elicit a continuum of biological responses down to
background concentrations." Id. (quoting G.T. Wolff, Letter from Chairman of Clean Air Scientific
Advisory Committee to EPA Administrator (Nov. 30, 1995) (EPA-SAB-CASAC-LTR-96-002)).
For a detailed assessment of the particulate matter NAAQS, see Sunstein, Air I1, supra note 48, at
325-330. See also Joseph M. Feller, Non-Threshold Pollutants and Air Quality Standards, 24
Envtl. L. 821, 825 (1991) (concluding "attempts to deal rationally with the problems of air
pollution are frustrated because the threshold assumption is built into the Act").
186. EPA Proposed Clean Air Regulations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Env't and Pub.
Works, 105th Cong. (1997) (testimony of Carol M. Browner, Adm'r, EPA).
187. National 8-Hour Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 40
C.F.R. § 50.10; National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856 (July 18,
1997). The new standard is roughly equivalent to a one-hour standard set at 0.09 ppm. National
Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,868.
188. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,868.
189. Id. Thus, regulatory efforts in regions that fail to attain 0.08 ppm would more likely
reach controllable human activity rather than natural levels of ozone. See Am. Trucking Ass'ns v.
EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Tatel, J., dissenting), modified on petition for reh'g,
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related effects [at 0.07 ppm], while judged to be adverse, are transient and
reversible. " 9"
The court did not seriously question the science behind the 0.08 ppm
standard, noting that the EPA's conclusions were within the range
recommended by CASAC and based on hundreds of studies published in
peer-reviewed journals on ozone's effects on human respiratory functions.'"
Instead, the court found that the agency had failed to articulate an
"intelligible principle" in setting its new standards,19 stating that "it is as
though Congress commanded EPA to select 'big guys,' and EPA announced
that it would evaluate candidates based on height and weight, but revealed no
cutoff point." 93 While such an approach may seem sensible enough on its
face, the court stated, a reasonable person would also ask, "'How tall?'
'How heavy?""'
According to the court, the EPA had examined appropriate factors to
focus the inquiry on ozone's effects on public health at various exposure
levels-the severity and certainty of adverse health effects, and the size of
population affected. 9 Even so, it found that the EPA lacked a "determinate
criterion for drawing lines" to justify the selection of any exposure level
above zero.' 96 The agency's rationale for its choice of revised NAAQS
"leaves it free to pick any point between zero and a hair below the
concentrations yielding London's Killer Fog."" 97
The EPA's interpretation of section 109 was equated with OSHA's efforts
to enact standards "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or
healthful employment," 98 which were invalidated in International Union,
195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000) (mem.); 120 S. Ct. 2193
(2000) (mem.).
190. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,868.
191. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1035-37, 1059-60.
192. Id. at 1034. The court found the particulate matter standard deficient on similar grounds.
Id. at 1036.
193. Id. at 1034.
194. Id. (citations omitted).
195. Id. at 1034-35 (citing National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg.
at 38,883). The three criteria used by the EPA to assess health effects were expressly approved by
the court in Lead Industries Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1161-62 (D.C. Cir. 1980). There, the
court explicitly rejected Lead Industries' argument that the EPA must consider costs and
technological feasibility in setting lead NAAQS. Id. at 1153.
196. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034.
197. Id. at 1037. In 1952, extremely high particulate matter levels, up to 2,500 g/m3,
contributed to 4,000 deaths in one week. Id. at 1036 (citing W.P.D. Logan, Mortality in the
London Fog Incident, 1952, The Lancet, Feb. 4, 1953, at 336-38).
198. Id. at 1037.
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UAW v. OSHA ("Lockout/Tagout I"). '" In that case, a regulation requiring
employers to lock or tag energy isolating devices, such as circuit breakers,
when maintaining or servicing industrial equipment was remanded for a more
precise definition.' The D.C. Circuit rejected OSHA's view that it could
impose any feasible restriction it chose as unreasonably broad in light of
nondelegation principles.'
Similarly, in American Trucking, the court found that the EPA's
interpretation was so broad that it violated the nondelegation doctrine.
"EPA's freedom of movement between the poles" is as unconstrained as that
asserted by OSHA in Lockout/Tagout L "but the poles are even farther
apart-the maximum stringency would send industry not just to the brink of
ruin but hurtling over it, while the minimum stringency may be close to
doing nothing at all. "'
Judge Tatel, in dissent, had no difficulty distinguishing Lockout/Tagout I.
Unlike the Occupational Safey and Health Act:
The Clean Air Act does not delegate to EPA authority to do
whatever is 'reasonably necessary or appropriate' to protect public
health. Instead the statute directs the Agency to fashion standards
that are 'requisite' to protect the public health. In other words,
EPA must set pollution standards at levels necessary to protect the
public health, whether 'reasonable' or not, whether 'appropriate'
or not. 20
3
In other words, Congress did not allow the EPA to prioritize economic
considerations over health in setting the NAAQS pursuant to the Clean Air
Act; Congress itself chose health as its priority by precluding a consideration
of costs. 2" As such, the Act's requirement that standards be set as
"requisite" for public health, according to Judge Tatel, was far more
analogous to the regulation upheld in International Union, UAW v. OSHA
("Lockout/Tagout II"),m5 where OSHA identified a "'significant' safety risk,
to enact a safety standard that provides a 'high degree of worker
199. 938 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting language on standards from the Occupational
Safety and Health Act §3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1994)).
200. Id. at 1312-13.
201. Id. at 1313. This decision was written by Judge Steven Williams, who also penned the
nondelegation part of the American Trucking opinion. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1027.
202. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1037.
203. Id. at 1058 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (second emphasis added).
204. See Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1148-55 (1980) (finding that Congress
had prohibited the EPA from considering the economic or technological feasibility of attaining
NAAQS); Adler, supra note 67, at 10,243 (citing language of § 108(a)(2) and legislative history to
support conclusion that Congress made the basic policy choice: health).
205. 37 F.3d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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protection.'" ' Either way, the agencies are directed to "ensure a high
degree of protection. "'
Judge Tatel also took issue with his colleagues' critique of the EPA's
rationale for differentiating between 0.08 ppm and some more stringent
regulatory level. "[The] EPA did not find simply that public health risks
decrease at lower levels. Instead, it found that public health effects differ
below 0.08 ppm, i.e., that they are 'transient and reversible,'" and that 0.08
ppm, unlike 0.07 ppm, was distinguishable from background ozone levels.' °
Moreover, the EPA's extensive review of relevant studies, and of CASAC's
recommendations, was in line with the Act's requirements that the NAAQS
"accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge" about effects of air
pollution on human health.2 9  In any event, Judge Tatel pointed out that
"[wihether EPA arbitrarily selected the studies it relied upon or drew
mistaken conclusions from those studies ... has nothing to do with our
inquiry under the nondelegation doctrine. Those issues relate to whether the
NAAQS are arbitrary and capricious. "210
Judge Tatel hit the nail on the head. The starting point for analysis of a
nondelegation claim should be the congressional directive as set forth in the
language of the statute, in view of the statute's purpose, history and
context. 21' After all, the focus of the inquiry is whether Congress has
unlawfully delegated legislative powers and unconstitutionally blurred the
lines of power between the branches of government. A central purpose of
the nondelegation doctrine is to insure that Congress, a legislative body
comprised of diverse representatives from all different geographical areas of
the United States, makes the basic policy choices, rather than unelected
agency officials.21 2  How, then, can the EPA fi'x the problem of
206. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1059 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (citing Lockout/Tagout II, 37 F.3d
at 669). OSHA's second regulatory attempt, after the remand in Lockout/Tagout 1, was found to
satisfy nondelegation concerns because its new interpretation, requiring "a high degree of worker
protection" once a "significant" safety risk was identified, would only allow deviation from
maximum feasible stringency by a "modest" amount. Lockout/Tagout 1, 37 F.3d at 669; see also
Industrial Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (the Benzene case).
207. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1059 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 1059-60 (emphasis added). The majority opinion stated that the EPA's rationale
for choosing 0.08 ppm amounted to nothing more than unremarkable assertions "that a less
stringent standard would allow the relevant pollutant to inflict a greater quantum of harm on public
health, and that a more stringent standard would result in less harm." Id. at 1035.
209. Id. at 1058 (quoting Clean Air Act § 108, 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2) (1994)).
210. Id. at 1061 (emphasis added). See generally infra Part IV (discussing judicial review
under administrative law principles as a viable alternative to nondelegation analysis).
211. See Am. Power & Light, Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946).
212. Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring); Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1038.
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congressional abdication if, in fact, abdication is evident in the Act? If the
Act is so obscure as to provide no intelligible directives to the agency, surely
that would be evidence that Congress intentionally chose to punt on basic
policy choices-a course of action forbidden by the nondelegation doctrine
and therefore impossible for an agent of the executive branch to fix.
Despite judicial protestations to the contrary, the majority opinion in
American Trucking seems more in line with the Relmquistian predilection to
subject certain delegations to "strict" review than with any precedent
provided by post-New Deal Supreme Court decisions.1 3 In support of its
decision to invalidate the NAAQS on nondelegation grounds, the court cited
only two Supreme Court majority opinions, Schechter Poultry' 4 and a 1928
case, J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States.2t 5 Ironically, in J. W.
Hampton the Court found that a law authorizing the President to regulate
customs duties was not an invalid delegation of legislative power.26 The
Court stated that it was simply a matter of "common sense" that a
commission would be endowed with the power to investigate, take evidence
from interested parties, and fix rates in accord with general objectives laid
down by Congress.1 7
The statute at issue in Schechter Poultry, NIRA, delegated legislative
power, not to an executive agency like the EPA, but to private groups. 21 In
fact, of the few Supreme Court cases to strike down congressional
delegations, both Schechter Poultry and Carter Coal involved delegations to
private unions and trade associations.2'9 In Carter Coal, a statute that
allowed a majority of miners to set a minimum wage and limit hours worked
during the week was invalidated as "delegation in its most obnoxious
213. The court protested that it was not reading "current Supreme Court cases as applying the
strong form of the nondelegation doctrine" advanced by Chief Justice Rehnquist in, for example,
Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 685-86 (Rehnquist, J., concurring), and American Textile
Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 546-47 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1038.
214. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
215. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
216. Id. at 409.
217. Id. at 407-08.
218. National Industrial Recovery Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 702-702f (1964) (repealed 1966);
Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 536-37.
219. Id. at 521-23, 551; see also Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936). Although
the Court's decision in Carter Coal rested on Fifth Amendment due process concerns, the Court
critiqued the Coal Conservation Act in terms of a delegation problem, citing Schechter Poultry as
precedent. See id. Only one Supreme Court case, Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,
417-19 (1935), actually invalidated a congressional delegation because it lacked standards to
adequately inform the exercise of executive branch authority. Jeffrey A. Needelman, Attacking
Federal Restrictions on Noncitizens' Access to Public Benefits on Constitutional Grounds: A Survey
of Relevant Doctrines, 11 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 349, 374-75 (1997).
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form."' The broad-sweeping delegation to private interests, who could then
exercise power to promote themselves at the expense of other members of
the same trade or industry, was rife with improper factional influences, and
therefore highly offensive to separation of powers principles."' But a
delegation of legislative power to the regulated industry is a far. cry from the
directive to the EPA to issue NAAQS "requisite to protect public health. "2
Moreover, both Carter Coal and Schechter Poultry rested on alternative
grounds not explicitly raised in American Trucking. The Supreme Court
viewed the legislative provisions at issue in those two cases through the lens
of Lochner and found them to be beyond the Commerce Clause power,
which, for a brief period of time, was thought to extend only to activities
with "direct effects" on interstate commerce.' The subsequent overruling
of Lochner 4 cast doubt on the enduring precedential value of related cases
like Carter Coal, Schechter Poultry, and even Panama Refining, the only
Supreme Court case to invalidate a congressional delegation to the executive
branch for lack of intelligible standards.'
Jurists and scholars alike, with few dissenters, have noted the justifiable
demise of the nondelegation doctrine in the modem era.226 In post-New Deal
cases, the Supreme Court has found that broad delegations to executive
agencies have not presented separation of powers concerns; to the contrary,
such delegations could even be viewed as a proper expression of
220. 298 U.S. at 311.
221. See Sunstein, Agency Inaction, supra note 51, at 655 n.16. Some state courts have
stated, or at least implied, that any delegation to private parties is intolerable. E.g., Rogers v.
Med. Ass'n, 259 So.2d 85, 87 (Ga. 1979); Gunbhir v. Kan. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 618 P.2d 837,
840-42 (Kan. 1980); Hetherington v. McHale, 329 A.2d 250, 253-54 (Pa. 1974).
222. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1994).
223. See Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 307-09; Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 546-51; Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); see also Needelman, supra note 219, at 375-76.
224. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116, 123 (1941) (overruling the "direct
effects" test of Hammer, limiting Carter Coal, and, by implication, limiting Lochner); NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (holding that, activities which, taken
singularly, are intrastate in nature, may be regulated if together they have a "substantial relation to
interstate commerce").
225. Needelman, supra note 219, at 376 (concluding that Schechter Poultry and Carter Coal,
along with Panama Refining, "by association," could be considered bad law after Darby (citing
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUST 132-33 (1980))); see also United States v. Frank,
864 F.2d 992, 1010 (3rd Cir. 1988) (referring to Schechter Poultry as "aberrational"). Professor
Sunstein, in contrast, believes that Schechter Poultry was correctly decided because "it did not
discipline executive authority, and indeed it operated as a grant of lawmaking power to private
groups." Sunstein, Air I1, supra note 48, at 356.
226. See Needelman, supra note 219, at 374-76; Sunstein, Agency Inaction, supra note 51, at
655 & n.17; see also Federal Power Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 352-53
(1974) (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that the doctrine "has been virtually abandoned by this
Court for all practical purposes").
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congressional will consistent with Article I, which ought not be disturbed by
the courts:'
Only if we could say that there is an absence of standards for the
guidance of the Administrator's action, so that it would be
impossible in a proper proceeding to ascertain whether the will of
Congress has been obeyed, would we be justified in overriding its
choice of means for effecting its declared purpose .... 22
It is doubtful that the Clean Air Act could be construed as a complete
absence of standards, particularly in light of other delegations which have
survived constitutional challenge, e.g., allowing the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") to regulate broadcasting "in the public interest." ' 9 If
the Supreme Court does adopt the D.C. Circuit's approach to the
nondelegation issue in American Trucking, it would be a dramatic departure
from more than half a century of Supreme Court jurisprudence. In the
aftermath of such a decision, establishing a more precise standard could well
be an insurmountable task, given the efforts that the EPA has already made
in reaching its revised ozone and particulate matter NAAQS.
The D.C. Circuit acknowledged that a more "determinate" approach
would be to set the NAAQS at zero and eradicate any hint of direct health
risk.y It quickly backed away from this option, however, noting that no
party advocated such a drastic solution." At the opposite extreme, the court
took note of the industry's argument that a consideration of economic costs
could curb the EPA's ability to set excessively stringent NAAQS, but the
court disposed of this issue in short order, agreeing that the agency cannot
consider costs under section 109 of the Clean Air Act. 2 The D.C. Circuit
has been steadfast in holding that costs play no role in setting the NAAQS:
Congress made a "'deliberate decision . . to subordinate such concerns to
the achievement of health goals.' . . [mhe 'technology-forcing'
requirements of the Act were expressly designed to force regulated sources
to develop pollution control devices that might at the time appear to be
227. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996); Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 379 (1989).
228. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 378-79 (citing Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425-26
(1944)) (emphasis added).
229. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943).
230. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999), modified on
petition for reh'g, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000) (mem.);
120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (mem.).
231. Id.
232. See id. (citing Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 973 (D.C.
Cir. 1990), modified on other grounds, 921 F.2d 326 (1991)).
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economically or technologically infeasible. "2 3  Nonetheless, the court's
resolution of the nondelegation issue in American Trucking could be
characterized as industry's successful end-run at finally getting costs into the
NAAQS-setting process.'3 In any event, the Supreme Court granted the
Association's petition for certiorari on the cost issue, providing it with an
opportunity to invalidate the NAAQS without reaching the constitutional
issue."3
The D.C. Circuit did offer some concrete suggestions to guide the EPA
on remand. The agency might avoid the nondelegation problem, according
to the court, by assigning "weights" to a "range of ailments short of death,"
using clinical criteria to decide whether an effect counts as an "adverse
health effect."236 This suggestion sounds quite a bit like a remand of
arbitrary agency action, rather than a solution for a constitutional problem.
Yet, if the statute does in fact improperly delegate legislative power to the
EPA, it defies logic to contend that the agency itself can somehow fix the
constitutional impairment simply by articulating and applying additional
criteria. 7
233. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting Lead
Indus. Ass'n, v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
234. As Justice Brennan once noted, "candor compels recognition that our cases regarding the
delegation by Congress of lawmaking power do not always say what they seem to mean."
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 273 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
235. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Browner, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (mem.). Interestingly, the
Court denied industry's petitions for certiorari on the same issue in NRDC v. EPA, Lead Industries,
and American Petroleun v. Costle.
236. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1038-39. In its per curiam order denying rehearing on the
nondelegation issue, the D.C. Circuit rejected the EPA's arguments that non-transient effects or a
ninety-five percent confidence level would serve as an intelligible limiting principle, stating that the
court could only decide if the nondelegation doctrine was satisfied "after the EPA itself has applied
[these parameters] in setting a NAAQS." Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4, 6-7 (D.C.
Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000) (mem.); 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (mem.).
237. See Am. Trucking, 195 F.3d at 14-15 (Silberman, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing); SUNSTEIN, AIR I, supra note 48, at 29. Professor Lisa Bressman disagrees, arguing
that the D.C. Circuit's "new delegation doctrine," where courts remand suspect provisions to
administrative agencies instead of invalidating the statute itself, offers courts a meaningful tool to
curtail abuses of discretion while acting in a manner more respectful of administrative expertise.
See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millenium: A Delegation Doctrine
for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1406-42 (2000). This option possesses notable
virtues, in that it avoids legislative inability to reenact statutes set aside as unconstitutional,
particularly when contentious detail-laden provisions are required; and it accentuates the advantages
of administrative rulemaking. But it has a serious downside in that it fails to satisfy the fundamental
basis for having a nondelegation doctrine in the first place-ensuring that Congress makes the basic
policy choices, and keeping core legislative, executive and judicial powers separate. See id. at
1416-1417 (conceding that the "new delegation doctrine" cannot remedy the separation of powers
problem). See also LOCKE, supra note 67, §§ 135-137, 220-222 ("The power of the legislative
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In the end, although the court seemed to use the nondelegation doctrine as
a rule of statutory construction to curtail the agency's discretion, rather than
a constitutional test,23 it at least recognized that Congress, in enacting the
Clean Air Act, may have left the EPA constitutionally vulnerable by failing
to articulate an "intelligible principle" on which to base the NAAQS.23 9 If
the agency is unable to craft "a determinate standard on its own," the court
noted, it could ask Congress to fix the problem by legislatively "ratifying its
choice" of ozone standards.' But this gives small solace to an agency
charged with administering the Act and other complex statutes, many of
which require extensive fact-finding, technical expertise, and politically
charged policy judgments regarding risks and benefits to human health and
the environment. The decision arguably provides even less solace for
members of the public, who have more reason to trust the EPA's
conclusions, resulting from lengthy rulemaking procedures with opportunity
for input at various points along the way, than the last minute trade-offs that
can result from legislative processes.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF "STRICT" NONDELEGATION REVIEW: THEDEVIL IN THE DETAILS
Strict nondelegation review, as exhibited in American Trucking, could
actually exacerbate separation of powers concerns. By calling upon the
judiciary to distinguish "intelligible" from unintelligible principles based on
nuances in legislative nomenclature, the doctrine denies the courts a
predictable reviewing role, ultimately undermining the rule of law. Further,
a resurrected nondelegation doctrine would inhibit the government's ability
to enact and implement even-handed, effective laws and regulations,
ultimately making both Congress and executive agencies less responsive to
the public will.
A. A Spectrum of Legislative Principles, Dubiously Intelligible
If strict nondelegation review were to become the law of the land, with a
"fetish" for legislative semantics as the predominant criterion for testing
delegations, a variety of regulatory provisions-many of which are far less
... can be no other than what the positive grant [from the people] conveyed, which being only to
make laws, and not to make legislators .. ").
238. See Adler, supra note 67, at 10,239.
239. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1036-37.
240. Id. at 1038, 1040.
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detailed than the Clean Air Act-would be vulnerable to attack. Indeed, by
some accounts, ninety-nine percent of the regulatory statutes currently found
in the United States Code could be struck down.241 Under the American
Trucking approach, the greater the discretion granted to an agency via
legislative generality or ambiguity, the more likely the statute itself, or the
agency's exercise of statutory power, will fall to a nondelegation challenge.
Statutory delegations governing agency action can be loosely categorized
into a spectrum, ranging from mandatory duties to wholly discretionary
activities. Environmental statutes are used to represent the regulatory array,
not only because American Trucking focused on the Clean Air Act but, more
importantly, because environmental issues tend to be highly visible and often
serve as proving grounds for controversial legal theories. While the function
of this section is, in part, descriptive, the depiction of a range of
representative statutes based on the type of language employed by Congress
illustrates that a search for "intelligible" guiding principles, particularly in
the vast mid-range of the scale, is at best an elusive undertaking.
At one end of the statutory spectrum are a handful of mandatory or
ministerial requirements that are virtually immune to nondelegation claims.
Statutory deadlines, for example, are fairly common in environmental law,
dictating timeframes for listing endangered species and certain types of
pollutants, along with technology-based standards for regulating those
pollutants. 242  The timing issue does not present a nondelegation issue;
Congress has done the heavy lifting itself by making the decision in the
statute. The agency has no wherewithal to avoid meeting the established
deadlines, even if it has good reason for delay. 3 Instead, it must simply
241. E.g., George I. Lovell, That Sick Chicken Won't Hunt: The Limits of a Judicially
Enforced Non-Delegation Doctrine, 17 CONST. COMM. 79, 86 (2000) (citing Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Political Accountability and Delegated Power: A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. REV.
391, 401 (1987)).
242. See Endangered Species Act § 4(b)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3) (1994) (specifying
deadlines for responding to petitions to list species as endangered or threatened); Clean Water Act §
303(d)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2) (1994) (specifying deadlines for total maximum daily loads);
Clean Air Act § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1994) (directing that, for those criteria
pollutants listed after 1970, the EPA simultaneously propose NAAQS).
243. See Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975) (holding that,
under Clean Air Act § 1 10(a)(2), the EPA must approve a state implementation plan "so long as the
ultimate effect of a State's choice of emission limitations is compliance with the national standards
for ambient air"); Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178, 1192-93 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding
that "the Secretary violated non-discretionary duty by failing to designate as critical the habitat for
the Rio Grande silvery minnow by the statutory deadline"); Oregon Natural Resources Council,
Inc. v. Kantor, 99 F.3d 334, 338-39 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that the Endangered Species Act
clearly required the Secretary to publish final regulations listing threatened species of salmon within
twelve months of date on which proposed regulation had been published).
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"take care" to implement the legislative decision, clearly an executive
function under Article 11.2 44
Moving along on the spectrum, a few statutory directives can be
described as "mixed," making them at least partially subject to nondelegation
challenges. These are only discretionary to a point, at which time mandatory
duties kick in. For example, in listing criteria air pollutants under section
108 of the Clean Air Act, the EPA Administrator must include those air
pollutants caused by "numerous or diverse" sources, that, "in his judgment,"
have an adverse effect on public health or welfare.'S Although the statute
provides for a fair amount of leeway in making the determination that a
pollutant has an adverse effect on health or welfare, once that determination
is made, the agency "shall" list the pollutant, and may not consider
alternative control strategies. 2 6
Similarly, the Secretary of Interior is required to issue patents for mineral
deposits on federal public lands under the 1872 Mining Act.u 7 Courts have
described the issuance of a patent as a nondiscretionary, even ministerial,
act.' However, before a patent will issue, the Secretary must determine
whether the application covers a "valuable mineral deposit."' Although the
Mining Act does not define "valuable" or provide any standards to guide the
inquiry, the Secretary has been allowed great discretion in developing and
applying a marketability test for determining which deposits are valuable.5 °
The Secretary's factual findings in applying the test are generally upheld if
supported by substantial evidence. 5  It is quite possible that this type of
244. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. In contrast, a fair amount of discretion is involved in the
substantive component of the decision (e.g., whether a particular pollutant or species meets the
criteria for listing; how stringent a pollutant standard should be), which would fall in the mid-range
of the spectrum.
245. Clean Air Act § 108(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The
provision has since been amended to require the listing of pollutants from numerous and diverse
sources "which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." Clean Air
Act § 108(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A).
246. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 324-25 (2d Cir. 1976)
(requiring the EPA to list lead as a criteria air pollutant).
247. 30 U.S.C. § 29 (1994).
248. E.g., Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 459-60 (1920); Roberts v. United States,
176 U.S. 221, 231 (1900); South Dakota v. Andrus, 614 F.2d 1190, 1193 (citing Wilbur v. United
States er rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306, 318-19 (1930)).
249. 30 U.S.C. § 29.
250. E.g., United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599, 601-03 (1968); Converse v. Udall, 399
F.2d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1968); In re Pac. Coast Molybdenum Co., 90 Interior Dec. 352, 361-63
(1983); Castle v. Womble, 19 Pub. Lands Dec. 455 (1894).
251. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Dombeck, 168 F.3d 367, 375 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that
substantial evidence supported the determination that a valuable mineral deposit existed based on
"geologic inference," i.e., "the reasonable likelihood of the persistence of similar mineralization
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threshold determination could fall under the "strict" delegation review
exhibited in American Trucking.
Most regulatory statutes are mid-range on the discretionary scale,
providing overall policy objectives plus some substantive standards to guide
the agency. The requirement that the EPA establish national ambient air
quality standards ("NAAQS") "requisite to protect public health" with "an
adequate margin of safety" 2 would be included in this category, as would
the Clean Water Act's requirement for setting technology-based standards for
certain pollutants using the "best available technology economically
achievable" ("BAT"). 3 The Clean Water Act is arguably closer to the
"safe" end of the spectrum, as it specifies a number of factors for the EPA to
consider in setting BAT, including the costs of achieving effluent reduction,
given the processes and "age of equipment and facilities involved."' This
distinction is merely a matter of degree, more quantitative than qualitative in
nature; the Clean Water Act still leaves a fair amount of discretion to the
agency, in that it does not direct a specific outcome based on costs, nor does
it require cost-benefit analysis. These mid-range provisions are likely to fail
strict nondelegation review because they lack precise parameters to confine
the agency's discretion, even though they typically include fairly extensive
procedural safeguards to protect against arbitrary outcomes."
The Antiquities Act of 1906,256 an example of a public lands statute mid-
range on the "intelligible principles" scale, has been challenged on
nondelegation grounds in several recent lawsuits." This statute has fewer
substantive standards to constrain agency discretion than does the Clean
beyond the areas actually sampled or exposed"); Hallenbeck v. Kleppe, 590 F.2d 852, 856-60 (10th
Cir. 1979) (upholding the Secretary's decision that no prudent person would develop mining claims
without a further showing of marketable discovery; decision was supported by substantial
evidence). But see Baker v. United States, 613 F.2d 224, 226-30 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that the
Department of the Interior's adoption of a "too much" test, which would deny patents on
marketable deposits for those additional claims in excess of the market need for the mineral, was an
abuse of discretion).
252. Clean Air Act § 109(b)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1994) (requiring NAAQS).
253. Clean Water Act §§ 301(b)(2)(A), 304(b)(2); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(2)(A), 1314(b)(2)
(1994).
254. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B).
255. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314(b), (m), 1361(a), 1365, 1369 (1994) (Clean Water Act
provisions directing publication of regulations in the Federal Register, and procedures for
administrative action, citizens suits and judicial review); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409(a), (d), 7601(a), 7604,
7607 (1994) (Clean Air Act provisions directing publication and review of regulations, and
procedures for administrative action, citizens suits and judicial review); see also Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994) (requiring informal rulemaking, with publication in Federal
Register and opportunities for public participation).
256. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1994).
257. For a discussion of these lawsuits, see infra notes 439-40 and accompanying text.
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Water Act or the Clean Air Act, and, if linguistics were the only
consideration, it would probably fail strict nondelegation review. The
Antiquities Act gives the President discretion to preserve public lands by
declaring "historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other
objects of historic or scientific interest . . to be national monuments." 58
The reservations are to encompass "parcels of land, the limits of which in all
cases shall be confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care
and management of the objects to be protected.""u9 Presidents of both parties
have exercised this power extensively throughout the twentieth century,
withdrawing millions of acres from extractive activities, like mining and
logging, to create the Grand Canyon National Monument,2' Jackson Hole
National Monument,26" ' and, most recently, the Grand Staircase-Escalante
National Monument and the Grand Canyon-Parashant National
Monument.262 Designation decisions have been challenged on a variety of
grounds over the years, including nondelegation, but none have been set
aside as yet,263 quite possibly because, as explained in Section VI, the
exercise of power over federal public lands does not raise the same concerns
as do other types of executive power.
At the far end of the spectrum, most susceptible to a reinvigorated
nondelegation doctrine, are a handful of statutes that provide no substantive
standards, much less intelligible principles, to guide the Executive's
discretion. Although the Administrative Procedure Act provides that final
agency action is subject to judicial review, §701(a)(2) exempts decisions
258. 16 U.S.C. § 431.
259. Id.
260. See Proclamation, 35 Stat. 2175 (1908). The Grand Canyon subsequently became a
National Park by act of Congress. See 16 U.S.C. § 221 (1994). See generally Cameron v. United
States, 252 U.S. 450, 454-64 (1920) (discussing history of withdrawal and designation).
261. See Proclamation No. 2578, 57 Stat. 731 (1943); see also 16 U.S.C. § 406d-1 (including
portions of the Jackson Hole National Monument within the Grand Teton National Park); d. §
482m (including portions of the Jackson Hole National Monument within the Teton National
Forest); Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890, 895-97 (D. Wyo. 1945).
262. See Proclamation No. 7265, 65 Fed. Reg. 2825 (2000) (designating the Grand Canyon-
Parashant National Monument); Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223 (1996) (designating
the Escalante National Monument). Two additional monuments were designated at the same time as
the Parashant National Monument. See Proclamation No. 7263, 65 Fed. Reg. 2817 (establishing
the Agua Fria National Monument); Proclamation No. 7264, 65 Fed. Reg. 2821 (establishing the
California Coastal National Monument).
263. E.g., Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 131-32 (1976) (Death Valley); Cameron,
252 U.S. at 459-64 (Grand Canyon); Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp. 1155, 1164-65 (D. Alaska
1978) (seventeen monuments in Alaska, totaling fifty-six million acres); Franke, 58 F. Supp. at
895-97 (Grand Tetons); Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus, 14 E.R.C. (BNA) 1853, 1854 (D.
Alaska 1980) (three monuments in Alaska). For a detailed discussion of the nondelegation doctrine
as applied to decisions affecting public lands and resources, see infra Part VI.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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"committed to agency discretion by law."' The Act's exception to judicial
review applies only "in those rare instances where 'statutes are drawn in
such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.'"' A prime
example is the exercise of prosecutorial discretion or enforcement power. In
Heckler v. Chaney,2' the Supreme Court held that the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"), which stated that "[t]he Secretary is
authorized to conduct examinations and investigations," provided no
standards regarding the prosecution of violations. 267  An executive agency's
"decision not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing of a number
of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise."' As a result, the Court
determined that the Secretary's refusal to initiate FDCA enforcement action
was committed to agency discretion by law.269
Although prosecutorial discretion can be thought of as uniquely within the
realm of the executive branch, there are a few other types of executive
actions that have been exempted from judicial review under § 701.
Decisions related to budgetary matters, such as the allocation of general
funds, as well as those related to national security, immigration, and
deportation status have been found "committed to agency discretion by
law. " '27 There are also several public lands statutes that arguably provide
"no law to apply." The Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act ("MUSYA") of
264. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1994) (insulating actions "committed to agency discretion by law"
from judicial review); Id. § 704 (1994) ("Agency action made reviewable by statute and final
agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in court are subject to judicial review.").
265. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (quoting S.
REP. No. 79-752, at 26 (1945)).
266. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
267. Id. at 835-38.
268. Id. at 831. In Heckler, the Court observed that judicial review of enforcement decisions
would raise separation of powers problems because they have the same characteristics as decisions
to indict and such decisions are considered the "special province of the executive branch." Id. at
832. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, I., dissenting) (arguing that
independent counsel provisions violate separation of powers because all law enforcement power
must be vested wholly within the Executive Branch).
269. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 835-38.
270. E.g., Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192-93 (1993) (denying review of agency's
allocation of funds from a lump-sum appropriation as committed to agency discretion to adapt to
changing circumstances and meet its statutory responsibilities in the most effective way); Webster v.
Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599-601 (1988) (denying review of the merits of a decision by the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency to terminate an employee in the interests of national security);
Achacoso-Sanchez v. INS, 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that executive decision not
to reopen deportation proceedings to adjust deportable alien's status was virtually unreviewable);
see also ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. 270, 276, 278-82 (1987) (holding
that, where unions petitioned for review of an administrative order exempting participants in a rail
consolidation from protection afforded railroad employees, the agency's refusal to grant
reconsideration is committed to agency discretion).
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196027' is an example of a highly discretionary statute that provides virtually
no direction to the agency. MUSYA quite simply and succinctly directs the
Forest Service to ensure that forest resources are available for multiple uses
and that they maintain sustained yields.'m Understandably, the statute has
been described as "breath[ing] discretion at every pore." 271 MUSYA has
since been supplemented with the National Forest Management Act,274 which
constrains the agency's discretion by providing shape and form to the
multiple-use sustained-yield concept through detailed planning
requirements.275
Similarly, the Taylor Grazing Act of 193426 provides little guidance to
the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") with regard to grazing on public
lands. It allows the Secretary of Interior to regulate the "occupancy and
use" of grazing districts, "to preserve the land and its resources from
destruction or unnecessary injury, [and] to provide for the orderly use,
improvement, and development of the range. ,2' Grazing permits are to
specify numbers of livestock as well as seasons of use. 78 These provisions,
standing alone, have been found to lack "law to apply."279
271. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1994).
272. Id. §§ 528, 531.
273. Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing Strickland v. Morton, 519
F.2d 467, 469 (9th Cir. 1975)); see also Ness Inv. Corp. v. USDA, 512 F.2d 706, 715, 718 (9th
Cir. 1975) (finding that the Secretary of Agriculture's power to grant or deny a special use permit
for the construction of a recreational facility for use on national forest land is committed to agency
discretion under 16 U.S.C. § 497).
274. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
275. See id. § 1604; see also Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Reg'l Forester, 833 F.2d
810, 813 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that Forest Service regulations provided standards for the
consideration of special use permits so that permit decisions are reviewable), rev'd on other grounds
sub nor. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989). As the
Supreme Court recently noted, "[a]t the time a statute is enacted, it may have a range of plausible
meanings. Over time, however, subsequent acts can shape or focus those meanings." FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco, Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291, 1306 (2000).
276. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1994).
277. Id. § 315a.
278. Id. § 315b; see also id. § 1752(e) (1994) (requiring that permits specify "the numbers of
animals to be grazed").
279. See Mollohan v. Gray, 413 F.2d 349, 352-53 (9th Cir. 1969); Sellas v. Kirk, 200 F.2d
217, 220 (9th Cir. 1952). Courts have reached similar results regarding the Secretary's
implementation of other public lands statutes. E.g., Nelson v. Andrus, 591 F.2d 1265, 1266 (9th
Cir. 1978) (holding that the Secretary's decision to classify land as suitable for entry under Desert
Land Act, 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1994), was committed to agency discretion); cf. City of Santa Clara v.
Andrus, 572 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding preference clauses of the Reclamation Act of 1939,
43 U.S.C. § 485h(c) (1994), and the Flood Control Act of 1944, 16 U.S.C. § 825s (1994),
provided "no law to apply" to Secretary's denial of allocation of hydroelectric power generated by
federal reclamation project).
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However, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act ("FLPMA"),
enacted in 1976, adds that permits should include "such terms and conditions
as [the Secretary] deems appropriate for management of the ... lands. "
Further, permits must retain authority to "reexamine the condition of the
range at any time and, if ... the condition of the range requires adjustment
in the amount or other aspect of grazing use, that the permittee or lessee
shall adjust his use to the extent the Secretary concerned deems
necessary." 28' FLPMA also provides that the BLM "shall" take any action
needed to prevent "unnecessary or undue degradation" of the lands under its
management.' These requirements, along with a provision directing that
judicial review of public land decisions be provided,' supply sufficient legal
specifications to allow judicial review of grazing decisions, but the standard
of review is highly deferential.'
A statutory provision that commits authority entirely to an agency's
discretion by providing "no law to apply" would seem a prime target for
nondelegation challenges. While § 701(a)(2) precludes judicial review on the
merits so that decisions made pursuant to such provisions cannot be attacked
as arbitrary under the Administrative Procedure Act, it does not insulate
prosecutorial and other wholly discretionary activities from constitutional
280. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315b, 1752(e).
281. Id. § 1752(e). In addition, the Secretary has issued regulations under FLPMA to provide
greater specificity for the management of public rangelands. See 43 C.F.R. Part 4100; Pub. Lands
Council v. Babbitt, 120 S. Ct. 1815, 1821-29 (2000).
282. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b).
283. Id. § 1701(6).
284. See Sierra Club v. Clark, 756 F.2d 686, 691 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that the multiple-use
goal vests great discretion in the Secretary to administer forest and range land; thus, the Secretary's
determination regarding effects of off-road recreational use "was not arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of the broad discretion committed to him by an obliging Congress" (citing Perkins)); Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. 1045, 1058 & n.7 (D. Nev. 1985), aff'd, 819 F.2d
927 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that judicial review is available under FLPMA "under a narrow
standard" as the statutory language "breathes discretion at every pore" (citing Perkins, 608 F.2d at
806)); see also Maria E. Mansfield, On the Cusp of Property Rights: Lessons from Public Land
Law, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 43, 103-04 (1991) (concluding that § 1732(b) supplies "law to apply,"
although BLM's interpretation of the scope of its power to prevent degradation, and its conclusions
regarding the actual effects of a potentially degrading activity, are generally given great deference
by courts). A few courts in the Tenth Circuit, however, continue to find that certain decisions
affecting public rangelands are wholly discretionary. E.g., Bischoff v. Glickman, 54 F.Supp.2d
1226, 1230 (D. Wyo. 1999) (dismissing rancher's challenge to Forest Service decision to cancel
grazing permits because there was "no law to apply"), affirmed, 216 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 2000);
see also Baca v. King, 92 F.3d 1031 (10th Cir. 1996) (dismissing rancher's challenge to land
exchange for lack of standing on grounds that whether to designate lands for grazing was
"completely within the Secretary of Interior's discretion" and therefore was not redressable by the
court).
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challenge.s 5 A claim that separation of powers had been breached, or that
rights secured by the Bill of Rights had been violated, such as the Fifth
Amendment's guarantee of due process, may be reviewable regardless of the
language of the statute in question.' Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has
exhibited little if any interest in the nondelegation doctrine in this context,
and the Court did not even mention it in the landmark Heckler case. 287
If a nondelegation challenge were asserted, it is plausible that the specific
statute in question and § 701(a)(2) itself would be suspect. Congress's
attempt to commit a decision entirely to the agency's discretion by failing to
include any substantive or intelligible standards, such that agency action is
effectively immunized from judicial review, would necessarily constitute an
unlawful delegation under American Trucking. Of course, Congress can
place certain executive actions beyond judicial review altogether by
maintaining sovereign immunity or by otherwise explicitly limiting access to
the federal courts, which are, after all, courts of limited jurisdiction. 28 But
statutory preclusion of judicial review through vague, standardless provisions
could render the delegation of power unconstitutional, both because Congress
failed to make the appropriate policy choice, leaving the agency to engage in
unfettered lawmaking; and because no satisfactory procedural safeguard is
285. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599-603 (1985) (stating that "where Congress intends
to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear;" a "heightened
showing" is necessary "to avoid the 'serious constitutional question' that would arise if a federal
statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim"); see also
Sunstein, Agency Inaction, supra note 51, at 658 (noting that there is always "law to apply" to
claims that an agency's action is based on constitutionally impermissible factors).
286. See Achacoso-Sanchez v. INS, 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Administrators
with plenary discretion to do as they will on the merits must still abide by constitutional constraints
...."); Shaltry v. United States, 182 B.R. 836, 842 (D. Ariz.) (allowing review of an allegation
that the termination of membership in the pool of individuals eligible to be named trustees in
Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases deprived plaintiff of property and liberty interests under the Fifth
Amendment, although membership determination was otherwise committed to discretion), aff'd
without opinion, 87 F.3d 1322 (9th Cir. 1996).
287. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). In one of the few cases to explore the
relationship between nondelegation and § 701, the D.C. Circuit, in a pre-American Trucking case,
flatly rejected the constitutional argument but found that a decision to close or realign 145 domestic
military bases was "committed to agency discretion by law." Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees v.
United States, 905 F.2d 400, 404-06 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Judge Wald, writing for the court,
concluded that the Base Closure and Realignment Act "easily clears the 'intelligible principle'
hurdle; it contains a terse but understandable standard to constrain administrative discretion,"
centered largely on the military value of the base in question. Id. at 404-05. Nonetheless, there
were no "judicially manageable standards .. .against which to judge the agency's exercise of
discretion" for the purpose of judicial review. Id. at 405 (citations omitted). Had American
Trucking been the law of the land, the outcome of the nondelegation issue may well have been
different.
288. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
990
BEYOND THE NEW DEAL
available to confine the agency to its congressional mission (to the extent that
a mission can be discerned). 9 Not too surprisingly, calls for the repeal of §
701(a)(2) followed closely on the heels of the Heckler decision.2"
The Eighth Circuit had an opportunity to consider the relationship of §
701 and the nondelegation doctrine in South Dakota v. United States
Department of Interior.29' There, the Secretary of Interior asserted that he
possessed complete and unreviewable discretion to acquire land in trust for
the Lower Brule Tribe under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
("IRA"), which allows the Secretary to "provid[e] land for Indians." 2' The
court went along with the Secretary to a point, agreeing that the IRA failed
to provide guiding standards:
By its literal terms, the statute permits the Secretary to purchase a
factory, an office building, a residential subdivision or a golf
course in trust for an Indian tribe .... Indeed, it would permit
the Secretary to purchase the Empire State Building in trust for a
tribal chieftain as a wedding present .... It delegates unrestricted
power to acquire land from private citizens for the private use and
benefit of Indian tribes or individual Indians.
293
Turning the Secretary's argument on its head, though, the court
concluded that not only was review of constitutional infirmities possible, the
nondelegation doctrine invalidated the relevant provision of the IRA and the
Secretary's decision.2' Indeed, the court remarked that the delegation of
"wholly discretionary" power requires "a particularly close look" because of
289. See Donald A. Dripps, Delegation and Due Process, 1988 DUKE L.J. 657, 682 n.105
(stating that the nondelegation doctrine may make it "unconstitutional for Congress to commit the
exercise of legislative power entirely to agency discretion" through § 701(a)(2)).
290. E.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, The Supreme Court, and The
Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819, 874; see also Kenneth Culp Davis,
No Law to Apply, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1, 4-10 (1988) (arguing that Heckler was incorrect
because even if Congress has not established clear statutory constraints, the Administrative
Procedure Act requires a court to apply "such everpresent standards as 'justice,' 'fairness,' and
'reasonableness' that necessarily guide all judicial action" and that "the question whether the agency
has abused its discretion is a matter for judicial discretion") (emphasis omitted). Shapiro and
Glicksman note that Davis's "interpretation serves the purposes of checks and balances review by
requiring that every agency action, unless Congress has expressly immunized it from review, be
subject to a requirement of 'reasonableness.'" Shapiro & Glicksman, supra, at 874 n.256.
291. 69 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 519 U.S. 919 (1996).
292. 25 U.S.C. § 465 (1994); see also 25 C.F.R. § 151.1-.15 (1999) (describing when land
may be acquired for the benefit of American Indians).
293. South Dakota, 69 F.3d at 882.
294. Id. at 884-85. Ironically, the IRA was passed in 1934 by the same Congress that enacted
the NIRA provisions invalidated in Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining. Id. at 881. There are
signs that the court may have been influenced, at least to some extent, by the perception that this
particular Congress was afflicted with poor drafting skills. See id. at 884.
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the lack of meaningful opportunities for judicial review.295 In reaching its
decision, the court noted that "delegation questions [should be] considered in
light of [the] legislative history and context," as well as any narrowing
agency interpretation, but that the Secretary's broad interpretation of the IRA
provided no constraints.2 As a result, "[tlhere are many opportunities for
abuse in a program of this nature;" the Secretary-as head of an "agency
fiefdom"-could arbitrarily remove the lands in question from state and local
taxation, as well as "zoning ordinances, building codes, health and safety
regulations, and other exercises of the police power. " " The Secretary
subsequently issued new regulations requiring notice before taking land into
trust and acknowledging that judicial review would be available;
consequently, the Eighth Circuit's decision was vacated by the Supreme
Court.298
As indicated in the South Dakota case, the demise of the nondelegation
doctrine in the post-New Deal years goes hand in hand with the increasing
availability of judicial review through the Administrative Procedure Act. 299
295. Id. at 881-82. "[Jludicial review perfects a delegated-lawmaking scheme by assuring that
the exercise of such power remains within statutory bounds." Id. at 881 (quoting Touby v. United
States, 500 U.S. 160, 170 (1991)). If meaningful judicial review is available, then that would be "a
factor weighing in favor of upholding a statute against a nondelegation challenge." Id. at 882
(quoting United States v. Garfinkel, 29 F.3d 451, 459 (8th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted)); see also
Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 219 (1989) (noting that when "Congress
clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of
this delegated authority[,] [p]rivate rights are protected by access to the courts to test the application
of policy in light of these legislative declarations") (quoting Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329
U.S. 90, 105 (1946)).
296. South Dakota, 69 F.3d at 884 (citing Garfinkel, 29 F.3d at 458; and Int'l Union, UAW
v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1314-15 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). The court acknowledged that delegation
questions should be considered in light of the overall statutory context and recognized that
Congress's intent, as shown in the legislative history, was probably for trust lands to be used for
agrarian purposes. Id. at 883. However, because Congress had failed to say so in the statute, and
the Secretary had interpreted the language as broadly as possible, the court believed it must
"construe the statute literally for purposes of applying the nondelegation doctrine." Id. at 884. The
court noted that it was bound to do so because it had upheld the Secretary's interpretation of this
provision in the past. Id.
297. Id. at 884.
298. See Dep't of the Interior v. South Dakota, 519 U.S. 919 (1996) (citing regulations now
codified at 25 C.F.R. § 151.12 (1996)). Justice Scalia, joined in dissent by Justices O'Connor and
Thomas, believed that vacating and remanding the decision was inappropriate. Id. at 920. He
noted that the government had maintained its position that review was unavailable under the Quiet
Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a) (1994), once title had passed. Id. at 921. In any event, he failed to
see how the availability of judicial review had anything to do with the nondelegation question. Id.
at 922 ("It is inconceivable that this reviewability-at-the-pleasure-of-the-Secretary could affect the
constitutionality of the IRA in anyone's view, including that of the Court of Appeals.").
299. See South Dakota, 69 F.3d at 881-82; see also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Leventhal, J., concurring) ("Congress has been willing to delegate its
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Although Congress must still make the fundamental policy choice in the form
of legislative objectives, broad-brushed though they may be, the possibility
of judicial involvement can alleviate the need for more detailed substantive
directives: °°  Judicial review protects the integrity of the administrative
process by preventing abuses of discretion, favoritism, and ad hoc, irrational
decision-making. A statute that provides "no law to apply" lacks guiding
principles for either the agency or the court's edification, and therefore
would be most vulnerable to challenge as an improper delegation of
legislative authority under the American Trucking approach.
The spectrum outlined above illustrates that "there is no simple metric to
tell how much [delegated] discretion is too much," 3°' particularly in the
middle of the spectrum, where most regulatory statutes lie. A resurrection of
strict nondelegation review based on the fine distinction between intelligible
and less-than-intelligible principles yields a judicial inquiry that can itself be
described as unprincipled. A legal formula that gives "controlling force to
nomenclature,"' as opposed to the actual effects of a delegation in a given
context, leaves the judiciary without any means of resolving separation of
powers concerns in a predictable, coherent fashion, in effect allowing the
judiciary to expand its own constitutional role by intervening in the policy-
303making process.
B. Subversive Legislative Tactics
Congress often finds itself unable to enact narrow and specific directives,
particularly in controversial and complex areas such as environmental law.
This is due, in no small measure, to the difficulty of reaching consensus on
issues that affect public health and welfare at the same time as jobs and profit
margins. Stalemate can also result due to turf wars between the myriad
legislative powers broadly-and courts have upheld such delegation-because there is court review
to assure that the agency exercises the delegated power within statutory limits .... ") (footnote
omitted).
300. See Sunstein, Agency Inaction, supra note 51, at 655-56.
301. Sunstein, Air II, supra note 48, at 337.
302. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 628 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
303. Even Justice Scalia, who has expressed his support for a revitalized nondelegation
doctrine, see South Dakota, 519 U.S. at 919-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Scalia, supra note 128, at
28, believes that the judiciary is ill-equipped to enforce the intelligible principle formula. See
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415-16 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that this
formula lends itself to a debate "not over a point of principle but over a question of degree;" as
such, "[Congress is] better equipped to inform itself of the necessities of government," including
"the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law").
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304
committees with overlapping jurisdiction over environmental issues.
Perhaps most frequently of all, the legislature articulates general policy
objectives and leaves the details to administrative processes because the very
complexity of the technical questions accompanying a regulatory decision
makes it more efficient and effective to do so.305 Even congressional
members admit that "[firom a group of legislators that sometimes has trouble
simply producing a budget, ... micromanagement would be a recipe for
disaster. "306
Congress's inability to enact specific and detailed regulatory directives
does not necessarily evidence a defective system. The constitutional process
for resolving conflict is designed to accommodate individuals and groups
with disparate ideologies. When Congress issues relatively general
legislative mandates in response to the range of interests presented to it, "it is
operating in the politically rational manner for which it was created."' A
probable consequence of strict delegation review is that "[u]nless Congress
can engage in political compromise by using generalities, it will likely pass
less regulatory legislation. Thus, reinvigoration of the nondelegation
prohibition would represent a political choice in favor of less regulation."3"'
If the Supreme Court affirms the D.C. Circuit on the nondelegation issue
in American Trucking, the EPA may be unable to craft more determinate
standards for itself on remand, and Congress could be immobilized by the
inability to articulate precise standards and inhibited from delegating the
power to craft such measures to executive agencies. As a result, either the
304. See Zellmer, supra note 25, at 501-03.
305. See PIERCE, supra note 30, at 58; see also Jerry A. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why
Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 98 (1985) (concluding
that broad delegation to agencies counters the "extraordinary delegitimizing effect of rules that are
so specific that they cannot be made responsive across either space or time"); Peter Schuck,
Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Shoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 781-83
(1999) (concluding that delegation is consistent with democracy, largely because agency decision-
making is more responsive to public input than is legislation). The Supreme Court has expressly
recognized that "[t]o burden Congress with all federal rulemaking would divert that branch from
more pressing issues, and defeat the Framer's design of a workable National Government." Loving
v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996); see also Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 381 (explaining that,
without some degree of overlap among the branches, the Nation would be incapable of "governing
itself effectively") (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976)).
306. Joseph I. Lieberman & Henry A. Waxman, A New Arena for Attacks on Clean Air: The
Courts, HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 10, 1999, at A23; see also Loving, 517 U.S. at 758 ("Nothing
is so embarrassing nor so mischievous in a great assembly as the details of execution.") (citing 5
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 319 (P. Ford ed. 1904) (letter to E. Carrington, Aug. 4, 1787)).
307. PIERCE, supra note 30, at 59.
308. Id. at 58 (emphasis added). See also Schuck, supra note 305, at 792 (remarking that a
robust nondelegation doctrine has the pernicious result of "forcing Congress to bear the burden of
inertia, which is always a crucial and often determinative, factor in legislative politics").
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status quo-dirty air-will be maintained indefinitely, or frustrated
congressional members will turn to alternative legislative processes to take
care of business. Congress may attempt to avoid constraints imposed by the
other two branches by tacking substantive legislative "riders" onto
appropriations bills. Appropriations riders allow their sponsors to side step
the difficult process of balancing diverse interests and reaching compromise
otherwise necessary for enactment of statutory provisions through normal
legislative procedures. 3" The appropriations process could be employed to
"fast track" detailed regulatory measures proposed by well-financed industry
constituents.1 0
Appropriations riders, far more than broad delegations included in regular
substantive enactments, seriously undermine each of the justifications offered
by the D.C. Circuit in American Trucking for invalidating the EPA's
regulations. 31' Although Congress itself does make "important choices of
social policy" through riders, riders are passed when Congress is acting in a
manner least "responsive to the popular will."32  Riders appended to
appropriations bills allow only minimal opportunity for review and
assessment by congressional members outside of the appropriations
committees, let alone by members of the interested public.32 3 The use of
riders to legislate important substantive choices, a process often shielded
from public review and critique, is especially vulnerable to manipulation by
special interests.3 14  Meanwhile, congressional members can evade
309. Zellmer, supra note 25, at 486-89 (1997); see also Lovell, supra note 241, at 92 (noting
that "[t]he nondelegation doctrine cannot prevent Congress from burying divisive regulatory
decisions in the technical details of omnibus [budgetary] bills").
310. See Zellmer, supra note 25, at 491, 520-21; see also Michael Axline, Forest Health and
the Politics of Expediency, 26 ENVTL L. 613, 637 (1996).
311. See Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (stating that
the doctrine's purposes are to ensure that Congress makes "important choices of social policy"
through the legislative process, to ensure that agencies do not exercise authority arbitrarily and to
"enhance the likelihood [of] meaningful judicial review"), modified on petition for reh 'g, 195 F.3d
4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000) (mem.); 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (mem.).
312. Id. (citing Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring)).
313. Zellmer, supra note 25, at 510-11.
314. See id. at 491. Forcing Congress to legislate with a high degree of specificity would
likely exacerbate the concentration of power in committee and subcommittee chairs, providing ever
greater opportunities for factional influence. See DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN,
DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER
SEPARATE POWERS 237-238 (1999): Sunstein, Air II, supra note 48, at 338 (citing BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 26-58 (1981)). Although "special
interests may receive protection through favorable agency regulations, is this more widespread or
morally more opprobrious than having them protected through a tax loophole or a targeted
provision in a bill?" EPSTEIN & O'HALLORAN, supra, at 10.
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responsibility for unpopular regulatory decisions by highlighting other, more
palatable provisions of omnibus budgetary bills, some of which are hundreds
of pages long.
In addition, appropriations riders often direct the agency to act in a
particular way while insulating that action from complying with otherwise
applicable legal standards." 5 As a result, the judiciary's role is impaired,
because reviewing courts have virtually no means to assess whether agency
action taken pursuant to a rider's directive is arbitrary and capricious. For
example, the 1995 Salvage Timber Rider, appended to a bill providing
disaster relief for victims of the Oklahoma City bombing, provided that
various types of national forest timber sales would proceed notwithstanding
any other law. 16 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that its
provisions left it with virtually "no law to apply" with respect to
environmental concerns. 7
Finally, the use of riders undermines executive prerogatives. Substantive
riders, like the Salvage Timber Rider, are typically appended to emergency
resolutions and omnibus spending bills that provide funding for essential
programs, inhibiting the presidential veto authority.3"8 The Salvage Timber
Rider and others like it also impede the Executive's authority to "take [c]are
that the [1]aws" enacted through regular legislative processes "be faithfully
executed. 319
In sum, not only would the revival of strict nondelegation review
exacerbate the inefficiencies caused by congressional deadlock, it could also,
in and of itself, upset the separation of powers, eroding both the judicial and
executive functions and making Congress less accountable to the public it
serves. In other words, congressional maneuvering to avoid strict
nondelegation constraints could heighten the very concerns cited by the D.C.
Circuit in invoking the doctrine.
315. See Zellmer, supra note 25, at 473-75, 523-25 (discussing various riders directing the
sale of timber from National Forest and BLM lands).
316. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Additional Disaster Assistance, for Anti-
Terrorism Initiatives, for Assistance in the Recovery from the Tragedy that Occurred at Oklahoma
City, and Rescissions Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-19, § 2001, 109 Stat. 240 (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 1611 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
317. See Ore. Natural Res. Council v. Thomas, 92 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 1996); Inland
Empire Pub. Lands Council v. Glickman, 88 F.3d 697, 701 (9th Cir. 1996); cf. Robertson v.
Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992) (holding that a rider which directed the outcome
of two pending cases did not violate separation of powers because it replaced existing law and
provided some new requirements applicable to the underlying lawsuits).
318. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (providing for the presidential veto).
319. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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V. JUDICIAL REVIEW AS AN ALTERNATIVE: CAN THE DEVIL BE
EXORCISED?
It is a fundamental principle of judicial review that courts should refrain
from ruling on the constitutionality of a statute unless "absolutely necessary
to the [resolution] of [a] case." 320 The D.C. Circuit could have resolved the
American Trucking Association's challenges to the national ambient air
quality standards ("NAAQS") on non-constitutional grounds by applying
principles of administrative law. Instead of remanding the ozone and
particulate matter NAAQS for violating nondelegation principles, the court
could have taken a "hard look" at the EPA's decision to determine if it was
arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act,3" an
approach commonly attributed to Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe. 22 Alternatively, the court, upon finding the statute itself ambiguous,
could have tested the agency's interpretation of the terms "requisite to
protect public health" and "adequate margin of safety" for reasonableness
under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc..323
Either approach would have provided an appropriate means for resolving the
case and avoiding the nondelegation doctrine altogether. 3"
The two approaches are not necessarily separate and distinct avenues of
judicial review, and the courts have not been entirely consistent in applying
320. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(citing Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905)). "Considerations of propriety, as well
as long-established practice, demand that we refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of an
act of Congress unless obliged to do so in the proper performance of our judicial function, when the
question is raised by a party whose interests entitle him to raise it." Blair v. United States, 250
U.S. 273, 279 (1919); see also City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S.
687, 707 (1999) (stating that courts "must 'first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is
fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be avoided.'") (citations omitted); Three
Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984)
(stating that this is "a fundamental rule of judicial restraint").
321. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
322. 401 U.S. 402, 415, 420 (1971) (remanding the decision of the Secretary of
Transportation to approve the use of parkland for a highway, and directing the district court to
review the full administrative record before the Secretary at the time of his determination that no
feasible alternative routes were available).
323. 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984); see also Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1965)
(deferring to agency's interpretation of its regulations and secretarial orders).
324. In its petition for certiorari, the United States urged the Supreme Court to repudiate the
D.C. Circuit's directive that the EPA restrain its interpretation on nondelegation grounds, and take
one of these well-established paths of judicial review. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *27-30,
43 Browner v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, No. 99-1257, 2000 WL 1010083 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2000)
(arguing that both Chevron support the NAAQS, and that neither the Constitution, nor the Clean
Air Act, require the EPA to supply the "determinate criterion for drawing lines,": instead, EPA
must simply "consider the factors that the [Clean Air] Act prescribes and provide a reasoned
explanation, based on scientific evidence, for its decision.").
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them.3" Generally speaking, Chevron comes into play as an interpretive tool
when an issue of statutory construction is raised. 26 Overton Park and its
progeny are utilized to review informal rulemaking involving an agency's
fact-based decision, for example, to issue a regulatory standard, like the
NAAQS for ozone and particulate matter, or to grant or deny a permit or
otherwise apply a legal requirement to a particular factual setting.327 The
circuit courts occasionally apply both Chevron and Overton Park when
reviewing administrative regulations, but rarely explain why they are
invoking both doctrines, or how they fit together in any given case."
By synthesizing the two doctrines, it is possible to lend some clarity to the
confusion in the context of broad delegations of authority to executive
agencies. A reasoned alternative to strict nondelegation review can be
conceptualized and articulated, at least in a tentative form, through a
marriage of these bedrock principles of administrative law. The proposed
approach involves a two-tier review of broad statutory delegations. First, it
calls upon courts to account for contextual differences, particularly those
rooted in the constitutional source of the authority in question, by giving
heightened scrutiny only to those delegations posing the most danger of
overreaching, factionalism or abuse of discretion. A statute would fail this
inquiry only in those rare cases where the delegation results in the
325. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 51, at 395-96 (noting that the Supreme Court itself has
been "criticized for its failure to articulate a theory of judicial review that" justifies confidence in
the administrative process).
326. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. 687, 703 (1995) (deferring to
agency's interpretation of the term "harm" as used in the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §
1532 (1994)).
327. See, e.g., Southwestern Penn. Growth Alliance v. Browner, 121 F.3d 106, 111 (3d Cir.
1997) (upholding the EPA's disapproval of Pennsylvania's request to redesignate air nonattainment
area to attainment status for ozone under arbitrary and capricious standard); BP Exploration & Oil,
Inc. v. EPA, 66 F.3d 784, 792 (6th Cir. 1995) (reviewing EPA's effluent standards for offshore oil
and gas operations under arbitrary and capricious standard).
328. See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. Dep't. of the Interior, 134 F.3d 1095, 1102 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (applying both Chevron deference and the arbitrary and capricious standard to review
Interior's procedures for natural resource damage assessments); Mausolf v. Babbitt, 125 F.3d 661,
667 (8th Cir. 1997) (upholding snowmobiling regulations for Voyageurs National Park while citing
both Chevron and Overton Park); Gamboa v. Rubin, 80 F.3d 1338, 1343-44 (9th Cir. 1996)
(stating that courts must give "significant deference" to regulations under Chevron, but also
"searching and careful" review under Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), and Overton Park), vacated on other grounds, 101
F.3d 90 (9th Cir. 1996); Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 76 F.3d 400, 407
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (acknowledging that the tests sometimes overlap, but that "a permissible statutory
construction under Chevron is not always reasonable ... . '[We might determine that although [an
interpretation is) not barred by statute, an agency's action is arbitrary and capricious because the
agency has not considered certain relevant factors or articulated any rationale for its choice'")
(citations omitted).
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obstruction or abdication of a core prerogative of one of the three branches.
If it does not, courts should proceed to the second tier of the proposed
approach, and take a hard look at the agency's decision to assure against
improper biases and unprincipled results.
A. Hard Look Review: Testing Arbitrary Agency Action
The "hard look" doctrine harkens back to Overton Park, where the Court
stated that, although an agency's decision is entitled to a "presumption of
regularity," it must nevertheless be subjected to "probing, in-depth
review."329 The doctrine has been further refined by the D.C. Circuit, where
it is frequently invoked to ensure that the agency has taken a hard look at all
relevant factors pertaining to the issue.33° Over the years, hard look review
has evolved into a double-layer of close scrutiny; it is now often described as
requiring the court itself to take a hard look at the agency's decision to
ensure that it is well-reasoned and supported by the administrative record.33" '
Hard look review does not give reviewing courts carte blanche to second-
guess an agency's reasoning, nor does it allow the judiciary to make the
ultimate decision. Courts are typically and justifiably more deferential when
an agency makes technical or scientific predictions "within its area of special
expertise, at the frontiers of science. " 332 However, the courts "can and do
insist that the agency's reasons and policy choices do 'not deviate from or
ignore the ascertainable legislative intent.' Beyond that, . . . [courts] can
only require the agency's reasons and policy choices to conform to 'certain
329. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
330. See, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Pikes Peak Broad. Co. v. FCC, 422 F.2d 671, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The development of
"hard look" review is described in detail in Nat'l Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451 n.126
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
331. See, e.g., Md. Wildlife Fed'n v. Dole, 747 F.2d 229, 237 (4th Cir. 1984) (upholding
agency action, stating that the agency must "take a 'hard look' at all relevant factors," and stating
that the court itself must observe "the rule of reason and practicality and take[] a 'hard look' at the
relevant factors") (citations omitted); see also Nat'l Lime Ass'n, 627 F.2d at 451-52 n. 126 (defining
and describing the evolution of doctrine).
332. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983)
(upholding the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's determination that the permanent storage of
certain nuclear wastes would have no significant environmental impact as within the bounds of
reasoned decision making required by the Administrative Procedure Act).
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minimal standards of rationality.'""' If so, the rule passes the "arbitrary and
capricious" threshold and must be upheld. 3"
Although the circuit courts have employed "hard look" review fairly
rigorously,335 the Supreme Court signaled some disapproval of this approach
in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.33 There, the Court found that the D.C. Circuit's probing
review of rulemaking regarding nuclear waste disposal, which resulted in a
remand for additional agency procedures, had gone too far.337 Indeed, the
circuit court's activist approach, the Supreme Court remarked, "borders on
the Kafkaesque." 331 It continued, invoking separation of powers concerns:
"[tjime may prove [the agency's decision] wrong . .. ,but it is Congress or
the States within their appropriate agencies which must eventually make that
judgment. In the meantime courts should perform their appointed
function. " 33  That function, according to the Court, does not include a
reexamination of fundamental policy questions.
333. Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 520-21 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (citations omitted).
334. Id. at 521. The court held that the EPA's lead-content limit for gasoline was reasonable,
but remanded other provisions of the rule for lack of notice and, alternatively, for failure to explain
the choice of phase-out dates and the belief that most small refiners could meet the standards at a
reasonable cost. Id.
335. E.g., Am. Lung Ass'n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388, 392-393 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (remanding the
EPA's decision not to issue short term NAAQS for sulfur dioxide when the record showed that even
brief "bursts" had significant effects on asthmatics, noting that "[w]here, as here, Congress has
delegated to an administrative agency the critical task of assessing the public health and the power
to make decisions of national import in which individuals' lives and welfare hang in the balance,
that agency has the heaviest of obligations to explain and expose every step of its reasoning");
Sierra Club v. Thomas, 105 F.3d 248, 251 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding that the Forest Service's
"planning process was improperly predisposed toward clearcutting" and resulting land resource
management plan was arbitrary), vacated on other grounds, 523 U.S. 726 (1998); Kennecott
Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 849-50 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (remanding secondary NAAQS to
the EPA for additional rationale); see also Ross v. Fed. Highway Admin., 162 F.3d 1046, 1055
(10th Cir. 1998) (finding that, by finishing construction of trafficway prior to completion of
supplemental environmental impact statement, the agency failed to take a "hard look" at the effect
of its actions, as required by the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")); Blue Mountain
Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that the Forest
Service arbitrarily failed to prepare a single impact statement that addressed cumulative effects of
logging projects), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1003 (1999).
336. 435 U.S. 519 (1978); see also Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial
Activism and Restraint in the Supreme Court's Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REV.
383 (1989); Stanley A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in
Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051 (1995).
337. Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 558.
338. Id. at 557.
339. Id. at 558.
340. Id. at 558.
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Subsequently, the Court has sent conflicting messages regarding the
appropriate level of judicial scrutiny to be given agency decisions. In Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co., 4 the Court found that the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration's failure to consider passive restraint requirements for
automobile manufacturing was arbitrary and capricious.3' 2 A multi-faceted
test was articulated for reviewing the agency's regulatory decision: (1) the
agency "relied on factors [that] Congress [did] not intendf' it to consider;"
(2) the agency "entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem;" or (3) the agency "offered an explanation for its decision that runs
counter to the evidence before [it], or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. "3 In
applying this test, the Court expressly warned that "[t]he scope of review
... is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency."' In effect, however, the Court engaged in rather aggressive
substantive review of the agency's decision.'
Other than the Motor Vehicle decision, a basic pattern of judicial restraint
seems to have emerged in the years since Overton Park, particularly when
the agency action at issue is policy-based.' A survey of the more recent
opinions indicates that the Court has not promoted the Motor Vehicle criteria
to define the scope of review of agency action.' Without some sort of
determinate judicial test, it is nearly impossible to predict with any degree of
certainty whether a given administrative action will be found arbitrary and
capricious. Ironically, as a result, judges are relatively free to engage in ad
hoc "result-oriented behavior,"' i.e., to replace the agency's judgment with
341. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
342. Id. at 46.
343. Id. at 43.
344. Id.
345. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 336, at 1066-67. The Court has engaged in rigorous
review in only a few cases since Vermont Yankee was issued. E.g., Indus. Union Dep't v. Am.
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 658-59 (1980) (plurality) (rejecting the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration's ("OSHA") benzene standard after a detailed examination of the
administrative record); cf. Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377-78 (1989)
(upholding agency's decision that new information did not require a supplemental environmental
impact statement, but acknowledging that the review of agency action, though narrow, must "be
searching and careful").
346. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 336, at 1066.
347. See id. at 1067.
348. Id. at 1067-68.
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their own-the very thing forbidden by Vermont Yankee as contrary to
separation of powers principles.349
Congress, on the other hand, explicitly approved of "hard look" review
as applied to Clean Air Act issues during legislative debate on the 1977
Clean Air Act amendments. 350  Thus, a remand in American Trucking for
articulation of principled reasons under the hard look doctrine, guided by the
Motor Vehicle factors, would have been a viable judicial response, true to
legislative objectives. In fact, the D.C. Circuit's overriding concern seems
to center on the quality of the EPA's explanation for its choice of NAAQS;
otherwise, the court would have vacated the NAAQS and found that the
Clean Air Act itself was unconstitutional.35' If rigorous review had been
employed in the American Trucking case, the court could remand the
decision as arbitrary if the EPA had failed to explain the criteria used to
determine that 0.08 ppm was an appropriate ozone NAAQS, but 0.09 ppm
inadequate and 0.07 ppm more stringent than necessary to protect public
health with an adequate margin of safety. Remand would also be in order if
the EPA failed to consider factors relevant to the protection of public health,
including both the likelihood and magnitude of effects on human health.
Finally, if the revised NAAQS were not supported by findings in the
administrative record, the court could remand the decision.
Along the same lines, Professor Sunstein has suggested that, on remand,
the EPA could survive the D.C. Circuit's scrutiny if it were to perform a
detailed analysis of anticipated benefits of its proposed NAAQS and at least
two other alternatives, one more strict and one more lenient.352 He
recommends that the agency determine the level of "residual risk" of all
349. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 435 U.S. 519, 558
(1978).
350. See National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 452 n.127 (D.D.C. 1980) ("[T]he
conferees intend that the courts continue their thorough, comprehensive review which has
characterized judicial proceedings under the Clean Air Act thus far") (citing H.R.REP. No. 95-564
(1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1559).
351. "Typically, the D.C. Circuit remands without vacating when the court believes that the
agency action is consistent with the statute, but requires a more careful explanation." Craig N.
Oren, Run Over by American Trucking, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,653, 10,657 (citing Patricia M.
Wald, Regulation at Risk: Are Courts Part of the Solution or Most of the Problem?, 67 S. CAL. L.
REV. 621, 638 n.72 (1994)).
352. SUNSTEIN, AIR 1, supra note 48, at 35. Professor Sunstein concludes that the EPA, in
failing to explain how it reached its conclusions and selected the NAAQS, was arbitrary and
capricious, particularly as to the ozone standard, where it failed to counter evidence that ground-
level ozone could in some ways be beneficial to health. Sunstein, Air 11, supra note 48, at 327-30,
369-70. He would recommend a remand to the EPA for further explanation without invalidation of
the NAAQS. Id. at 369.
1002 [Ariz. St. L.J.
BEYOND THE NEW DEAL
three options before selecting a revised NAAQS." 3 This approach likely
goes above and beyond what is needed to survive "hard look" review-
rational and balanced decision-making based on a complete administrative
record.3" As such, it would provide "intelligible principles" and then some,
alleviating the D.C. Circuit's concerns of unbridled agency discretion run
amuck.
B. Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Ambiguous Statutes
Arbitrary and capricious review generally arises in the context of
challenges to an agency's decision to apply statutory criteria to a particular
issue, based on facts developed in an administrative record. In contrast,
facial challenges to an agency's interpretation of statutory directives trigger a
two-step analysis under Chevron.355 Step one requires the reviewing court to
determine whether Congress directly and unambiguously expressed its intent
on the question at hand. If so, the inquiry is over and a court must hold true
to congressional intent.356 If the statute is silent or ambiguous on the issue, a
court must proceed to step two and affirm an agency's "permissible"
interpretation, even if the court itself would reach a different conclusion. 357
In Chevron, the Court, reviewing the language of the Clean Air Act and
its legislative history, found that Congress had not clearly expressed an intent
regarding the meaning of the term "stationary source."358 Although the
353. SUNSTEIN, AIR I, supra note 48, at 35.
354. Professor Sunstein's model approaches the level of analysis required by NEPA, 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1994), which mandates the assessment of environmental effects and alternatives
for all major federal actions. However, as the court noted in American Trucking, Congress
exempted the EPA from preparing NEPA documents when it establishes NAAQS or takes other
action under the Clean Air Act. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1041 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 793(c)(1) (1994)), modified on petition for reh'g, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir.
1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000) (mem.); 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (mem.). Even absent
a specific statutory exemption, it is relatively well-established that NEPA does not apply to most of
EPA's actions under pollution control statutes, on the grounds that these statutes require the
"functional equivalent" of environmental assessment or impact statement. See Portland Cement
Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The merits of requiring NEPA or
NEPA-like analysis of the EPA, while warranting additional attention, must be left for another day.
355. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
356. Id.
357. Id. Thus, "Chevron presumes the existence of at least one constitutionally permissible
interpretation of the relevant statutory language .... Where only one constitutionally permissible
interpretation of the statute is possible, i.e., where Congress has spoken directly to the precise
question at issue, the court must effectuate that interpretation of the law." Adler, supra note 67, at
10,244. "Where multiple permissible readings exist," the agency is allowed to choose any
reasonable outcome. Id.
358. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 841, 845.
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opinion did not provide explicit guidance as to when a statute should be
found ambiguous, it did note that courts should employ "traditional tools of
statutory construction" to ascertain whether Congress had a specific intent on
the particular provision at issue.359 The starting point for this inquiry is the
plain language of the statute itself. Other tools may include the overall
statutory framework, congressional policy and the legislative history."
Moving on to step two, the Chevron Court found that the EPA's
definition was permissible. The agency allowed a facility to "bubble"
multiple emission sources for the purposes of calculating emission rates, so
that if the facility were to add a new emission source it could offset that
source by reducing emissions elsewhere in its bubble.36" ' This interpretation
allowed many facilities to avoid the stringent requirements imposed on new
or modified major stationary sources.362 In finding the agency's decision
permissible and reasonable, the Court cited the complex and technical nature
of the regulatory scheme, the "detailed and reasoned" consideration that the
EPA had given to the issue, and the nature of EPA's interpretation as one of
policy choice.363 The Court admonished the reviewing court that it need not
find that the agency's interpretation is the most accurate one, or the one the
court itself would have chosen, to conclude that the interpretation is
permissible."
As in Vermont Yankee, the Chevron Court invoked separation of powers
principles to justify its deferential stance.365 It explained that the judiciary
359. Id. at 843 n.9; see also Shapiro & Levy, supra note 336, at 1069 (describing the Chevron
decision as giving rise to a presumption of ambiguity). There appears to be no precise formula for
step one, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict when a court will find a statute ambiguous
under step one. In application, "disagreement reigns as to the clarity of particular statutes."
Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking under Chevron,
6 ADMIN. L.J. Am. U. 187, 205 (1992). Justice Scalia has remarked that it is not necessary for
opposing interpretations to be in "absolute equipoise" for ambiguity to exist. Antonin Scalia,
Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 520.
360. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291, 1301 (2000); see also
Scalia, supra note 359, at 515.
361. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 841 (reviewing the EPA's regulatory definition and the language
and intent of the Clean Air Act). The new source review program requires the EPA to set uniform
standards of performance for emissions from new or modified sources reflecting "the degree of
emission limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emission reduction...
adequately demonstrated." Clean Air Act § l11(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (1994).
362. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 841.
363. Id. at 865.
364. Id. at 843 n. 11; see also NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local
23, 484 U.S. 112, 133 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
365. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 864-66; Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978); see also Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation
and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 456 (1989).
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should not undermine the legislature's decision to entrust regulatory
responsibility to executive agencies:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is
an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a
specific provision of the statute by regulation .... Sometimes the
legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is
implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency.3s
The Court castigated the D.C. Circuit for "misconceiv[ing] the nature of
its role" and imposing its own belief that bubbling would not advance the
Act's overarching goal of improving air quality: "If [EPA's] choice
represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were
committed to the agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless
it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is
not one that Congress would have sanctioned." 367  In essence, Chevron
assumes that policy choices ought to be made by persons accountable to the
political branches-if not by Congress itself, then at least by agency
administrators appointed by the President and confirmed by Congress-but
not by the federal judiciary.
In its initial decision in American Trucking, the D.C. Circuit cited
Chevron step one to support the relatively narrow finding that the EPA was
correct in refusing to consider costs, given the plain language of section
109. 368 Curiously, the court did not even mention Chevron's deferential
standard with respect to the overall integrity of the levels chosen for the
NAAQS, instead invoking the nondelegation doctrine. The per curiam
opinion on the petition for rehearing gave more consideration to Chevron:
To choose among permissible interpretations of an ambiguous
principle, of course, is to make a policy decision, and since
Chevron it has been clear that "[t]he responsibilities for assessing
the wisdom of such policy choices ... are not judicial ones."
Accordingly, just as we must defer to an agency's reasonable
366. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
367. Id. at 845 (citation omitted).
368. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1999), modified on
petition for reh'g, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000) (mem.); 120
S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (mem.). The role of economic costs as a factor in setting NAAQS is the subject
of the Association's petition for certiorari, which was granted by the Court a few days after it
granted review on the nondelegation issue. See Am. Trucking, 120 S. Ct. at 2193 (mem.) (petition
for writ of cert. granted).
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interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term, we must defer to an
agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute containing only an
ambiguous principle by which to guide its exercise of delegated
authority. In sum, the approach of the Benzene case, in which the
Supreme Court itself identified an intelligible principle in an
ambiguous statute, has given way to the approach of Chevron. 369
The court indicated that Chevron step two is applicable whether the
inquiry is characterized as an interpretive matter or as a decision to fill a gap
left by Congress to the agency; even so, it denied the petition.37°
Unlike the "stationary source" definitional issue before the Court in
Chevron, the ozone "cutoff" at 0.08 ppm did not turn solely on the EPA's
definition of an ambiguous term. Instead, it involved the EPA's choice of a
specific standard, based on an administrative record, regarding the level of
NAAQS necessary to protect health as directed by section 109. To execute
the Act's requirements by choosing a standard, the EPA had to make a
policy call, guided by scientific data compiled in its administrative record but
also involving a fair amount of judgment of an interpretive nature, as to
exactly what level would be "requisite" to protect public health with an
"adequate" margin of safety.
If in fact Chevron is applicable to the EPA's revised NAAQS, it cuts
against the D.C. Circuit's decision to set aside the agency's choice of a
standard.37' Under Chevron step one, the court would find a lack of clear
intent on the stringency of standards necessary to protect public health. It
appears that Congress did not express an opinion on the range of permissible
standards, and, more likely than not, punted on the question of what to do
when adverse health effects might occur at any level above zero. The Clean
Air Act is ambiguous on this point, perhaps even intentionally so.
3n
Moving on to step two, the court would defer to the EPA's choice of the
appropriate NAAQS, so long as that choice is "permissible." Courts rarely
reverse once they reach step two, unless the agency's interpretation is
patently unreasonable, unconstitutional, or frustrates discernible statutory
goals.373 An agency's decision is not delegitimized just because it reflects the
369. Am. Trucking, 195 F.3d at 8 (citing Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448
U.S. 607, 642, 646 (1980)) (other citations omitted).
370. Id.
371. See id. at 11-12 (Tatel, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing).
372. Public choice theorists posit that Congress routinely passes ambiguous provisions to avoid
the need to reach consensus or take responsibility for controversial issues. E.g., David Shoenbrod,
Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My Critics, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 731, 740 (1999); JERRY
L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 140-42 (1997).
373. Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in
Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 96 (1994) (noting that some
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political goals of the powers that be in the executive branch if other factors
showing "permissibility" are met.374
Chevron plainly refutes the position that a broad delegation of standard-
setting authority to an executive agency offends separation of powers. The
Chevron Court recognized that legislative ambiguities, i.e., standards that
lack crystal-clear guiding principles, are not at all remarkable or unusual in
complex areas like environmental law. As a result, it is perfectly
appropriate-and not constitutionally suspect-for the agency to "fill in the
blanks" with reasonable details if the statutory directive is broadly or loosely
phrased such that several interpretations are possible. Yet, under American
Trucking, it is hard to imagine a court ever proceeding to Chevron step two,
because an ambiguous statute would trigger a constitutional delegation
problem. The application of American Trucking to future cases could
effectively eviscerate the Chevron doctrine.
There are those who might say "good-bye and good riddance" to Chevron
deference, on the grounds that Chevron itself presents a separation of powers
problem. The notion that judges should stand back and let executive
agencies interpret statutory provisions may be "quite jarring to those who
recall the suggestion, found in Marbury v. Madison,375 and repeated time and
again in American public law, that it is for judges, and no one else, to 'say
what the law is.'" 376 But the interpretation of ambiguous language in a
regulatory statute often boils down to a choice between competing policies,
not merely the construction of words, phrases, statutory context and
legislative history. This is especially true in those cases where nondelegation
arguments are most likely to be raised-where Congress did not make a
judges uphold the agency under step two unless the agency's decision outright "flunk[sl the laugh
test") (quoting Judge Stephen Williams, author of the majority opinion in American Trucking). In
fact, the Supreme Court had never invalidated an agency's interpretation of a statute within its
jurisdiction once it reached step two, see Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two
Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1261 (1997), until it issued AT&T Corp. v. Iowa
Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
374. Seidenfeld, supra note 373, at 100, 103 (noting that the Court in both Chevron and later
in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 187 (1991), "explicitly accepted the agency's assertion that
political attitudes had changed" under President Reagan as a legitimate factor and justification for
the agency's decisions); see also Scalia, supra note 359, at 517-18 (stating that step two should
allow political flexibility).
375. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall proclaimed that "[i]t
is emphatically the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Id. at 177.
376. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071,
2074 (1990) [hereinafter Sunstein, After Chevron]. Professor Sunstein describes Chevron as "a
kind of Marbury, or counter-Marbury, for the administrative state." Id. at 2075. Prior to Chevron,
a line of cases had refused to give any deference to agency interpretations of "pure questions of
law," but Chevron plainly repudiated that approach. See Scalia, supra note 359, at 513 (citing
cases).
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choice on a particular issue but delegated that function to the agency. The
choice of policy is clearly a function of the elected branches, not the
courts.3
Two recent Supreme Court decisions clarify the constitutional role of
courts, Congress and executive agencies when faced with ambiguous
statutory directives. In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,3"' the
Court held that the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") lacks authority
to regulate nicotine and tobacco products as drugs or devices under the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"). 7 9 Instead of striking down a broadly
phrased statute on nondelegation grounds, the Court simply recognized that
its role, as a matter of judicial review, was to find the FDA's assertion of
jurisdiction impermissible in view of Congress's apparent refusal to delegate
the power to regulate tobacco under the FDCA. 380 Far from invoking the
separation of powers doctrine or in any way calling into question the
constitutional validity of the statute itself or the agency's construction of it,
the Court stated that "we must be guided to a degree by common sense as to
the manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of such
economic and political magnitude to an administrative agency. "381
The FDA issued the regulations at issue in 1996, defining nicotine as a
"drug"3" and cigarettes and smokeless tobacco as "drug delivery devices," 38 3
and asserting jurisdiction to restrict the promotion, labeling and accessibility
of tobacco products to adolescents. 31 Under the Court's construction of the
FDCA, given the FDA's express finding that cigarettes and other tobacco
377. Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283,
295 (1986) (noting that the Supreme Court has equally "emphatically stated that it [is] for the
agency, not the reviewing court, 'to make such policy choices-resolving the competing interests
which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved'"
(citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865)).
378. 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000).
379. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (1994).
380. Brown & Williarmson Tobacco, 120 S. Ct. at 1301.
381. Id. (citing MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994)).
382. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (1994) (providing that drugs include "articles (other than food)
intended to affect the structure or any function of the body").
383. Id. § 321(h) (1994) (defining device as "an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine,
contrivance, . . . or other similar or related article, including any component, part, or accessory,
which is ... intended to affect the structure or any function of the body"); see also id. § 353(g)(1)
(1994) (granting the FDA authority to regulate "combination products" which "constitute a
combination of a drug, device, or biological product"). The FDA found that these provisions gave
it discretion to regulate combination products as drugs, devices or both. See Regulations
Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and
Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,400 (1996).
384. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg.at 44,397, 44,402.
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products were unsafe,3a5 the Act would require FDA to ban such products
entirely-an outcome which Congress had foreclosed in subsequent
statutes a.3' Accordingly, the Court invalidated the FDA's regulations,
specifically invoking Chevron step one:
Deference ... to an agency's construction of a statute that it
administers is premised on the theory that a statute's ambiguity
constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to
fill in the statutory gaps .... In extraordinary cases, however,
there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress
has intended such an implicit delegation.... This is hardly an
ordinary case. Contrary to its representations to Congress since
1914, the FDA has now asserted jurisdiction to regulate an
industry constituting a significant portion of the American
economy. 3P
The Court found that deference could not be given the agency's
interpretation of the statute because Congress had "repeatedly acted to
preclude any agency from exercising significant policymaking authority in
the area [of tobacco]." 3  In keeping with Chevron step one, the Court
concluded:
Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such
economic and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a
fashion. To find that the FDA has the authority to regulate tobacco
products, one must not only adopt an extremely strained
understanding of "safety" as it is used throughout the Act-a
concept central to the FDCA's regulatory scheme-but also ignore
the plain implication of Congress' subsequent tobacco-specific
legislation. It is therefore clear . . . Congress has directly spoken
385. See id. at 44,398-99.
386. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 120 S. Ct. at 1301-04. Various provisions of the
FDCA require that regulated products be found "safe" before they can be sold or allowed to remain
on the market. Id. at 1301-05 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(a)(2), 3520), 393(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. IV
1998)). The Court went on to examine a panoply of subsequent enactments and proposed
amendments in determining that Congress had forbidden such a ban. Id. at 1306-13. It concluded
that, "[t]aken together, these actions by Congress over the past 35 years preclude an interpretation
of the FDCA that grants the FDA jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products." Id. at 1312.
387. Id. at 1314-15 (emphasis added). The Court also noted that, up until 1995, the FDA had
consistently denied that it possessed jurisdiction "to regulate tobacco products as customarily
marketed." Id. at 1307.
388. Id. at 1315. The Court added "tobacco has its own unique political history" owing to its
"unique place in American history and society." Id.
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to the question at issue and precluded the FDA from regulating
tobacco products.38 9
Thus, it stated, "we are obliged to defer not to the agency's expansive
construction of the statute, but to Congress' consistent judgment to deny
FDA this power."390
The Court's only direct reference to the separation of powers concerns
typically raised by nondelegation challenges was in response to a point raised
by dissenting Justice Breyer. Justice Breyer refuted the majority's
implication that courts "should assume in close cases that a decision with
'enormous social consequences,' . .. should be made by democratically
elected Members of Congress rather than by unelected agency
administrators." 39' The majority remarked that, although the public may
well hold the executive branch politically accountable for the FDA's
decision, given the serious and high-profile nature of the tobacco issue, an
"agency's power to regulate in the public interest must always be grounded
in a valid grant of authority from Congress."392
389. Id.
390. Id. The Court cited MCI Telecommunications, where it had held that the FCC did not
have the authority, under a proviso allowing it to "modify any requirement" of the Communications
Act of 1934, to convert a mandatory requirement that long distance carriers file their rates into a
voluntary activity. Id. (citing MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 512 U.S. 218, 225 (1994)).
"[F]inding 'not the slightest doubt' that Congress had directly spoken to the question, .. . we
concluded that '[i]t is highly unlikely that Congress would leave the determination of whether an
industry will be entirely, or even substantially, rate-regulated to agency discretion-and even more
unlikely that it would achieve that through such a subtle device as permission to 'modify' rate-filing
requirements.'" Id. (quoting MCI Telecomm., 512 U.S. at 228, 231).
391. Id. at 1330 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer noted that the public was quite likely
to be aware of the FDA's decision to regulate tobacco products and to hold executive branch
officials politically accountable:
Presidents, just like Members of Congress, are elected by the public. Indeed,
the President and Vice President are the only public officials whom the entire
Nation elects. I do not believe that an administrative agency decision of this
magnitude-one that is important, conspicuous, and controversial--can escape
the kind of public scrutiny that is essential in any democracy. And such a
review will take place whether it is the Congress or the Executive Branch that
makes the relevant decision.
Id. at 1331; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 323
(2000) [hereinafter Sunstein, Canons] (noting that, if the public is angry at Congress for "passing
the buck" to the executive branch, voters will react accordingly in the next election; if they don't, it
may be because they are content with the operation of government under broad delegations).
392. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 120 S. Ct. at 1315. The Court went on to state, "[in our
anxiety to effectuate the congressional purpose of protecting the public, we must take care not to
extend the scope of the statute beyond the point where Congress indicated it would stop." Id.
(citations omitted).
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The Court took a different tack in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board,393
and, for the first time since Chevron was handed down in 1984, invoked
Chevron step two to invalidate regulations issued by the FCC pursuant to the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. 394  The similarity between Brown &
Williamson Tobacco and Iowa Utilities is more striking, though, than is this
distinction-once again, principles of administrative law, not constitutional
law, were invoked to resolve a difficult regulatory issue.
The Telecommunications Act, designed to introduce competition among
providers of local telephone service, allows new entrants to lease certain
elements of the existing carriers' network.3 s Section 25 1(d)(2) directs the
FCC to determine which elements would be subject to this "unbundled
access" by considering, "at a minimum, whether (A) access to such network
elements . . is necessary; and (B) the failure to provide access to such
network elements would impair the [new entrant's] ability ... to provide the
services that it seeks to offer." 3' The FCC's regulations allowed new
entrants to meet the "necessary" standard regardless of whether they could
obtain the network element from some other source; in other words, if
service could be provided at the lowest cost using the incumbent's elements,
the standard was met, even if services were otherwise available from other
carriers. 3  The FCC's interpretation of "impairment" likewise precluded
consideration of opportunities for self-provision or purchase from other
providers. New entrants could meet this standard if an incumbent's failure to
provide access "would decrease the quality or increase the . . . cost of the
service. "398
The Court found § 251(d) "a model of ambiguity or indeed even self-
contradiction, "M but nonetheless concluded that the FCC had failed to
interpret the statutory terms in a "reasonable fashion," because its rule "is
393. 525 U.S. 366, 392-93 (1999).
394. Id. at 392-93; see Bressman, supra note 237, at 1399. Justice Souter dissented from this
part of the opinion on the grounds that, once ambiguity was detected, 'Chevron deference surely
requires us to respect the Commission's conclusion." Ia. Utilities, 525 U.S. at 401 (Souter, J.,
dissenting in part).
395. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c) (Supp III. 1997).
396. Id. § 251(d)(2) (Supp. III 1997). The FCC's general rulemaking authority to "prescribe
such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest," provided in the
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994), extends to its implementation of the 1996
Act. Ia. Utilities, 525 U.S. at 377-78.
397. See Ia. Utilities, 525 U.S. at 389 (citing In re Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499 (1996) (First Report & Order 283)).
398. Id. (citing First Report & Order 285).
399. Id. at 397. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, remarked that the lack of clarity "is
most unfortunate for a piece of legislation that profoundly affects a crucial segment of the economy
worth tens of billions of dollars." Id.
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simply not in accord with the ordinary and fair meanings" of the terms
"necessary" and "impairment. "' Moreover, the agency had failed to take
the Act's objectives into account,"' and had neglected to apply any "limiting
standard, rationally related to the goals of the Act. "2 In effect, the FCC
had abdicated its regulatory role, delegating almost complete discretion to the
aspiring carriers themselves to determine whether access to the network
elements of an incumbent was necessary simply by choosing the most
efficient service, while turning a blind eye to the availability of elements
outside of the incumbent's network. 3 This, the Court found, was surely
contrary to congressional intent.4 4
Although portions of the Court's opinion evidence its overarching
concerns about regulatory responsibility for a program with tremendous
implications for the national economy and federalism-the same concerns
evident in the early New Deal nondelegation cases-nowhere does it cite
those precedents, nor does it even mention the nondelegation doctrine. The
Court's decisions in both Iowa Utilities and Brown & Williamson Tobacco
indicate that it has no interest in reviving the nondelegation doctrine as a
constitutional ground for invalidating congressional enactments. To the
contrary, the opinions demonstrate a willingness to hold true to the very
basis for the Chevron doctrine, i.e., effectuating the intent of Congress.' If
Congress spoke directly to the issue, delegation was not intended and there is
no basis for giving deference to the agency's interpretation, or to even move
400. Id. at 390.
401. Id. at 392.
402. Id. at 388.
403. See id. at 389-90. Justice Scalia characterized the power delegated to the new entrants as
"promiscuous," id. at 397 (quoting a statement made by GTE's counsel at oral argument),
reminiscent of the imagery used by Justice Cardozo in Schechter Poultry, see Bressman, supra note
237, at 1401, 1435-36. The lack of limiting standards, along with the abdication of lawmaking
authority to private parties, were the very same flaws which rendered the delegation at issue in
Schechter Poultry unconstitutional. Id. at 1435. Professor Bressman concludes that the Iowa
Utilities decision can be explained in terms of a nondelegation problem just as easily as it could a
Chevron step two problem, although the Court did not couch its opinion in constitutional terms. Id.
at 1436.
404. Ia. Utilities, 525 U.S. at 390. Economic and states' rights themes were evident
throughout the opinion, and, in particular, the Court seemed acutely conscious of the economic
implications of the FCC's interpretation. See id. at 395. However, the majority flatly rejected the
state utility commissions' appeals to states' rights, id. at 378 n.6, although Justices Thomas,
Rehnquist and Breyer believed that the case raised "basic principles of federalism," citing "the 100
year tradition of state authority over intrastate telecommunications," id. at 411 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting in part, with Rehnquist and Breyer); id. at 427 (Breyer, dissenting in part).
405. See Scalia, supra note 359, at 516-17. Scalia explains that whether or not ambiguity
reveals a true congressional intent to confer discretion on an agency, a query which is "probably a
wild goose chase anyway," Congress now knows that, as a result of Chevron, intentional or
unintentional ambiguities will be resolved by agencies, not courts. Id. at 517.
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beyond step one of the Chevron analysis. On the other hand, if Congress left
a gap in the statutory scheme, it has implicitly delegated the power to the
agency to fill that gap with a permissible interpretation of the provision in
question. Iowa Utilities demonstrates a renewed interest in step two, and a
clarification of what is "permissible." Reviewing courts are to determine
whether the interpretation is permissible and reasonable, giving due
deference to the agency's policy choices, while probing the factual and legal
bases for the ultimate decision.
Of course, invoking Chevron is not a panacea for irregular or
unpredictable decision-making. There is a danger that courts can find
ambiguity where none exists if they wish to uphold the agency's decision, or,
on the other hand, discern clarity where none exists, thereby stripping the
agency of discretion when its interpretation is disagreeable to the ideology of
the judges.' Empirical studies of cases applying the Chevron doctrine have
yielded contradictory results. Some find that courts do use Chevron for
partisan purposes," while others conclude that judges actually behaved less
ideologically after Chevron."° Whether judicial proclivities play a distinct
role or not, it is apparent that the application of Chevron has not produced
the predictable results one might expect. But Chevron has, at least, given a
signal to Congress that legislative ambiguities are more likely to be resolved
by agencies, whose political biases are relatively easy to discern, than by
individual jurists.' And, in cases where Congress established legislative
goals but otherwise avoided a particular issue by giving the broadest possible
delegation to the agency, the use of Chevron as an interpretive norm should
caution courts against striking down the delegation and supplying policy-
based limitations intended for administrative resolution.
406. See Bressman, supra note 237, at 1411-12; Schuck, supra note 305, at 788.
407. E.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2175 (1998); see
also Scalia, supra note 359, at 521 (stating that, under a textualist approach, a judge can generally
find that the plain meaning is apparent from a provision's text and its relationship to other laws; as
a result, deference under Chevron step two will be less often triggered, making it "relatively rare"
that "Chevron will require me to accept an interpretation which, though reasonable, I would not
personally adopt").
408. E.g., Aaron P. Avila, Application of the Chevron Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, 8 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 398 (2000) (comparing challenges to EPA decisions before and after Chevron to see if
judges tended to be more ideological after Chevron).
409. See Scalia, supra note 359, at 517. As a result, Justice Scalia concludes, legislating
"becomes less of a sporting event." Id.
32:941] 1013
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL
C. A Marriage of Chevron and Overton Park, with a Contextual Twist
It is virtually impossible to square American Trucking's nondelegation
approach with Chevron."" A more reasoned response to separation of
powers and due process concerns can be crafted by synthesizing Chevron
principles with hard look review, as seen in Brown & Williamson Tobacco
and Iowa Utilities. This approach would allow Congress to establish
legislative goals and delegate the details to agencies so that the political
branches are making policy-based judgments, while promoting meaningful
judicial review, without raising constitutional concerns.
The Brown & Williamson Tobacco decision provides a viable judicial
response where the subject matter of the regulation and the relevant statutory
scheme shows a congressional intent to place discernible limits on the
agency's discretion. In those instances, courts must fulfill their constitutional
duties by holding true to congressional intent and invalidating inconsistent
executive action. Where the statute at issue does not specify precise
parameters, however, the initial inquiry will still employ "traditional tools of
statutory construction" to see if Congress has spoken to the issue, as directed
in Chevron step one. The nuance added by the proposed nondelegation
alternative gives special attention to context-"step one-plus."
Courts can presume that Congress is less likely to delegate open-ended
powers to executive agencies in certain areas, and demand greater specificity
in those cases. Professor Sunstein describes several categories of
"nondelegation canons" to illustrate that courts generally do not defer to
agencies when their decisions go against "background" legal principles.""
These canons justify more rigorous review when the subject of the agency's
decision is contrary to widely held expectations or uniquely within
Congress's realm. Examples include the retroactive application of a statute
or rule, the intrusion on fundamental constitutional rights, the abrogation of
American Indian treaties 12 and, possibly, decisions requiring tremendous
410. See Adler, supra note 67, at 10,242 (noting the tension between the nondelegation
doctrine articulated in the American Trucking and Lockout/Tagout decisions, and the Chevron
doctrine of judicial review).
411. Sunstein, Canons, supra note 391, at 330.
412. See id. at 331-35. Although federal taxation would also seem a likely candidate for
inclusion in a set of nondelegation canons as a power uniquely within Congress's sovereign and
legislative realm, especially subject to lobbying efforts and factional influence by private groups,
see id.; United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 354 (1988); Sunstein, Canons, supra
note 391, at 325, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected arguments that heightened scrutiny
should be given to delegations of the taxing power, see Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490
U.S. 212, 222-23 (1989).
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expenditures for marginal gains.41 3 Courts may expect Congress to voice a
clear intent to grant specific powers to the executive branch in these areas,
and agencies will not enjoy the benefit of the doubt in the face of legislative
ambibuity.
414
By the same token, a "pro-delegation" presumption might be recognized
in other areas where plenary powers have been routinely granted in the past
or where separation of powers concerns are minimal. Regardless of the level
of statutory detail, certain types of statutes are less likely to trigger
nondelegation and separation of powers concerns. As noted in American
Trucking, and as Justice Rehnquist explained in Industrial Union Department
v. American Petroleum Institute,1 5 some enactments warrant less scrutiny
than others.4 16  His examples include cases where the delegatee possessed
413. Sunstein cites, inter alia, Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1222-23 (5th
Cir. 1991), for this proposition, a case that invalidated EPA's decision to ban the manufacture of
asbestos under the Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA")). Sunstein, Canons, supra note 391, at
334 n.93. As TSCA explicitly requires a consideration of economic effects, see 15 U.S.C. §
2618(a)(3) (1994), a straightforward application of Chevron step one dictates against any contrary
interpretation. TSCA is also distinctive in that it imposes the more exacting "substantial evidence"
standard of judicial review. Id. § 2618(c)(1)(B)(i) (1994). Compared to arbitrary and capricious
review, this standard "imposes a considerable burden on the agency and limits its discretion in
arriving at a factual predicate." Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1214. In two other cases
cited in support of his point, agencies were allowed to grant de minimis exceptions to statutory
prohibitions where costs of regulation in the particular case yielded minimal gains, see Alabama
Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Monsanto Co. v. Kennedy, 613
F.2d 947, 955-56 (D.C. Cir. 1979), but there are probably as many cases where the agency was
denied the power to imply regulatory exemptions, see, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v.
Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (invalidating EPA decision to exempt irrigation
return flows from the Clean Water Act's definition of "point source"). Sunstein also cites the
Benzene case, Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 644 (1980), which may be
a better example of an implicit "nondelegation canon" against the imposition of excessive costs, see
supra notes 119-28 and accompanying text.
414. See Sunstein, Canons, supra note 391, at 335-36. Another category that could be
included as a "nondelegation canon" involves agency interpretations of their own jurisdictional
reach. Although Justice Scalia has argued that it is "settled law" that Chevron deference applies to
jurisdictional issues, other justices have disagreed. Herz, supra note 359, at 216-18 (discussing
divergent views evidenced in several Supreme Court cases). Arguably, Congress is less likely to
have intended to leave a determination as to the scope of administrative authority to the agency
itself, so implied delegation of a jurisdictional issue may be inappropriate. Id at 219; see also Lars
Noah, Interpreting Agency Enabling Acts: Misplaced Metaphors in Administrative Law, 41 Win. &
Mary L. Rev. 1463, 1484-1485, 1528-1529 (2000).
415. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
416. See Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting that no
"special theories," such as "war powers .. .or the sovereign attributes of the delegatee [had been]
asserted" to justify the "vague delegation" given in the Clean Air Act), modified on petition for
reh'g, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000) (mem.); 120 S. Ct.
2193 (2000) (mem.); Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. at 684 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in
judgment). A test that embraces differentiated levels of review finds support in United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), which gave rise to strict scrutiny for laws
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residual authority over particular subjects of regulation, as does the President
with respect to foreign affairs,""' and cases where the statutory delegation
takes place against the backdrop of an administrative practice that predated
the legislation."" Rehnquist also referred to situations where the delegatee
itself possesses independent authority over the subject matter, citing a statute
that authorized American Indian tribes to regulate the import of liquor into
Indian Country.419 Finally, he would include "a rule of necessity," where
broad delegations of authority are upheld simply because "it would be
'unreasonable and impracticable to compel Congress to prescribe detailed
rules' regarding a particular policy or situation."'
These contextual and practical presumptions become tools of construction
to be utilized at step one-plus of the proposed nondelegation approach.
Using these tools, if the court is convinced that delegation was not intended
by Congress, or that it does result in separation of powers problems, it must
remand the decision, as it did in Brown and Williamson Tobacco, or
that discriminate against a "discrete and insular minority" or impair the political processes
otherwise expected to result in the repeal of unfavorable legislation. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond
Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 714 (1985) (explaining that Carolene Products
provided a unifying principle for judicial review in the New Deal era, based on "an entirely new
constitutional rhetoric-one that self-consciously recognized that the era of laissez-faire capitalism
had ended"); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32 SUFFOLK U. L.
REv. 441, 459 (1999) (noting that Carolene Products provides "a framework of general judicial
deference to the legislature, but with particular areas of more intensive judicial review").
417. Am. Petroleum inst., 448 U.S. at 664 ("[The Court upheld a statute authorizing the
President to prohibit the sale of arms to certain countries if he found that such a prohibition would
'contribute to the reestablishment of peace'" (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 307 (1936))). The Court stated that, "in the area of foreign affairs, Congress
'must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction
which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.'" Id. (quoting Curtiss-
Wright, 229 U.S. at 320). Along the same lines, a pro-delegation presumption might also be
warranted for decisions governing international trade relationships. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters
v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 754 (D.D.C. 1971) (citing Curtiss-Wright; & Zemel v. Rusk, 381
U.S. 1, 17 (1965)).
418. See Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. at 683 (giving President authority to recapture
"excessive profits" (citing Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 783 (1948))).
419. Id. at 684 (citing United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1975)). Notably,
Justice Rehnquist would review this type of delegation less strictly, even though the authority was
given to a non-federal entity.
420. Id. at 684-85 (quoting Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946)).
According to Justice Rehnquist, there was no necessity which would justify an "evasive" standard
like "feasibility" in the Occupational Safety and Health Act: "Congress was faced with a clear, if
difficult, choice between balancing statistical lives and industrial resources or authorizing the
Secretary to elevate human life above all concerns save massive dislocation in an affected industry."
Id. at 685. In contrast, both a "rule of necessity" and an extensive backdrop of administrative
practice justify a pro-delegation presumption in Property Clause cases. See infra Part VI.A-B.
Rather than attempt to imagine every subject to be included, my intent is to introduce the pro-
delegation concept here and try it out in the context of the Property Clause.
1016
BEYOND THE NEW DEAL
invalidate the statute. On the other hand, if the court is satisfied that the
agency has been given the power to "fill in the details," then it moves to step
two to determine permissibility, as a matter of administrative law.
If heightened emphasis were placed on step two of Chevron, as it was in
Iowa Utilities, courts would take a hard look at the reasonableness of the
agency's decision in light of legislative goals, as shown by the overall
statutory framework and legislative history.42' Under this "step two-plus"
inquiry, if the question is one of pure interpretation, for example, defining an
ambiguous statutory term like "stationary source," the court must follow
Chevron and defer to the agency's policy-based selection of any permissible
definition. If the issue involves a mixed question of interpretation and
application of the law to a set of facts, as did EPA's decision that 0.08 ppm
ozone is an appropriate level "requisite" to protect public health with an
"adequate margin of safety," the court's review of the interpretative
component should still be deferential. Review of the "as-applied"
component, though, would employ the Motor Vehicle factors. The court
should look closely at the record and the ultimate decision to ensure that the
agency explained itself clearly, considered all relevant factors and made a
decision that is well-supported by the record. As a result, the agency's
political choices are not second-guessed (unless they were precluded by
Congress as revealed in step one-plus), but its factual findings and ultimate
conclusions must be the product of regular and well-informed processes, as
opposed to factional influence or arbitrary whim, to withstand review.
Meanwhile, courts can fulfill their constitutional role and promote
deliberative tripartite democratic processes by providing careful judicial
review, without displacing the agency's judgment on policy or factual
matters, formulated through rulemaking and public input. In turn, agencies
are less likely to issue arbitrary or ill-formed decisions if they know that,
given a concrete case or controversy, courts will be probing those decisions
with a hard look.4"
421. See Seidenfeld, supra note 373, at 128-30; see also Adler, supra note 67, at 10,243 ("In
a 'step two' context, the nondelegation doctrine is satisfied where Congress has included adequate
standards in the statute, augmented by its legislative history, to guide an agency in its choices
among competing, permissible readings of the statute."); Shapiro & Levy, supra note 336, at 1075
n.96, 1076 n. 100 (noting that the Administrative Conference recommended the merger of Chevron
and Motor Vehicle, and recommending th.; step two of Chevron include the first two Motor Vehicle
factors).
422. See Richrd B. Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional
Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62
IOWA L. REv. 713, 731-32 (1977); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101
HARV. L. REV. 421, 471 (1987) [hereinafter Sunstein, Constitutionalism].
32:941] 1017
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL
Vigorous judicial scrutiny at step two-plus acts as a significant
impediment to improperly motivated decisions. 4 s Administrative processes
generally provide greater opportunities for public involvement than
congressional processes, allowing more informed decision-making but, at the
same time, increasing the potential for undue influence by more vigilant or
well-heeled interest groups. Heightened scrutiny minimizes the potential for
abuse of agency discretion by revealing the influences of interest group
pressure on administrative processes. By requiring the agency to explain
why a rule or interpretation favoring any particular faction is a reasonable
balance of statutory goals in a way that furthers the public interest and takes
account of all relevant facts, courts play an important role in preventing
factionalism-one of the primary concerns of the separation of powers
doctrine.424
The marriage of Chevron principles and Overton Park "hard look"
review, guided by the Motor Vehicle factors, would not deprive the
nondelegation doctrine of its force or effect. This approach is actually more
likely to result in each branch performing its primary functions. Meaningful
judicial review goes a long way toward ensuring that, when Congress
performs its law-making duties by crafting policy-based objectives while
delegating the details of regulatory implementation to administrative
agencies, judges-not "foxes"-are "guarding the henhouses." 42
Legislatures and agencies are both made more accountable through judicial
review, and agency decisions are more likely to be based on intelligible and
well-supported principles because of the procedural protections afforded
through the administrative process and access to the courts.42 6
Admittedly, rigorous judicial review is not without its own dangers. The
knowledge that each decision may be subjected to heightened scrutiny can
ossify the agency's decision-making process and result in less regulation,
tending to cause in the administrative arena the same adverse consequence
423. Sunstein, Constitutionalism, supra note 422, at 471; see also Seidenfeld, supra note 373,
at 133 ("According to deliberative democracy, agencies, rather than courts, should have primary
interpretive authority, not only because of their superior expertise and greater political
accountability, but also because agency decision-making processes are geared toward more
meaningful interest group discourse. ").
424. Seidenfeld, supra note 373, at 135-36.
425. Farina, supra note 365, at 498 (citing Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a
Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REv. 353, 368 (1987) (remarks of Cass R. Sunstein at panel
discussion, Oct. 10, 1986)); see also Sunstein, Constitutionalism, supra note 422, at 467 (criticizing
Chevron's deferential stance, in that "[t]he case for judicial review depends in part on the
proposition that foxes should not guard henhouses").
426. See discussion supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text (discussing Warren and Davis'
proposal).
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feared of strong nondelegation review in the legislative forum.' In other
words, because stringent judicial review encourages more detailed and
cautious rulemaking, it may result in less frequent rulemaking, and standards
like the NAAQS, once set, will rarely be revised.2 While this provides
stability to states and regulated entities, it also causes standards to lag behind
scientific advancements. Yet some delay, or ossification, may well be an
unavoidable cost of the business of governance in a democracy. Delay
occurs both at the legislative and administrative levels when opportunities for
public involvement and judicial scrutiny are afforded as a result of
constitutional checks and balances. The increased accountability and public
confidence resulting from full and open processes, safeguarded by judicial
review, will likely outweigh the costs of delay in most cases.
As for the NAAQS at issue in American Trucking, instead of focusing on
whether intelligible principles exist to curb the agency's discretion, the Court
should consider the actual effects of the action at issue, as well as the overall
context of the statutory directives, to resolve the nondelegation issue at step
one-plus. Even though Congress may have stated its Clean Air Act
objectives in relatively broad terms, by no stretch of the imagination does the
Act pose a danger of "aggrandizement or encroachment" into core
prerogatives of other branches.' 29 If Congress had given the power to the
EPA to implement whatever environmental standards it deemed appropriate,
with no guidance as to the relevant legislative goals or priorities, perhaps that
could be viewed as abdication of its Article I duties, in light of the Act's
effects on the "whole economy" and state interests. But Congress did not do
that-it specified its objectives and prioritized health over other
considerations. As the D.C. Circuit itself recently observed, if "Congress
can lawfully delegate the power to define crimes-a power which is arguably
at the height of that which might be defined as legislative-then surely it can
lawfully delegate" other powers, like the regulation of public health and
welfare, to executive agencies.43
Step two-plus of the proposed approach requires an in-depth look at the
administrative record and the EPA's explanation and factual basis for
selecting the final NAAQS.431 If this inquiry reveals that EPA arbitrarily
427. See generally Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on 'DeOssifying' the Rulemaking
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992).
428. See Oren, supra note 351, at 10,664.
429. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989).
430. Milk Indus. Found. v. Glickman, 132 F.3d 1467, 1474 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (discussing
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768 (1996); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 385).
431. For an assessment of the possible deficiencies in EPA's conclusions regarding the f'mal
ozone standard, see Sunstein, Air I. supra note 48, at 324-30.
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selected the studies relied upon, ignored relevant data, failed to explain its
conclusions or drew a conclusion that is not supported by the evidence in the
record, its decision would fail "hard look" review, and would be
remanded.432
In the end, reviewing courts should heed the advice given in Brown &
Williamson Tobacco, and be guided "by common sense" as to the likelihood
and effects of implied delegation in a particular context.433 Courts will still
invalidate congressional attempts to abdicate its law-making function.
Separation of powers precludes Congress from reassigning powers
constitutionally vested in one branch to another branch or its agent, for
example, by giving uniquely legislative powers to the Executive through a
line item veto, as in Clinton v. City of New York.4' By the same token,
Congress may not hoard executive or judicial powers unto itself, as in INS v.
Chadha435 and Bowsher v. Synar.436 In cases like American Trucking,
however, the issue is not one of reassignment or abdication of legislative
432. See supra notes 341-45 and accompanying text.
433. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291, 1301 (2000); see also
Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946) (using common sense approach in
upholding broad standards as "a reflection of the necessities of modem [securities] legislation
dealing with complex economic and social problems"); J.W. Hampton, Jr. v. United States, 276
U.S. 394, 407-08 (1928) (upholding, as a matter of "common sense," legislation that gave a
presidential commission the power to fix rates in accord with general objectives); cf. United States
v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 472 (1915) (implying congressional acquiescence to the
President's power to withdraw public lands, and remarking that "government is a practical affair
intended for practical men").
434. 524 U.S. 417 (1998). In Clinton, the Line-Item Veto Act was held unconstitutional
because it violated the procedures of Article I, section 7, governing statutory enactment; the Court
refused to reach the separation of powers issue. Id. at 448. However, Justice Kennedy, in his
concurrence, noted, "By increasing the power of the President beyond what the Framers
envisioned, the statute compromises the political liberty of our citizens, liberty which the separation
of powers seeks to secure." Id. at 452. Notably, the majority did not invoke nondelegation as a
ground for invalidation, and dissenting Justice Breyer expressly concluded that there was no
nondelegation problem. Id. at 490; see also Steven F. Huefner, The Supreme Court's Avoidance of
the Nondelegation Doctrine in Clinton v. City of New York: More Than "A Dime's Worth Of
Difference," 49 CATH. U. L. REv. 337, 341 (2000) (noting that the Court's avoidance of the
nondelegation doctrine is "telling, for if the Court does desire to reinvigorate the nondelegation
doctrine, it will be hard pressed to find a better opportunity than the Line Item Veto Act
presented").
435. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). In Chadha, the Supreme Court struck a provision giving the
House power to veto deportation decisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
explaining that Congress must abide by its decision to delegate authority to decide deportation
matters until it legislatively altered or revoked the delegation. Id. at 954-55. Moreover, because
the veto exercised by the House was essentially legislative in purpose and effect, it was subject to
the procedural requirements of Article I, sections 1 and 7, i.e., passage by a majority of both
houses and presentation to the President. Id. at 957-58.
436. 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (holding that Congress may not exercise removal power over officer
performing executive functions).
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duties, but of a legitimate delegation of discretion as to the details of
executing the stated objectives of the law. The only question, then, is
whether the discretion has been effectuated in a non-arbitrary, non-biased
way.
VI. THE DELEGATION OF POWER OVER PUBLIC LANDS AND RESOURCES:
"DEFY THE DEVIL" 437
If the American Trucking approach receives a warm reception in the
Supreme Court, aggressive executive action over public lands and resources
may well be the flashpoint for the resultant wave of nondelegation review.
The presidential withdrawal of public lands to create national monuments is
particularly controversial, and is often raised as an example of unbounded,
heavy-handed federal intrusion into states' rights. Recent challenges to
President Clinton's designation of several new national monuments,
including the Grand Canyon - Parashant National Monument and the Grand
Staircase-Escalante National Monument,43 explicitly raise nondelegation and
separation of powers claims. In Esplin v. Clinton, a group of ranchers and
state legislators allege that the decision to withdraw public lands and reserve
them as the Parashant National Monument is unconstitutional because, under
the Property Clause, only Congress may designate federal lands "for
disposition," and it may not "delegate power to dispose of federal land to the
Executive. , 439  Likewise, in Utah Association of Counties v. Clinton and
437. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TWELFTH NIGHT act 3, sc. 4.
438. See Proclamation No. 7265, 65 Fed. Reg. 2825 (2000) (designating the Grand Canyon-
Parashant National Monument); Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223 (1996) (designating
the Grand Staircase Escalante National Monument).
439. Compl. for Declaratory J. and Injunctive Relief and Deprivations of Federal
Constitutional Rights 112-29, Esplin v. Clinton (D. Ariz. filed Jan. 26, 2000) (No. CIV 00 0148
PCT PGR). Plaintiffs characterize the withdrawal for the specific purpose of creating a national
monument as the equivalent of a disposition of the public lands, a matter plaintiffs claim is left
solely to Congress. Id. 121, 127. Plaintiffs apparently believe that the designation should have
been effectuated (if at all) pursuant to the Enclave Clause, most frequently used to create military
posts and post offices. See id. 38, 114-117; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 17 (allowing
the creation of federal enclaves with the consent of the affected state). Plaintiffs also raise a variety
of assertions founded on "equal footing" and rather vague federalism themes. They argue that the
designation of Parashant National Monument treats Arizona as if it were merely a territory,
discriminating against its citizens by creating "specific classifications of persons and different rights
in similarly situated groups of people," thereby depriving them of privileges and immunities, equal
protection and voting rights. Compl. for Declaratory J. and Injunctive Relief and Deprivations of
Federal Constitutional Rights 73, 77, 86-87, 140-42, Esplin v. Clinton (D. Ariz. filed Jan. 26,
2000) (No. CIV 00 0148 PCT PGR). In support of this theory, plaintiffs invoke Dred Scout v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), see id. 62, 136-38 ("It is no longer constitutional for Congress to
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Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Clinton, plaintiffs allege that the
President's decision to designate the Grand Staircase Escalante National
Monument violates the separation of powers doctrine and exceeds his
delegated authorities under the Antiquities Act of 1906. "o
The rather vaguely worded Antiquities Act would not fare well if strict
nondelegation review were applicable, as noted above in Section IV of this
article."' However, executive decisions governing the management of public
lands, including Antiquities Act withdrawals, should be less susceptible to
nondelegation problems than the exercise of Commerce Clause powers.
Under the contextual Chevron-based approach, property Clause authority
would be included as another type of delegation justifying less intense
scrutiny. Executive exercises of Property Clause power easily fit within two
of Rehnquist's "pro-delegation" categories, as they take place within an
extensive backdrop of pre-existing administrative practices governing public
lands, and they satisfy the "rule of necessity." 2 Moreover, the regulation
of public lands and resources generally does not affect the whole economy,
unlike the executive actions invalidated on nondelegation grounds in
American Trucking and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States."3
Last but certainly not least, Congress's Property Clause power is plenary in
nature, with both proprietary and sovereign attributes, and is therefore more
sweeping, at least with respect to the resources it covers, than its Commerce
Clause powers. Consequently, the delegation of Property Clause power to
the executive branch may be correspondingly broad.
create different rights to state citizenship."), a case which now has little or no precedential value,
see notes 509-12, infra, and accompanying text.
440. Compl. for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief 1, 100, Utah Ass'n of Counties v.
Clinton (D. Utah filed June 23, 1997) (No. 2:97CV-0479B) (citing Antiquities Act of 1906, 16
U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1994)); First Am. Compl. 11 45-48, Mountain States Legal Found. v.
Clinton, (D. Utah filed Dec. 15, 1997) (No. 2:97CV-0863G) (alleging that the Escalante
designation violates nondelegation doctrine). The Utah Counties and Mountain States plaintiffs also
allege violations of the withdrawal and planning provisions of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act ("FLPMA") and the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"). Compl. for
Injunctive and Declaratory Relief 11 105-37, Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Clinton (D. Utah filed June
23, 1997) (No. 2:97CV-0479B); First Am. Compl. 11 58-65, 83-90, Mountain States Legal Found.
v. Clinton, (D. Utah filed Dec. 15, 1997) (No. 2:97CV-0863G).
441. See supra Part IV.A.
442. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1911). See supra notes 415-20 and
accompanying text (discussing pro-delegation categories). For discussion of the historic backdrop
for executive withdrawals of public lands, see infra Part VI.B. 1.
443. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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A. The Duality of Property Clause Powers and Responsibilities
1. Proprietorship of Public Lands
Congress's power to make all "needful" regulation respecting the public
lands and integral resources' has been described as "without limitations. ""
Property Clause enactments concern only federal property and federal
resources, and the regulatory power takes on both proprietary and sovereign
attributes."6 Because of the relatively narrow focus of the Property Clause
power, the exercise of its authority has far less potential to invade state
sovereignty in areas of traditional state regulation and is less likely to impact
the "whole economy" than Commerce Clause legislation. Thus, even if the
trend toward "strict" nondelegation review continues in the Commerce
Clause context, it should not carry over to public lands decisions.
As discussed above, the only Supreme Court cases to strike legislation on
nondelegation grounds involved statutes enacted under the Commerce
Clause." 7 The Court has become increasingly vigilant in reviewing the use
of the federal Commerce Clause authority when it bumps up against areas
perceived as being within traditional state powers." 8 Although the Commerce
Clause power has been described at times as plenary in nature," '9 when it
444. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (providing that "Congress shall have Power to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States").
445. United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940); see also Kleppe v. New Mexico,
426 U.S. 529, 539-40 (1976) (describing Congress's broad powers under the Property Clause);
Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525 (1897) (noting that the power over public property
was at least as extensive as "the police power of the several States").
446. The exertion of Property Clause power over activities on private or state land adjacent to
federal public lands has been upheld where the regulation involved subjects closely related to the
protection of federal property or resources integral to federal property. See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at
538; Camfield, 167 U.S. at 525; see also Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1250-51 (8th Cir.
1981) (holding that the Property Clause power authorizes the regulation of motorboats and
snowmobiles on non-federal lands and waters where such activities would threaten the designated
purpose of the public lands).
447. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 297 (1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430
(1935).
448. E.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995) (holding that an activity must
"substantially affect" interstate commerce to be regulated under the Commerce Clause); supra notes
141-70 (assessing trends in Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
449. E.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 15 (1989), overruled by Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 840 (1976),
overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118-21 (1941); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-95 (1824).
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impacts states' rights, the Court has found that the broader principles of the
Constitution, reserving powers to the states unless specifically enumerated as
federal powers, must impose some limits.45
Further, as noted in Schechter Poultry and American Trucking, and more
recently in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp,45 courts most
closely scrutinize statutes that affect the entire American economy, such as
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's ("OSHA") authority to
reach into "every workplace." 452 The Clean Air Act, like the Occupational
Safety and Health Act and other Commerce Clause authorities,4 3
undoubtedly has great potential to affect a wide array of state and private
interests, and in turn the "whole economy." Public lands provide significant
economic resources in the form of hard rock minerals, oil and other fuel
minerals, timber and forage. However, in contrast to the Clean Air Act and
the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the regulatory impacts of Property
Clause delegations are generally felt, not across broad and diverse sectors of
the economy, but instead by a handful of local communities and specialized
industries, such as logging companies, sawmills and mining companies.'
Executive actions governing public lands and resources are also readily
distinguishable from public health and environmental regulations because the
The theory that Commerce Clause power is "plenary" seems to have been repudiated by a majority
of the Court, in application if not in express judicial holdings. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 61-
62; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566-68.
450. See U.S. CONST. amend. X; Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932-33 (1997);
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559; supra notes 160-70 (assessing trends in federalism jurisprudence).
451. 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000).
452. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting that the
nondelegation doctrine has special force if the exercise of the delegated power affects the whole
economy (citing Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 553; and Int'l Union, UAW v. OSHA
("Lockout/Tagout I"), 938 F.2d 1310, 1317-18 (D.C. Cir. 1991))), modified on petition for reh'g,
195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000) (mem.); 120 S. Ct. 2193
(2000) (mem.); see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291, 1315
(2000) (observing that Chevron deference is less likely when agency action affects an industry
constituting a "significant portion of the American economy"). The dissent in American Trucking
distinguished the Occupational Safety and Health Act from the Clean Air Act, noting that under the
Clean Air Act the states are on the front-lines of implementing the NAAQS and allocating the
burdens of pollution reduction to individual sources through their State Implementation Plans; thus,
courts have less reason to second-guess the specificity of the delegation to the EPA. 175 F.3d at
1061 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
453. Pollution control statutes like the Clean Air Act are generally enacted under the
Commerce Clause. See generally United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121
(1985); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
454. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND
THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 28-33, 149-50, 166-67 (1992) (describing economic effects of timber
and mining enterprises); Michael Axline, Forest Health and the Politics of Expediency, 26 ENVTL.
L. 613, 614 (1996) (assessing economics of logging on public lands in the Pacific Northwest);
Zellmer, supra note 25, at 467-71, 483 (discussing effects of Pacific Northwest "timber wars").
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Property Clause, unlike the Commerce Clause, evidences a duality of
governmental power.55 In executing delegated Property Clause powers, the
Executive acts both as a proprietor and as a sovereign.456 Thus, property
management is not necessarily analogous to other types of lawmaking, and
more leeway might be afforded executive agencies, acting not only as
instruments of a tripartite government but also as proprietors, when public
property is implicated.45
Courts have regularly cited the Executive's role as proprietor of the
public lands and resources to ratify sweeping exercises of power.
Proprietorship is viewed not as a limitation on power, but as a supplement to
the government's sovereign powers. In Kleppe v. New Mexico,458 the Court
described Congress's dual powers under the Property Clause as "complete
power" over the public property entrusted to it.459 The extent to which the
federal government may exercise its Property Clause power is simply
"measured by the exigencies of the particular case."'
At one time, the proprietary nature of the power over public lands was
routinely invoked to curtail both public participation and judicial review.
Public involvement was considered inappropriate "because public land
management was [merely] an internal affair."" Judicial review of executive
455. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540-41 (1976); United States v. Midwest Oil
Co., 236 U.S. 459, 459-60, 474 (1915); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1911);
Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525 (1897).
456. See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 540-41; Midwest Oil , 236 U.S. at 459-60, 474; Light, 220 U.S.
at 536-37; Camfield, 167 U.S. at 525.
457. See Schoenbrod, supra note 75, at 1265-69 (explaining that mere expectations to use
public property, such as public lands and even government contracts and broadcast signals, have not
been treated as protected property interests by the takings and due process clauses under the Fifth
and Fourteenth amendments; these expectations have "special feature[s]" and should be subject to
less stringent review); see also Louis L. Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power I, 47
COLUM. L. REV. 561, 567-68 (1947) (noting that property management is not law-making).
458. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
459. Id. at 540. Kleppe upheld the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act as a valid
exercise of the Property Clause power, in spite of alleged impacts on the traditional roles of state
and local governments in regulating livestock. Id. at 546.
460. Camfield, 167 U.S. at 525 (upholding Congress's power to prevent the enclosure of
public lands). The sweeping nature of the executive's power to protect public lands was addressed
in Midwest Oil, where the Court recognized the President's power to withdraw public lands from
extractive activities "as the exigencies of the public service required." Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at
471 (quoting Grisar v. McDowell, 73 U.S. 363, 381 (1867)). See infra Part VI.B. for a more
detailed discussion of the Midwest Oil decision.
461. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVS L.
REV. 269, 303 (1980). This approach was consistent with a provision of the Administrative
Procedure Act, which provides that rulemaking is not required for matters "relating to . . .public
property." 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). At one point, the Attorney General
defined public property to include "real or personal property owned by the United States" or its
agencies, and stated that "the making of rules relating to the public domain, i.e., the sale or lease of
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activities was sometimes denied as "committed to agency discretion by
law. " 2 When courts did review public lands decisions, the scope of review
was sharply circumscribed on the grounds that agencies had wide latitude in
their roles as proprietors.4 3 As a result, the agencies' own decision-making
processes took place, for the most part, behind closed doors. This changed
significantly in the 1960's and 1970's, with the enactment of the National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 46 and the extensive overhaul of
statutes governing national forest and rangeland management.' Yet the
concept of proprietorship as a basis for authority over public lands and
resources remains a viable analytical tool for distinguishing Property Clause
power from other governmental powers.
In the nondelegation context, the breadth of the Executive's Property
Clause powers is perhaps best illustrated by United States v. Grimaud,'
where the broadly phrased language of the National Forest Organic Act of
1897 was tested and upheld by the Supreme Court against a nondelegation
challenge. 7 The Act, designed "to improve and protect the forest and to
secure favorable conditions of water flows," states that the Secretary "may
make such rules and regulations ... as will insure the objects of such
reservation; namely, to regulate their occupancy and use, and to preserve the
forests thereon from destruction."' To achieve these ends, persons entering
forest reservations must comply with the Secretary's regulations.4 9
public lands or of mineral, timber or grazing rights in such lands, is exempt . . ." from rulemaking
requirements. Wilkinson, supra, at 303 n.149 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 27 (1947)).
462. Wilkinson, supra note 461, at 303 (citing Ferry v. Udall, 336 F.2d 706, 711 (9th Cir.
1964)); see also Linn Land Co. v. Udall, 255 F. Supp. 382, 386 (D. Or. 1966) (expressing "grave
doubts as to a court's jurisdiction to review the power of the Secretary to classify the lands pursuant
to . . .[the Taylor Grazing Act]" (citing Ferry)). For more extensive treatment of this topic, see
supra, Part IV.A.
463. See Wilkinson, supra note 461, at 303; see also Udall v. Tallman, 280 U.S. 1, 7 (1965)
(finding that the Secretary had broad authority to issue oil and gas lease on public lands); Dorothy
Thomas Found., Inc. v. Hardin, 317 F. Supp. 1072, 1076 (D.N.C. 1970) (holding that agency had
broad authority over timber sales).
464. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1994).
465. 16 U.S.C. § 1601 (1994); 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1994). The enactment of NEPA, the
National Forest Management Act ("NFMA"), and FLPMA, along with the Wilderness Act of 1964,
established that the federal government has duties to the public in its role as sovereign, as well:
"[riulemaking is required, records are open, decision-making is shared, and the courts are available
because public lands business is public business. It is the public to whom public lands managers are
ultimately accountable." Wilkinson, supra note 461, at 304.
466. 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
467. Id. at 522.
468. Id. at 515.
469. See id. at 515. The provision at issue is currently codified at 16 U.S.C. § 478 (1994).
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Mr. Grimaud was indicted for grazing sheep on a forest reserve without
permission of the Secretary of Agriculture.4 70 In defense, he claimed that the
Act was unconstitutional in that it delegated legislative functions-the power
to make rules and regulations-to an executive entity.47' The Court found
that the delegation of power was permissible; it provided sufficient guidance
to the Secretary and therefore avoided the pitfalls of excess delegation.4'
Although Congress cannot delegate to "other tribunals, powers which are
strictly and exclusively legislative," it may give authority to those who are
directed to act under general legislative provisions "to fill up the details. ""
Foreshadowing Chief Justice Rehnquist's "rule of necessity," the Court
recognized that it was "impracticable" for Congress to specify various details
of management or determine when activities might be harmful in one forest
but not in another, given the stage of timber growth or the season of the
year.474 Accordingly, it held that the Organic Act had adequately defined the
subjects on which the Secretary could regulate.475 "Thus the implied license
under which the United States had suffered its public domain to be used as a
pasture for sheep and cattle ... was curtailed and qualified by Congress, to
the extent that such privilege should not be exercised in contravention of the
rules and regulations."476
Similarly, in Butte City Water Co. v. Baker,4' the Supreme Court
rejected a nondelegation challenge to a provision of the General Mining Act
which allowed Congress to entrust "minor and subordinate regulations ...
to the inhabitants of the mining district or state in which the particular lands
are situated."47s Even though the provision transferred power to non-federal
entities, the Court found that the delegation of Property Clause power "is not
of a legislative character in the highest sense of the term, and, as an owner
may delegate to his principal agent the right to employ subordinates . . ., so
it would seem that Congress might rightfully entrust to the local legislature
the determination of minor matters respecting the disposal of these lands.""
Notably, Butte City was later distinguished in Schechter Poultry, where the
Court remarked that, unlike public lands management, it could not "be
seriously contended that Congress could delegate its legislative authority to
470. Grimand, 220 U.S. at 514.
471. Id. at 513.
472. Id. at 522.
473. Id. at 517 (citing Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 42 (1825)).
474. Id. at 516.
475. Id. at 522.
476. Id. at 521 (citations omitted).
477. 196 U.S. 119 (1905).
478. Id. at 126.
479. Id.
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trade or industrial associations or groups so as to empower them to enact the
laws they deem to be wise and beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion
of their trade or industries. ",o
Executive power to protect federal property has been upheld in the face of
nondelegation challenges even when the regulations pertain to activities off
the federal lands. For example, in United States v. Brown,481 the Eighth
Circuit held that regulations prohibiting hunting on nonfederal waters within
the boundaries of Voyageurs National Park were enforceable as a proper
delegation of congressional authority.' The court gave the nondelegation
argument short shrift, satisfied that the regulations were "founded upon a
rational basis:" ' hunting on adjacent waters could "significantly interfere
with the use of the park and the purpose for which it was established."'
Likewise, in Stupak-Thrall v. United States,'4  the Forest Service's
regulations prohibiting the use of houseboats and sailboats on Crooked Lake,
most of which was within a designated wilderness area, were upheld.4
There, owners of recreational and resort properties along the lakeshore, who
also held water rights pursuant to Michigan state law, alleged that the Forest
Service had acted beyond its Property Clause powers and its statutory
authority under the Organic Act and the Wilderness Acts, in that it had
unlawfully infringed on plaintiffs' valid existing riparian rights.' The court
480. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935).
481. 552 F.2d 817 (1977)
482. Id. at 823 n.8 (citing United States v. Cassiagnol, 420 F.2d 868, 872-77 (4th Cir. 1970));
see also Udall v. Wash., Va. and Md. Coach Co., 398 F.2d 765, 769-70 (D.C. Cir. 1968)). The
court went on to state that the regulations, "which are not overbroad or vague, cannot be
invalidated merely because they are penal in nature." Brown, 552 F.2d at 823 n.8 (citing United
States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 521 (1911)).
483. Id.
484. Id. at 822 (citing United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 266-67 (1927); and McKelvey
v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 359 (1922)). The court specifically referred to the National Park
Service Act, as well as the Voyageurs Park enabling act: "It]he fundamental purpose of national
parks, including Voyaguurs Park, is to 'conserve the scenery and the natural historic objects and the
wildlife therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as
will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.'" Id. at 822 n.7 (citing 16
U.S.C. §§ 1, 160). In comparison, the Department of the Interior's authority over nonfederal lands
is far more circumscribed outside of the Property Clause context. See generally South Dakota v.
United States Dep't of the Interior, 69 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 1995).
485. 843 F. Supp. 327 (W.D. Mich. 1994), afd, 89 F.3d 1269 (6th Cir. 1996). Plaintiffs'
nondelegation claims were assessed in an Eighth Circuit panel decision which was vacated when the
court accepted a petition for rehearing. Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 70 F.3d 881 (6th Cir.
1995). The district court opinion was affirmed by an equally divided vote of the en banc court.
Stupak-Thrall v." United States, 89 F.3d 1269 (6th Cir. 1996).
486. Stupak-Thrall, 843 F. Supp. at 330-31.
487. Stupak-Thrall, 70 F.3d at 887; see also Organic Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. § 551 (1994)
(authorizing the Secretary to "regulate [national forest] occupancy and use and to preserve the
1028
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rejected the challenges, finding that Congress had the authority to regulate
non-federal lands in order to protect federal property under the Property
Clause. 4a The court went on to say that "the scope of [the Forest Service's]
authority-except to the extent that Congress may expressly limit it-is
coextensive with Congress' own authority under the Property Clause." 9
Even a leading critic of delegations, Professor David Schoenbrod,
concludes that the management of government property is distinct from the
governance of private conduct: "[flor Congress to manage public property
through agents having broad discretion rather than through narrowly
legislated rules is not just convenient but necessary." 4' Thus, a liberalized
construction of Property Clause legislation and regulation, i.e., "loose"
nondelegation review, may be warranted under a "rule of necessity," given
the unique nature and history of the Property Clause power, even if the
American Trucking decision is upheld.
2. Plenary Power and the Public Trust
The Supreme Court has observed that federal land management agencies
possess "plenary authority over the administration of public lands. "4' This
forests thereon from destruction"); Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b) (1994) (agencies
shall administer wilderness areas with a view toward "preserving the wilderness character");
Michigan Wilderness Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-184, § 5, 101 Stat. 1274, 1275-76 (making
certain Forest Service regulations subject to "valid existing rights").
488. Stupak-Thrall, 70 F.3d at 888.
489. Id. Reminiscent of the Supreme Court's opinion in Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S.
518, 525 (1897), Judge Moore's concurring opinion on rehearing characterized the delegation as
one of police powers under the Property Clause. Stupak-Thrall, 89 F.3d at 1271 (Moore, J.,
concurring). In his dissenting opinion, Judge Boggs agreed that there was no need to reach
"extreme constitutional questions" such as nondelegation, because in his view, the Forest Service's
regulations could not be sustained under Chevron as they violated a clear congressional mandate by
infringing on valid existing rights. Id. at 1284-85, 1300. Judge Boggs nonetheless surmised that
the nondelegation doctrine was not totally dead: although "Congress could not enact the text of
Joyce's FINNEGAN'S WAKE and then delegate to the Forest Service the power to administer it"
because such a statutory standard would truly be "meaningless," the statutes at issue were not
meaningless. Id. at 1300.
490. Schoenbrod, supra note 75, at 1268 (concluding that many delegations regarding property
"must be under goals statutes that grant broad discretion. Consider the example of building
construction .... The legislature cannot deal with the myriad details involved in designing private
buildings. How then could Congress write a set of rules that would positively tell the General
Services Administration how to go about building the many government buildings?").
491. Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 336 (1963) (emphasis added). The
Best decision reviewed the Secretary's authority under the General Mining Act, 30 U.S.C. § 22
(1994), as well as the general powers over public lands granted in Title 43 of the U.S. Code. Id.
Although federal power is regularly characterized as "plenary" in the mining context, the plenary
nature of the power has been noted in a variety of other circumstances. See Kleppe v. New
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broad-sweeping power flows from the Property Clause and more specific
congressional directives. The Forest Service has received explicit
congressional delegations and directives in the National Forest Management
Act ("NFMA"), 49' and Title 7 of the U.S. Code.493 Likewise, Congress has
provided Interior agencies with express delegations of authority to manage
public lands and resources in various sections of Titles 16 and 43 of the U.S.
Code .
Although some scholars have suggested that the Property Clause power
derives its plenary nature and escapes the constraints of the nondelegation
doctrine due to its placement in Article IV of the Constitution, rather than
Article I,495 this is probably a distinction of little significance. Article I lists
a variety of law-making powers, while the provisions of Article IV govern
relations with the states, including the full faith and credit clause, provisions
for the admission of new states, and the privileges and immunities clause. 96
Yet Congress acts in a legislative capacity whenever its action has "the
Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540-41 (1976) (noting that Congress, as both proprietor and sovereign, has
"complete power" to protect public lands and resources, including wildlife); Ideal Basic Indus., Inc.
v. Morton, 542 F.2d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 1976) (recognizing that "the Secretary of Interior has
broad plenary powers over the disposition of public lands" (citing Cameron v. United States, 252
U.S. 450, 459-64 (1920); Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 177 (1891); and
United States v. Williamson, 75 I.D. 338, 342 (1968))); see also Robert L. Glicksman & George
Cameron Coggins, Hardrock Minerals, Energy Minerals, and Other Resources on the Public
Lands: The Evolution of Federal Natural Resources Law, 33 TULSA L.J. 765, 781 (1998) (noting
that Camfield, 167 U.S. 518, and Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911), neither of which
involved mining, "confirmed that congressional Property Clause power is plenary, unlimited, and
preemptive").
492. 16 U.S.C. § 1600 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
493. 7 U.S.C. § 6912 (1994). The Secretary of Agriculture has delegated authority to
administer the national forests to the Under Secretary for Natural Resources and Environment, 7
C.F.R. § 2.20(a)(2)(ii) (2000), who has in turn delegated that power to the Chief of the Forest
Service, 7 C.F.R. § 2.60(a)(2) (2000). The Chief has delegated the authority for forest regions to
regional foresters, and for individual units of the National Forest System to the forest supervisors.
36 C.F.R. § 200.2 (1999). The Secretary may still exercise those powers which have been sub-
delegated. 7 C.F.R. § 2.12 (2000).
494. E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (directing the Secretary and the National Park Service "to
promote and regulate the use of" national parks, units and monuments); 43 U.S.C. § 1457 (1994)
(charging the Secretary "with the supervision of public business relating to the following subjects
and agencies: .. .12. Petroleum conservation. 13. Public lands, including mines"). The enactment
of FLPMA in 1976 added more specific provisions regarding public lands. See 43 U.S.C. §§
1732(b) (1994) ("In managing the public lands the Secretary shall, by regulation or otherwise, take
any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands."), 1733(a) (1994)
("The Secretary shall issue regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this Act with
respect to the management, use, and protection of the public lands, including the property located
thereon").
495. See Schoenbrod, supra note 75, at 1265-1266.
496. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1 (full faith and credit); id. § 2, cl. 1 (privileges and
immunities); id. § 3, cl. 1 (admission of states).
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purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons
... outside the Legislative Branch," whether the power to act flows from
Article I or Article IV.4 7
Moreover, along with public lands management, a handful of Article I
powers have been described as plenary in nature, including immigration,
national security and military matters, taxation, foreign trade, and relations
with American Indians.498 Whether Article I or Article IV powers are
involved, the plenary power doctrine has been held to support broad
delegations of legislative-like authority, and Congress's ability to delegate its
plenary powers to the executive branch is generally considered concomitant
with its own broad power.'
497. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501
U.S. 252, 276 (1991) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952-55 (1983)); see also Eugene R.
Gaetke, Refuting the 'Classic" Property Clause Theory, 63 N.C. L. REV. 617, 658 n.129 (1985).
In Metropolitan Washington Airports, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress must follow
constitutionally acceptable legislative procedures when it transferred federal lands to an airport
governing board. Metro. Wash. Airports, 501 U.S. at 274. Although it found that the process of
delegating power to the board violated separation of powers under Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951,
because congressmen sat on the board and maintained veto power over decisions of local
authorities, it implied that the substantive scope of the delegation at issue was acceptable:
"Congress itself can formulate the details, or it can enact general standards and assign to the
Executive Branch the responsibility for making necessary managerial decisions in conformance with
those standards." Metro. Wash. Airports, 501 U.S. at 272, 277. For dicta regarding the
constitutionality of section 204(e) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 43
U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1994), which requires the Secretary of Interior to temporarily withdraw lands at
the direction of a congressional committee, see National Wildlife Federationn v. Watt, 571 F. Supp.
1145, 1155 (D.D.C. 1983), and Pacific Legal Foundation. v. Watt, 529 F. Supp. 982, 1002 (D.
Mont. 1982).
498. See South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343 (1998) (describing
relations with American Indian tribes as a plenary power (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978))); Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 441 (1987) (citing U.S. CONST.
art. 1, § 8, cl. 14, as providing plenary power regarding "Rules for the Government and Regulation
of the Land and Naval Forces"); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 178 (1974) (citing
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 cl. 7, regarding the reporting of expenditures of appropriated funds and the
exemption of certain "secret activities" from public reporting); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S.
389, 397 (1973) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17, regarding legislation for the District of
Columbia); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) (describing immigration power as
plenary). In addition, the power to prohibit obstructions in navigable waters, United States v.
Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 424 (1940), to tax income, Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S.
188, 194 (1938), to exclude or regulate merchandise brought from foreign countries, Buttfield v.
Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 492 (1904), and to dictate "the coining of money, the establishment of
post-offices and post-roads, the declaring of war, etc.," The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 18
(1883), have been described as plenary in nature.
499. Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 769 (holding that "the Attorney General [had] validly exercised
the plenary power ... delegated to the Executive" in the immigration context); Sabin v. Berglund,
585 F.2d 955, 958 (10th Cir. 1978) (finding that Congress may delegate its plenary power over
public lands to the Secretary of Agriculture (citing Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S.
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The plenary power doctrine declares broad authority over the subject of
the power, typically insulating the action at issue from probing judicial
review; as a result, it is frequently criticized for fostering abusive
government action." However, in the Property Clause context, the
delegation of plenary power is arguably tempered by special duties regarding
public lands and resources. Executive branch officials, while having wide
latitude to make all needful rules regarding the public lands, may have a
countervailing trust-like responsibility to protect those resources on behalf of
the public.5"
The idea that governments have a "public trust" duty regarding certain
natural resources flows from ancient Roman and English law.502 The public
trust doctrine was invoked by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois
Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois"0 3 to set aside the state's disposition of
submerged lands because the sale would interfere with the public's rights to
access and enjoy Lake Michigan.5" "[S]uch property is held by the state, by
334, 336-38 (1963); and Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24, 28 (9th Cir. 1970))); see also Snaider,
supra note 128, at 107 (discussing plenary nature of immigration powers).
500. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 547 (1990); see also Frank
Pormersheim, Tribal Courts and the Federal Judiciary: Opportunities and Challenges for a
Constitutional Democracy, 58 MONT. L. REv. 313, 320 (1997) (stating that the doctrine "ratified
the absorption of Indian tribes physically and politically into the national republic .... The brutal
effect... was both to strip tribes of their constitutional status and to make their sovereignty subject
to the unconstrained (and extra-constitutional) authority of the federal government."). Professor
Pommersheim notes that the doctrine is often used for the benefit of tribal interests. Id. at 323-324.
But "of course, extensive power is like that; it can be used for good or ill." Id. at 323.
501. See Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536-38 (1911) (upholding the Forest Service's
power to protect forest reserves from trespass under a broad delegation from Congress to regulate
the use and occupancy of said reserves, and stating that "the public lands of the nation are held in
trust for the people of the whole country"); Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161,
177, 181 (1891) (stating the Secretary of Interior is a guardian of the public lands with an obligation
to "see that the law is carried out, and that none of the public domain is wasted or is disposed of to
a party not entitled to it"); see also Mansfield, supra note 284, at 47 (discussing public trust
concept as applied to public lands). Plenary power is tempered by a trust responsibility in the
Indian law context as well, although this trust relationship flows from treaties, tribal sovereignty
and "the special place of aboriginal people in international jurisprudence;" as such, it should not be
confused with the public trust concept. Wilkinson, supra note 461, at 275 & n.23.
502. See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public
Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425,
429-31 (1989).
503. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
504. Id. at 460, 464. The states hold title to the beds of navigable waterways received at
statehood under the "equal footing" doctrine. Id. at 465 (Shiras, J., dissenting); see also Pollard v.
Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 224 (1845); Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410
(1842).
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virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for the public. The ownership of the
navigable waters of the harbor and of the lands under them is a subject of
public concern to the whole people of the State . . .."'
The public trust doctrine enunciated in Illinois Central is not strictly
applicable to federal lands, given that Congress retains explicit constitutional
power to dispose of them.'t 6 In addition, inland public lands would not be
considered trust resources under the traditional formulation of the doctrine,
which is limited to navigable and tidal waters and submerged lands.
50 7
Nonetheless, the public trust doctrine has endured over time as a living,
evolving concept, and, even though the duties of federal agencies are distinct
from the duties of states, "public trust notions have charged and vitalized
public land law, particularly in the modern era. "5"8
Some of the earliest Supreme Court cases to address disputes over inland
public lands characterized the government's responsibility as a "trust." ' In
Dred Scott v. Sandford,'5 10 the Court noted that new territory is "acquired by
the General Government, as the representative and trustee of the people of
the United States, and it must therefore be held in that character for their
505. Id. at 455. The Court defined the state's power over navigable waters as "the 'jus
regium,' the right of regulating, improving and securing them for the benefit of every individual
citizen ...: 'The sovereign power, itself, therefore, cannot consistently with the principles of the
law of nature and the constitution of a well-ordered society, make a direct and absolute grant of the
waters of the State, divesting all the citizens of their common right.'" Id. at 456.
506. Given the explicit authorization in the Property Clause, and the history of public lands
management and sale, there can be no serious argument that the federal government may not
"dispose of" public lands. Wilkinson, supra note 461, at 276. Most of the nineteenth century was
marked by an active campaign to dispose of the public lands, but federal policy began to shift
toward retention during the late 1800's. While the President had withdrawn and reserved vast areas
of land for various purposes throughout the nineteenth century, the congressional shift toward
retention most likely began with the creation of Yellowstone National Park in 1872. See id. at 280
n.44. Congressional retention policy was explicitly incorporated into FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. §
1701(a)(1) (1994).
507. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 484 (1988); Ill. Cent. R.R.
Co., 146 U.S. at 435, 452-53;.
508. Wilkinson, supra note 461, at 278; see also id. at 304, 310-15. Professor Sax has
explained that the core concepts of the American trust doctrine are not limited by Roman and
English law. Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185, 192-93 (1980). Instead, the trustee's obligations should be viewed in an
evolutionary fashion "with an eye toward insulating those expectations that support social,
economic and ecological systems from aveidable destablization [sic] and disruption." Id.
509. E.g., Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911); Camfield v. United States, 167
U.S. 518, 524 (1897); Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 177-78 (1891); Pollard,
44 U.S. (How. 3) at 222; see also Wilkinson, supra note 461, at 281 n.45 (citing additional cases,
issued between 1888 and 1970, which describe the United States' role in terms of a trust).
510. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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common and equal benefit."i" Of course, the Dred Scott opinion is better
known, and justly vilified, for holding that Scott was not a citizen entitled to
invoke diversity jurisdiction, but its discussion of the public trust doctrine is
illuminating. 12
Congress has, from time to time, considered its Property Clause powers
and responsibilities to be akin to those of a trustee. 3  The strongest
congressional statement of a federal trust duty can be found in NEPA: "it is
the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable
means ... [to] fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the
environment for succeeding generations."5"4 Taken together, the complex
modem "legislative matrix" governing public lands and resources provides
fairly compelling evidence of some sort of a trust responsibility: the lands
cannot be sold except in "limited and exceptional circumstances"; 1 5 the
public resources-wildlife, watersheds, forage, minerals, timber and
aesthetics-are to be utilized, but also nurtured and sustained for future
generations; 5 6 and "the public is to play a . . . significant role in decision-
511. Id. at 448. However, the Court also noted the United States' role as a temporary
custodian of the lands, holding them until they could be sold so that new states could enter the
nation not as mere "colonies" but on equal footing with original states. Id. at 447-48; David E.
Engdahl, State and Federal Power Over Federal Property, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 283, 293-96 (1976).
512. The Court held that Mr. Scott, once enslaved in Missouri, did not enjoy one of the most
basic rights of the "people of the United States"-that to invoke the power of the courts to ensure
his own freedom. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 453-54. The Dred Scott opinion is also known
for invalidating the Missouri Compromise on grounds that it interfered with the Fifth Amendment
due process rights of citizens who owned slaves as property. Id. at 449-52. The case was
overturned by the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of privileges and immunities and equal
protection, and the Thirteenth Amendment, which ended slavery. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII;
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
513. See, e.g., The Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1994) (requiring that
wilderness areas shall be "administered for the use and enjoyment of the American people in such
manner as will leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness, and so as to
provide for the protection of these areas"); National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (stating that lands within the national park system shall be managed "to
conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for
the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the
enjoyment of future generations").
514. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1994). The provision further characterizes the trust duty as
requiring the government to "attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences." Id. But
in spite of its lofty substantive objectives, NEPA requires only procedural duties. See 42 U.S.C. §
4332(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332,
350 (1989).
515. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(l) (1994); see also Wilkinson, supra note 461, at 299.
516. See Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act (MUSYA), 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1994); National
Forest Management Act (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600, 1604(e) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); Federal
Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(7)-(8) (1994); f. Endangered
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making. "517 "The whole of these laws is greater than the sum of its parts.
The modern statutes set a tone, a context, a milieu. When read together they
require a trustee's care."518
The public trust concept has been invoked to justify the vesting of plenary
powers over public lands in executive agencies as proper recipients of broad-
sweeping congressional delegations."1 9 But along with this power comes a
duty "to protect the public domain from trespass and unlawful
appropriation."5 20 Although the exact parameters of a public trust as a duty
of care for managing public lands and resources are not defined, the concept
has great potential as a tool for measuring executive activities. Even in its
most general sense, a trust duty would prevent executive agencies from
unreasonably exploiting public resources to promote the private gain of any
particular industry or faction. 52' Equally important, the public trust doctrine
could provide a basis for the judiciary to engage in "hard look" review of
agency action, even when the statutory standards governing a particular
category of public lands or activities are relatively vague, for a protective
standard of care would be required as the default-a baseline to fill any
congressional gaps."
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)-(c) (1994) (placing duties on all federal agencies to conserve
listed species and their ecosystems).
517. Wilkinson, supra note 461, at 298-99 (discussing statutes); see e.g., National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); National Forest
Management Act (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. § 1604(d) (1994); Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(5)-(6), 1712(a) (1994).
518. Wilkinson, supra note 461, at 311-13. A counter-argument can be made that the
comprehensive array of federal statutes governing public lands curtails the operation of a common
law doctrine like the public trust. See id. at 298-99; see also Richard J. Lazarus, Changing
Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust
Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REv. 631, 633, 710-16 (1986) (arguing that the public trust ought not apply
to natural resource management, in part because it relies too heavily on the judiciary to further its
goals; as such, "the doctrine amounts to a romantic step backward toward a bygone era at a time
when we face modem problems that demand candid and honest debate on the merits, including
consideration of current social values and the latest scientific information," better served by
legislation than common law). Wilkinson concludes, however, that the public lands laws can be
supplemented with the public trust concept as a rule of statutory construction. Wilkinson, supra
note 461, at 299, 311-13.
519. See Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 534 (1911) (citing United States v. Grimaud,
220 U.S. 506, 522 (1911)).
520. Id. at 536 (quoting United States v. Beebee, 127 U.S. 338, 342 (1888)).
521. See Wilkinson, supra note 461, at 310-11 (explaining that express legislative authority
would be required to support such decisions).
522. See id. at 310-13 (arguing that the public trust doctrine could serve as a rule of
construction for public lands statutes); see also David H. Getches, Managing the Public Lands: The
Authority of the Executive to Withdraw Lands, 22 NAT. RESOURCES 1. 279, 334 (1982) (concluding
that the public trust doctrine could require courts to demand greater justification for extractive
activities on public lands).
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The doctrine has been raised in court both as a shield, to justify extensive
executive power to protect the lands and resources, and as a sword, to
prohibit agencies from allowing extractive or destructive activities on and
near public lands. Notions of public trust and stewardship powers are woven
throughout the Court's opinion in Light v. United States,", upholding Forest
Service regulations requiring that grazing only occur under permit.5" In the
Monongahela National Forest case," the court, noting the historic role of
the Forest Service as "custodian and protector" of the forest reserves,
implicitly relied on public trust concepts to construe the "broad and
ambiguous" language of the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act ("MUSYA")
as precluding even-aged management or clear-cutting. 5" In the Redwood
National Park cases, the court expressly relied on the public trust doctrine to
require affirmative action to protect park resources from external threats.527
Although the courts have not considered the public trust doctrine in the
context of a nondelegation challenge, it may mean that executive agencies
have greater latitude to prevent the destruction or impairment of public lands
and resources. 52' As a result, separation of powers is in no way offended
when an agency acts in this fashion, for the judiciary can review the action
under the Administrative Procedure Act in light of statutory objectives and
standards (generic though they may be), with the extensive history of public
lands management as the backdrop and the public trust doctrine to provide
context and fill in the gaps. In addition, so long as the decision in question is
preservation Oriented, such that resources are not irreparably damaged or
523. 220 U.S. 523 (1911).
524. Id. at 536-38; see also Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409-11
(1917) (affirming injunction against trespass on.public lands for the generation of power).
525. W. Va. Div. of Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.
1975).
526. Id. at 948, 950-55 (construing the requirements of MUSYA and the 1897 Organic Act,
16 U.S.C. § 476 (1994), which required trees to be mature, and that they be individually marked,
before harvest). This provision was repealed by NFMA, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(F), (m) (1994).
527. Sierra Club v. Dep't. of the Interior, 424 F. Supp. 172, 174-75 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Sierra
Club v. Dep't. of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Sierra Club v. Dep't. of the
Interior, 376 F. Supp. 90, 95-96 (N.D.Cal. 1974). The Sierra Club alleged that the Secretary of
the Interior had failed to protect Redwood National Park from adjacent logging operations. See
Sierra Club, 398 F. Supp. at 294. However, other courts have not been so willing to impose
affirmative trust-like duties. See Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443, 449 (D.D.C. 1980)
(holding that the Department of the Interior had no duty to take further action to protect reserved
water rights).
528. See Getches, supra note 522, at 333 (stating that "[slo long as the volume and thrust of
statutory law is directed at protection and judicious use of public lands, it is reasonable to expect
more deferential treatment of interpretations that deny development, demand caution in use, or
prefer non-damaging uses than of interpretations that err on the side of facilitating development").
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conveyed away, Congress can change course by stepping in with legislation
to specify its intentions and constrain agency discretion in a particular area.
B. Executive Withdrawals and Reservations
Withdrawals of public lands under the Antiquities Act are among the most
unconstrained exercises of executive power over public lands and resources.
Nonetheless, given the plenary nature of the Property Clause power, the
government's historic and dual roles as proprietor and sovereign, and the
countervailing notion of a public trust responsibility to temper abuses of
discretion, delegations to effectuate public lands withdrawals satisfy the first
step of a contextual Chevron-based inquiry. The presidential designation of
national monuments, however, lacks the, procedural safeguards necessary for
the meaningful application of step two-plus. Although this does not
necessarily mean that Antiquities Act decisions fail nondelegation review, it
does leave them open to criticism, albeit not as a matter of separation of
powers or federalism but as one of due process and fairness.
1. The History of Public Lands Withdrawals
Many of the earliest presidential withdrawals reserved public lands from
various disposal laws for military or American Indian reservations, bird
reserves and various other public uses, with no explicit congressional
authorization. 29 By 1867, the Supreme Court had already recognized that
"from an early period in the history of the government it has been the
practice of the President to order, from time to time, as the exigencies of the
public service required, [federal lands] to be ... set apart for public
uses. 530
In 1909, President Taft executed one of the most extensive withdrawals
ever accomplished by a President, without any specific delegation of
congressional power, by declaring over three million acres of public lands
529. Id. at 283 (citing Wheatley, Study of Withdrawals and Reservations of Public Domain
Lands 55 (rev. 1969), as "the most comprehensive source on withdrawals").
530. Grisar v. McDowell, 73 U.S. 363, 381 (1867). In Grisar, the plaintiff asserted title to
lands reserved for military purposes, claiming that he had derived title from the City of San
Francisco to lands formerly held by Mexican pueblos under the laws of Mexico. Id. at 365. The
Court rejected plaintiff's argument that public lands "could only be reserved from sale and set apart
for public purposes under the direct sanction of an act of Congress," and noted that Congress had
implicitly recognized the President's withdrawal authority through numerous enactments dating
back to 1830. Id. at 380-82.
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"off limits" to oil and gas development.5 3' In United States v. Midwest Oil
Co.,132 the Supreme Court upheld Taft's decision, finding that his authority
was implicitly allowed by Congressional acquiescence based on the
Executive's long continued practice of making withdrawals without express
statutory authority. 33 The President's national perspective and direct
accountability to the voters was specifically noted: "[he] was in a position to
know when the public interest required particular portions of the people's
lands to be" set aside. 5" Such actions did "no harm to the interest of the
public at large," given that the reservation, by denying use of the resource,
simply preserved congressional prerogatives and could therefore be subject to
legislative reversal. 35
Congress itself has validated the practice of executive withdrawal through
a variety of enactments going as far back as the early 1800's. s36 One of the
most widely used withdrawal statutes was the 1891 General Revision Act,
which authorized the President to "set apart and reserve... any part of the
public lands wholly or in part covered with timber or undergrowth, whether
of commercial value or not, as public reservations. "13 Presidents withdrew
more than 194 million acres of forest lands under this statute. 31 Congress
did not always sit quietly on the sidelines, and although repeal efforts were
generally rebuffed, presidential authority to create new reserves in six
western states was ultimately revoked. 39 Congress also passed the Pickett
Act, in part to "restrict the greater power already possessed" by the
Executive, by stating that "[tihe President may, at any time in his discretion,
temporarily withdraw from settlement, location, sale, or entry any of the
public lands ... and reserve the same for ... public purposes."' Instead
531. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 467 (1915) (citing Temporary
Petroleum Withdrawal No. 5 (1909)).
532. 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
533. Id. at 468-70.
534. Id. at 471.
535. Id.; see also Getches, supra note 522, at 287.
536. Grisar, 73 U.S. at 381 (citing statutes).
537. Ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1095 (1891).
538. Getches, supra note 522, at 286.
539. Id. (citing Ch. 2907, 34 Stat. 1271 (1907). The evening before he signed the bill into
law, President Theodore Roosevelt, with the advice of Gifford Pinchot, proclaimed 32 new forest
reserves and enlarged existing reserves in the restricted states. PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF
PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 580 (1968); Getches, supra note 522, at 286.
540. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 421, §§ 1-3, 36 Stat. 847 (1910) (emphasis added) (repealed
by Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. § 1714 (1994 & Supp. III
1997)). The Pickett Act further restricted presidential power, as withdrawals were to remain "open
to exploration, discovery, occupation, and purchase under the mining laws." Id.; 43 U.S.C. § 142
(1994).
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of restricting itself to temporary withdrawals, however, the executive branch
continued to assert that it possessed all the implied withdrawal powers it had
enjoyed prior to the Pickett Act, reserving millions of acres from disposition
under mining laws and other public lands statutes, with no judicial
curtailment.
54
'
In the Antiquities Act of 1906, Congress further delineated the
withdrawal power by authorizing the President, "in his discretion, to declare
S.. historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects
of historic or scientific interest ... to be national monuments."' 2  This
provision has served as one of the most powerful preservation tools in the
federal arsenal, and the executive branch has exercised its Antiquities Act
powers aggressively since the Act's inception, reserving vast areas of land
for hundreds of national monuments.43 President Theodore Roosevelt
utilized the Antiquities Act power almost immediately, creating the first
national monument, Devils Tower, as well as one of the largest, the Grand
Canyon National Monument, and dozens of others.'" Various congressional
members have attempted to rescind or curtail this power over the years, with
only minimal success.545
The only true inroad on Antiquities Act power was effected when, in the
wake of the Grand Teton National Monument designation, Congress forbade
the President from creating any additional monuments in Wyoming absent
express authorization.' Subsequently, when Congress enacted Federal Land
541. Getches, supra note 522, at 293-98; Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Kleppe, 441 F. Supp.
859, 861-62 (D. Wyo. 1977) (stating that even if the Pickett Act did curtail the President's implied
authority to make withdrawals, congressional acquiescence over the course of more than sixty years
had restored the power (citing 40 Op. Att'y. Gen. 73 (1941) in upholding temporary withdrawal of
three million acres of oil shale lands from appropriation)).
542. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
543. See 146 CONG. REC. S7030-7032 (daily ed. July 17, 2000) (statement of Sen. Nickles)
(listing monuments by President and total acreage). President Franklin Roosevelt designated the
greatest number of monuments (28), while Carter holds the record for amount of land withdrawn
(55,975,000 acres, mostly in Alaska). Id. at S7031. President Clinton takes second place in terms
of total acreage withdrawn (3,789,669 as of July 2000). Id. at S7031-32.
544. Proclamation No. 794, 35 Stat. 2175 (1908) (creating Grand Canyon National
Monument); Proclamation No. 658, 34 Stat. 3236 (1908) (creating Devils Tower National
Monument); Getches, supra note 522, at 302.
545. Justin James Quigley, Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument: Preservation or
Politics?, 19 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 55, 84-85, 93-96 (1999) (describing proposals to
amend or rescind the Antiquities Act); James R. Rasband, Utah's Grand Staircase: The Right Path
To Wilderness Preservation?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 483, 531-32 (1999) (describing congressional
backlash and proposed bills in the wake of the Escalante National Monument designation).
546. 16 U.S.C. § 431a (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Congress also restored some of the lands
within the Grand Teton Monument to the Teton National Forest, while merging the remainder with
the Grand Teton National Park. Id. §§ 406d-1, 482m (1994).
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Policy and Management Act ("FLPMA") in 1976, it repealed the
Executive's implied authority to make withdrawals and reservations but left
Antiquities Act powers intact.5 7  FLPMA § 1714 otherwise requires
congressional approval for withdrawals over 5,000 acres if intended to last
more than twenty years in duration."s It also specifies that notice and an
opportunity for public hearing must be provided before a new withdrawal
occurs. 49  The Secretary of Interior may, however, take immediate,
unilateral action to withdraw public lands for up to three years without public
participation or congressional approval in situations where "extraordinary
measures must be taken to preserve values that would otherwise be lost."
550
2. Judicial Treatment of Monument Designations
The courts have uniformly rejected challenges to monument designations.
In Cameron v. United States,"5' the United States brought action to eject
Ralph Cameron, a mining claimant, from a tract on the southern rim of the
Grand Canyon. 5 2  Cameron, in defense, challenged the Grand Canyon's
designation, claiming that the area was not an object of historic or scientific
interest, nor was the reservation the smallest area compatible with its proper
care and management.5 3 A unanimous Supreme Court rejected the argument
in one short paragraph.5 4 The Court noted that the presidential proclamation
had expressly determined that the canyon "is an object of unusual scientific
interest," and described it as the "greatest eroded canyon in the United
States, if not in the world .... [It] has attracted wide attention among
547. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (delegating power to the Secretary of
Interior "to make, modify, extend or revoke withdrawals but only in accordance with the provisions
and limitations of this section"); see also Getches, supra note 522, at 308, 315 (noting that
Congress, through FLPMA, intended to rein in executive withdrawal authority, even though it did
not repeal the Antiquities Act). As originally enacted, § 1714(a) expressly stated that the
President's "implied authority ... resulting from acquiescence of the Congress (United States v.
Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915)). . . [is] repealed." Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a), 90 Stat.
2744, 2792 (1976).
548. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
549. id. § 1714(b), (h) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
550. Id. § 1714(b)(2), (h), (i), (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
551. 252 U.S. 450 (1920).
552. Id. at 454.
553. Id.; Getches, supra note 522, at 303 n.131.
554. Cameron, 252 U.S. at 455-56. Cameron argued that the President had set aside the
enormous canyon simply because of it size, which, in and of itself, did not qualify the area as an
object of unusual scientific interest within the meaning of the Antiquities Act. Getches, supra note
522, at 303 n.131 (citing Brief for Appellant at 44-48). The court did not address this issue.
Cameron, 252 U.S. at 455-56.
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explorers and scientists, affords an unexampled field for geologic study,
[and] is regarded as one of the great natural wonders . . . .""' The Court
did not definitively address whether the Act authorized such a large
withdrawal," although the legislative history indicates that Congress
intended relatively small areas to be set aside as necessary to protect
archeological ruins and relics."'
A challenge to the Grand Teton designation was also rejected in Wyoming
v. Franke."'8 The presidential proclamation establishing the monument
addressed the statutory criteria in the most cursory manner: "the Jackson
Hole country . .. contains historic landmarks and other objects of historic
and scientific interest."s59 In order to satisfy the minimal standards provided
in the Act, the United States was allowed to submit evidence of historic and
scientific characteristics of the area.sw The court concluded that the
President had acted within his authority under the Antiquities Act, stating
that "if the Congress presumes to delegate its inherent authority to Executive
Departments which exercise acquisitive proclivities not actually intended, the
burden is on the Congress to pass such remedial legislation as may obviate
any injustice brought about.'561 Expressing its belief that the decision could
result in hardship and injustice to the state of Wyoming,562 the court
questioned the wisdom of the action but found that separation of powers
555. Cameron, 252 U.S. at 455-56.
556. Id.; Getches, supra note 522, at 303 n.131.
557. Getches, supra note 522, at 302 nn.124-27 (reviewing the legislative history of the Act,
during which the floor manager, Representative Lacey, assured his colleagues that, unlike the forest
reserves, "[nlot very much land" would be taken off the market as a result of the Antiquities Act,
because it would involve only the "smallest area necesstry [sic] for the care and maintenance of the
objects to be preserved ... these old objects of special interest and the Indian remains in the
pueblos of the Southwest" (citing 40 CONG. REC. 7888 (1906))); see also H.R. REP. No. 59-2224
(1905) ("The bill proposes to create small reservations reserving only so much land as may be
absolutely necessary for the preservation of these interesting relics of prehistoric times.").
Professor Getches concludes that Congress likely intended that large reservations "would become
national parks through congressional action rather than [national] monuments withdrawn under the
Antiquities Act. Getches, supra, at 490.
558. 58 F. Supp. 890 (D. Wyo. 1945).
559. Id. at 894-95 (quoting Proclamation No. 2578, 47 Stat. 731 (1943)). The Grand Teton
National Monument consisted of 221,610 acres of public lands, some of which had been donated for
park purposes by John D. Rockefeller, Jr. Proclamation No. 2578, 47 Stat. 731 (1943); Getches,
supra note 522, at 304. The evidence showed that the area included mineral deposits, important
indigenous plants, glacial formations and historic trails and camps. Franke, 58 F. Supp. at 895.
560. Franke, 58 F. Supp. at 895.
561. Id. at 896. The court added that "the power and control over and disposition of
government lands inherently rests in its Legislative branch." Id.
562. Id. at 896. The designation by President Franklin D. Roosevelt ended nearly two
decades of congressional wrangling, which was largely the result of resistance by the Wyoming
delegation. Getches, spra note 522, at 304.
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necessitated deference to the President: "For the judiciary to probe the
reasoning which underlies this Proclamation would amount to a clear
invasion of the legislative and executive domains. "563
Given the broad and relatively general criteria of the Antiquities Act, and
the charged political context of executive withdrawals, it is not surprising
that a court would be loath to second-guess a presidential determination that
national monument lands possess some historic and scientific interest, but
would instead leave it to Congress to remedy if it so chose."6 The Franke
court did suggest that "a bare stretch of sage-brush prairie . . . would
undoubtedly be ...outside the scope and purpose of the Monument Act,"
absent substantial evidence of historic or scientific objects.565 Yet if the
President were to proclaim that a particular sage-brush prairie was unique in
that it was undisturbed by grazing or mining, or that it contained indigenous
vegetation or important soil or geological features, a court would be hard
pressed to find a monument designation arbitrary and capricious, considering
the extensive amount of discretion given by the Act.5"
Nondelegation challenges to executive withdrawals have fared no better.
Reminiscent of the judicial deference given President Taft's withdrawals in
Midwest Oil, 61 in Linn Land Co. v. Udall,5 the Secretary's power to
563. Franke, 58 F. Supp. at 896 (quoting United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S.
371, 380 (1940)).
564. Courts are generally reluctant to interfere in political controversies between the
Legislature and the Executive Branch. See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. at 462, 476 (1994) (stating
that the President's exercise of discretionary powers granted by Congress "is not a matter for our
review"); George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. at 380 (holding that the exercise of presidential
discretion does not raise any reviewable question of law); Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. South Dakota,
250 U.S. 163, 184 (1919) (stating that a claim concerning "mere excess or abuse" of presidential
discretion over powers granted by Congress "involves considerations beyond the reach of judicial
power"); Franke, 58 F. Supp. at 896; cf. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 801 (1992)
(given unique constitutional position of President, congressional silence is not enough to subject
presidential decisions to Administrative Procedure Act review); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,
750 (1982) (the President's unique constitutional status distinguishes him from other executive
officials).
565. Franke, 58 F. Supp. at 895.
566. Professor Getches notes that the history of expansive interpretation of authority,
beginning with Cameron and including Congress's failure to rescind the Antiquities Act in FLPMA,
"has legitimated a broad construction." Getches, supra note 522, at 308.
567. See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 471 (1915). Although the Court
did not explicitly address separation of powers or nondelegation in Midwest Oil, it noted both that
the President was directly accountable to the public and that the government did not contend that it
had "any general authority in the disposition of the public land which the Constitution has
committed to Congress, and freely concede[d] the general proposition as to the lack of authority in
the President to deal with the laws otherwise than to see that they are faithfully executed." Id. at
505.
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classify lands as valuable for grazing, production of crops or any other use,
or to be exchanged for scrip rights, as provided in the Taylor Grazing Act
and Executive Order 6910, was found constitutional. 9 According to the
court, the relevant statutory standards should not be piecemealed or viewed
in isolation, as they "gain their vitality from the background and purposes of
the entire Act. . . " passed as part of a "general plan to protect the
Government's lands."' 7  The court further remarked that the few cases
which did find nondelegation problems, namely Schechter Poultry and
Panana Refining Co. v. Ryan, have been "questioned and seriously modified
by later United States Supreme Court decisions."'
3. Ascending the Grand Staircase
As evidenced by Linn Land and Midwest Oil, the decisions to create the
Grand Staircase-Escalante and Parashant National Monuments are less
susceptible to nondelegation challenges under the first step of the proposed
Chevron-based approach than Commerce Clause-oriented decisions, given
their unique, multi-faceted Property Clause foundation with volumes of
public lands history as their backdrop. However, the Antiquities Act lacks a
key element fundamental to the satisfaction of step two-plus. Unlike the
extensive administrative procedures afforded by the Clean Air Act," and,
for that matter, other public lands statutes like NFMA and FLPMA,573
Antiquities Act withdrawals lack procedural safeguards. There are no
formalized administrative processes required for monument designations,574
568. 255 F. Supp. 382, 387-88 (D. Or. 1966). Linn Land involved consolidated cases, see id.
at 385, one of which was reversed on other grounds, see Udall v. Battle Mountain Co., 385 F.2d
90 (9th Cir. 1967).
569. Linn Land, 255 F. Supp. at 387 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 315f and Exec. Order No. 6910,
which withdrew western public lands from settlement, location, sale or entry pursuant to the Pickett
Act of 1910, 36 Stat. 847).
570. Id. at 385. "Certainly, the Constitution does not require Congress to foresee the
countless situations to which it may wish a particular policy to be applied and to formulate specific
rules for each problem as it arises." Id. at 388.
571. Id. at 387-88 (citing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935); and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 420 (1935)). The court noted
approvingly that Professor Davis "is of the belief that neither Panama Refining or Schechter would
be followed today on the same facts." Id. (citing 1 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, §§ 2.01-. 16).
572. See supra Part I.C.2.
573. See National Forest Management Act (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. § 1600 (1994 & Supp. III
1997); Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1994).
574. Rasband, supra note 545, at 560-61 (concluding that either the Antiquities Act should be
amended to include procedural safeguards or the President should voluntarily include the public in
withdrawal decisions; "[a]chieving preservation should not come at the expense of a fair process").
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and no statutory vehicle for challenging presidential designations as arbitrary
and capricious in federal court.575
The Antiquities Act provides no regular means for members of the
interested public to receive notice of the decision-making process or to make
their views known through public hearings or the submission of public
comments.57 6 In addition, when the President designates a new national
monument, there is no requirement that environmental effects be assessed or
that alternatives be considered because NEPA does not apply to presidential
action. 5" Notably, FLPMA's withdrawal provisions, which do require
notice and an opportunity for public hearing,"'8 were enacted "to regularize
administrative practice that had in the past been used to effect withdrawals
which were 'not always in the best interest of all the people.'"' Although
the Clinton Administration has afforded some opportunities for public input
with regard to most of the recent designations," other administrations may
not be as amenable to public processes.
The lack of process is exacerbated by the lack of opportunity for judicial
review. The Administrative Procedure Act provides for review of "final
agency action," but the President is not an agency within the purview of that
Act.5"' Even if the review were allowed, courts would have little to assess
other than the presidential proclamation itself, which will routinely state that
the area being withdrawn is of scientific, historic or archeological interest. 5"
In the absence of regular pre-designation processes, opposing viewpoints are
575. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994).
576. See 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
577. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp. 1155,
1161-64 (D. Alaska 1978) (finding that NEPA does not apply to monument designations because the
President is not a federal agency).
578. See 43 U.S.C. § 1714(b), (h) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
579. Getches, supra note 522, at 318 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1163 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6175).
580. John D. Leshy, Natural Resources Policy in the Clinton Administration: A Mid-Course
Evaluation from the Inside, 25 ENVTL. L. 679, 681 (1995) (noting the Clinton Administration's
efforts to engage the public and promote "cooperative federalism"). Executive branch officials
have been criticized, however, for keeping the decision-making process for the Escalante National
Monument quiet until just a few days before the designation was announced. See Rasband, supra
note 545, at 484 n.5 (citing Tom Kenworthy, President Considers Carving Natoinal Monument out
of Utah Land, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1996, at A3 (breaking the news about possible monument
designation)).
581. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994); Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 468-470 (1994); Franklin v.
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796, 800-801 (1992).
582. See Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890, 896 (1945) (admitting, in a pre-
Administrative Procedure Act case, additional evidence of historic and scientific objects, in view of
cursory statements contained in the proclamation, and determining that the President's decision was
not arbitrary in that the statutory criteria were met).
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less likely to be publicly aired and fully considered, and the court could be
reduced to accepting post hoc rationalizations in an administrative record
compiled solely for litigation purposes." Yet, taking their cue from the
Supreme Court's opinion in Cameron, courts will rarely question the
presidential findings.'"
If the Secretary were to make the designation decision rather than the
President, the Administrative Procedure Act would allow review of the
merits of the decision.5 '0 NEPA would also apply, so the court could review
the environmental impact statement and the administrative record generated
by the NEPA process ss The authority to withdraw and reserve national
monuments has been delegated to the Secretary of Interior," and, in spite of
NEPA and other procedural requirements, the Secretary possesses a great
deal of latitude to effectuate the Antiquities Act's standards, given the Act's
loosely phrased directives. Nonetheless, designations are almost always
made by the President, likely to signify the political importance of the
decision and to avoid the constraints of NEPA and the Administrative
583. See id.
584. See Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 455-56 (1920).
585. Although the directive allowing the reservation of "historic landmarks, historic and
prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest" is rather loosely phrased,
designations are unlikely to be found wholly committed to agency discretion by law. The Act
surely sets forth enough law to apply so that judicial review could go forward. See supra notes
264-69 and accompanying text (discussing Administrative Procedure Act § 701); supra notes 291-
98 and accompanying text (discussing South Dakota v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 69 F.3d 878 (8th
Cir. 1995), cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 519 U.S. 919 (1996), where the court concluded
that a lack of judicial review under the Act, which addresses tribal lands and interests, as opposed
to public lands, contributes to a nondelegation problem).
586. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 336 (1989). Although
a few courts have held that environmentally beneficial actions do not trigger NEPA, e.g., Douglas
County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1507 (9th Cir. 1995), others refuse to recognize any such
exception, e.g., Catron County Bd. of Com'rs v. U.S., 75 F.3d 1429, 1436 (10th Cir. 1996).
587. The President's authorities to withdraw or reserve federal lands were delegated to the
Secretary of the Interior by executive order. Exec. Order No. 10,355, 17 Fed. Reg. 4831 (May
26, 1952); see 43 C.F.R. § 2300.0-3(a)(1)(iii), (2). One district court, however, has assumed,
without analysis, that because the Antiquities Act refers expressly to the President's power to
declare national monuments, "apparently this authority cannot be delegated." Alaska v. Carter,
462 F. Supp. 1155, 1159 (D. Alaska 1978). This conclusion is likely erroneous; other courts have
regularly upheld delegations to agencies even though the statutory language refers to the President's
power to take action. See Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting
that, although the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
specifically grants authority to the President, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606, that authority was delegated
to the EPA in Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (1987), and therefore the agency was
entitled to Chevron deference).
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Procedure Act, as well as FLPMA's withdrawal provisions, which
specifically speak to secretarial duties.s
Procedural safeguards could be formalized through regulations to avoid
due process concerns. Establishing regular means for public input would not
only provide the executive branch with more complete information from a
variety of perspectives, at least some of which will flow from local interests
knowledgeable about the land base in question, but it would also heighten
public acceptance of designation decisions." 9 Judicial review could then
enhance the legitimacy of the decision-making process and the ultimate
outcome, in keeping with the purposes of the second step of the proposed
approach.
As a practical matter, the executive branch will be reluctant to adopt the
suggested regulations, in part because regulations have become increasingly
difficult to promulgate."9 A substantive draw-back is that the imposition of
extensive preliminary requirements may result in fewer designations, and
less federal land ultimately placed in protective status. The cumbersome
nature of NEPA and other public processes could have a chilling effect on
executive withdrawals, and the delay caused by public involvement and other
procedural requirements may result in harm to the resources in question.
However, if extractive activities were imminent, the regulations could
include emergency procedures similar to those found in FLPMA, allowing
temporary withdrawal until public processes are complete.59 This proposal
588. See 43 U.S.C. § 1714 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp. 1155
(1978); see also Rasband, supra note 545, at 505-61 (noting that, to avoid having to comply with
NEPA, executive branch officials wanted a letter from President Clinton to Secretary Babbitt
regarding the suitability of Utah lands for designation as the Escalante National Monument).
589. See Rasband, supra note 545, at 560 (extolling the virtues of public process, and noting
that, though the Escalante National Monument may well be regarded as one of the "jewels" of our
national monument system, "like the collection of old world antiquities in the British Museum ...
[it] is forever tarnished by its method of acquisition"). Notably, the Secretary has responded to
nondelegation concerns by promulgating regulations to constrain the exercise of review, and thereby
hasten judicial review, in at least one other context. See supra notes 291-98.
590. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Law After the Counter-Reformation: Restoring
Faith in Pragmatic Government, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 689, 709 (2000) (describing legislation and
executive orders which require agencies to assess the costs and benefits of proposed and final rules,
along with the rules' impacts on federalism, small businesses, intergovernmental interests, property
rights and environmental justice). Of course, procedural requirements could be effectuated by a
legislative amendment to the Antiquities Act, see Rasband, supra note 545, at 555, and several bills
have been proposed to that effect, e.g., H.R. 1487, 106th Cong. (1999), H. REP. 106-252 (passed
the House Sept. 24, 1999); S. 729, 106th Cong. (reported by committee Aug. 25, 2000). The
labyrinthine nature of congressional processes and the risk entailed in bringing this highly
beneficial, long-standing statute up for amendment in the current political climate, with Congress
touting private property rights as one of its primary values, make regulation a better bet.
591. See 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1994 & Supp. II1 1997).
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would in many ways emulate FLPMA's withdrawal provisions, with one
critical distinction-by utilizing the Antiquities Act power, the executive
branch frees itself from FLPMA's congressional approval requirement.
Absent formalized procedural safeguards, monument designations may
implicate due process issues, 593 but they do not trigger the separation of
powers and federalism concerns raised in American Trucking and especially
evident in Schechter Poultry. As noted in Midwest Oil and, more recently,
in Brown & Williamson Tobacco, the President is acutely accountable to
political processes, and, consequently, his or her cabinet members are as
well. 5  Moreover, given the federal government's plenary power over
public lands and resources, the expectations of both state and private entities
in having a say over the use of those resources are less compelling. 595
Finally, because Antiquities Act withdrawals are preservation-oriented,
preventing extractive or destructive uses which are inconsistent with
monument designation, Congress has ample opportunity to step in and
correct any situations it determines are unfounded or improperly motivated.
But the ends do not wholly justify the means. If the executive branch,
acting through the Department of Interior, were to adopt regulations
providing for more meaningful and predictable administrative procedures,
allowing for public input and judicial review, designation decisions could
effectuate preservation objectives in a more open and publicly acceptable
way.
592. See id. § 1714(c) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
593. The concern noted here is one of fairness and public buy-in rather than constitutional law.
An analysis of whether the lack of procedures and judicial review in the public lands context
actually violates constitutional due process under the Fifth Amendment is beyond the scope of this
article. However, courts have tended to reject such claims. See Fed'! Lands Legal Consortium v.
United States, 195 F.3d 1190, 1197-1200 (10th Cir. 1999); Clouser v. Espy, 42 F.3d 1522, 1540-
41 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Linn Land Co. v. Udall, 255 F. Supp. 382, 388 (1966) (noting that,
once plaintiffs' nondelegation challenge to the withdrawal of lands under the Taylor Grazing Act
had been rejected, their due process claims must also fall "when viewed in the light of the [Property
Clause] power of the Congress and the Secretary ... to dispose of and regulate lands belonging to
the United States").
594. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291, 1330-31 (2000) (Breyer,
J., dissenting); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 471 (1915). Arguably, a lame
duck President is less accountable than one who acts during the first term, but presidential action is
likely to be constrained by the knowledge that controversial decisions will be attributed to the
President's political party regardless of timing.
595. See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 104-105 (1985) (noting that unpatented mining
claims are held with knowledge of the federal government's "substantial" regulatory power; thus,
no reasonable expectation had been impaired when Congress exercised that power by requiring that
claims be filed); United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 494 (1973) (holding that the government
need not compensate rancher for loss of value added to his fee lands by adjacent federal grazing
lands in light of clear congressional intent that grazing permits create no right, title or interest in the
federal lands).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The-revival of the nondelegation doctrine goes hand in hand with the
recent hue and cry for regulatory reform, i.e., less regulation and,
consequently, less federal interference with states' rights and private
economic interests. Yet the concerns evidenced by the D.C. Circuit in
American Trucking do not justify the resurrection of an antiquated doctrine
premised on an elusive quest for intelligible legislative nomenclature. Unless
Congress has completely side-stepped its legislative responsibility by failing
to make a fundamental policy choice and handing a "blank check" to an
executive agency, thereby abdicating-not delegating-its law-making
functions, separation of powers concerns are scarcely implicated, and the
concerns that are raised by ambiguous statutory provisions can be better
addressed through other means. In the regulatory context, reviewing courts
need not, and should not, reach constitutional issues when established
principles of administrative law provide less drastic and, in many ways,
more meaningful means to scrutinize agency action and set aside abusive or
irrational decisions.
With regard to the American Trucking controversy, although the EPA
may find itself rewriting the national ambient air quality standards
("NAAQS") or providing a more detailed explanation of its choice in the
administrative record, the Clean Air Act itself, a long-standing regulatory
statute and venerable member of the "first generation" of federal
environmental laws, should not be struck down on nondelegation grounds.
The statutory objectives and standards do not reflect an abdication of
legislative power, particularly when considered in the context of the Act as a
whole. Instead, the Act specifies policy goals and provides appropriate
legislative parameters, allowing the EPA to fill in the details within those
parameters, an activity especially well suited for an executive agency with
technical expertise in environmental quality.
The Clean Air Act and many other regulatory statutes enacted under the
Commerce Clause provide substantive law for the courts to apply in
reviewing agency action, while affording procedural safeguards to both the
regulated community and the interested public through the administrative
rulemaking process, and, ultimately, judicial review. When faced with
statutory ambiguity in this context, the court should assume that Congress
intended to delegate regulatory authority to the agency, as noted in Chevron,
but scrutinize the agency's ultimate decision using the principles of "hard
look" review, all the while conscious of the overall context of the regulation
at issue, including other constitutional ramifications. Agencies would be
then required to articulate and support their decisions based on all relevant
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legislative objectives and factors in an open and complete administrative
record. As a result, the legislative, executive, and judicial branches could
each effectuate their primary constitutional functions, and the public would
gain the assurances of impartial, reasoned and predictable regulation and
accountable decision-makers.
The merits of nondelegation arguments outside of the Commerce Clause
context should be considered in light of the source of constitutional power
giving rise to the executive decision in question. Under the first step of the
proposed approach, certain subjects may warrant heightened vigilance to
nondelegation issues, while in other areas, congressional intent to delegate
extensive powers can be presumed, and such delegations will call for less
constitutional interest. In the public lands context, Congress's explicit
Property Clause power to make all needful regulations respecting public
lands and resources includes the plenary power to delegate extensive
regulatory duties to executive agencies to manage those resources. Public
lands statutes generally do not raise the constitutional concerns evident in the
early New Deal cases-separation of powers, federalism, and due process-
nor do they have the pervasive effects on the whole economy noted in those
cases. This is especially true when the Executive implements the laws in a
protective manner, preserving options for the future. Judicial review of a
complete administrative record resulting from open and regular decision-
making processes under the second step of the proposed approach serves to
enhance reasonable and unbiased outcomes.
Under this formula, Antiquities Act withdrawals will withstand
nondelegation challenges as appropriate exercises of the Property Clause
power, but they come up short under the second step of the proposed
alternative, as they lack formalized procedural safeguards. This shortcoming
does not require invalidation on constitutional grounds, but it diminishes
public confidence in the executive action, and creates opportunities for abuse
with no judicial corrective check. As for other public lands decisions, where
Congress has provided the basic policy objectives, and opportunities for
public participation and judicial review are available, the powers and
prerogatives of all three branches remain intact and the interests of the
affected public are adequately protected.
32:941] 1049

